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WASHINGTON POST
2 November 1971

Communique Hints Softer Cuban Line

By Dusko Doder
Washington Post Staff Writer

HAVANA, Nov. 1—Cuba and the Soviet Union today made public a communique expressing their support for the leftist regimes in Chile and Peru as well as for other Latin American governments seeking political and economic independence from the United States.

The communique was interpreted by some senior Western diplomats here as indicating that Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, who ended his four-day visit to Cuba Saturday, has persuaded Premier Fidel Castro to abandon his policy of trying to export armed revolution around Latin America.

This would formally mark a major departure in Cuban policy, although some Cuban officials expressed reservations about the extent to which Havana backs Moscow's efforts to court Latin regimes regardless of their political complexion.

Published in the Cuban Communist Party newspaper Granma, the communique voiced support for Panama's demands for sovereignty over the Canal Zone, condemned the U.S. trade blockade of Cuba and "acts of piracy" and violations of Cuban airspace as well as what it termed the "illegal U.S. presence at Guantanamo" naval base.

It made only passing reference to the revolutionary situation in the hemisphere that "increasingly confronts with greater strength the domination of North American imperialism and oligarchies allied with it.

"In this context," the communique continued, "the two sides expressed their solidarity with the government of Popular Unity led by Salvador Allende in Chile and with the structural changes and transformations which the government of Peru is carrying out.

"Likewise the two parties expressed their resolute support for economic and social measures which are being applied in those Latin American countries that are moving toward the distribution of their national wealth and toward consolidation of their political and economic independence."

Cuban Economic Problems

Western diplomats here said that Castro, who is now more dependent on Soviet aid than ever before, has chosen to accept the Moscow line because of his preoccupation with domestic economic problems. The diplomats said that the Cubans have practically ceased exporting revolution in the past two years, although they were reluctant to admit it publicly.

Today's communique stands in sharp contrast to Cuba's position in 1967-1968, when Castro contended that any economic or other cooperation with non-Communist regimes in Latin America in fact helped suppress revolutionary movements in the hemisphere.

Castro was also against Communist parties' forming united fronts with nationalist groups in order to weaken America's position, a policy advocated by Moscow.

Earlier Visit

Differences on this point were such that no communique was issued after Kosygin's first visit to Cuba in 1967.

But last week the Soviet premier was received warmly, and the communique described his conversations with Castro as "friendly and cordial." It asserted that both men "affirmed their mutual aspiration to continue strengthening and developing by all means that fraternal friendship" between the two nations.

Kosygin said the Soviet Union would continue to extend aid to Cuba, but there were no specific references to any additional subsidies.

Cuba's acceptance of the Soviet line is said to have been based on a growing feeling here that Havana is slowly breaking the diplomatic isolation imposed by the United States.

Peru Link Expected

In addition to diplomatic ties with Mexico and Chile, Cuba has a large trading office in Peru. Cuban officials here said that a formal establishment of diplomatic relations between Havana and Lima is expected within the next few weeks.

Cuban sources also said that Kosygin has reassured Castro that the Soviets will make no deals with President Nixon at Cuba's expense. These sources said that Castro in turn sought to impress upon the Soviets that any such deal would be unacceptable to his regime.

While the communique was largely devoted to generalities about common positions on international issues, it made only a passing reference to China, with both sides expressing satisfaction over Peking's admission to the United Nations.

IZVESTIYA, Moscow
24 November 1971

SOLIDARITY WITH CUBA

[Text] It can be said without exaggeration that the visit to Chile of Fidel Castro, Cuban Communist Party Central Committee first secretary and Cuban Revolutionary Government prime minister, has become the number one event in the current political life of Latin America. One has only to glance at the front pages of the leading newspapers of the countries of this continent to be convinced that the warm reception accorded by the Chilean people to the emissaries of heroic Cuba is being appraised not only as a demonstration of the feelings of friendship of the two countries' peoples but also as a new stage in the relations between revolutionary Cuba and the other Latin American states. "F. Castro's visit to Chile," an editorial in the Uruguayan newspaper EL POPULAR stated, "means the final collapse of Cuba's isolation from the continent and is a stimulus for the intensification of the liberation process in these countries."

Moreover the response evoked by the visit is proof of the acknowledgement of the revolutionary merits of the Cuban people and of their successes in building the foundations of socialism, for socialism is being developed in Cuba under the difficult and complex conditions of an economic and political blockade imposed by U.S. imperialism. For more than 7 years Cuba has been artificially isolated from the other Latin American countries, and, as F. Castro has repeatedly stressed on previous occasions and during his visit, had it not been for the vast aid and support of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, Cuba would have had to face its bitterest enemy alone. But Cuba was not left alone, and all the armed provocations and interventions ended in failure.

Today it can be said that Washington's entire political policy with regard to Latin America is also suffering failure. Cuba's revolutionary influence, as the imperialist strategists had feared, has broken through the blockade and shown other countries the way to national independence and freedom from the U.S. diktat and from domination of their economies by the North American monopolies. A vivid example of this is the victory of the Popular Unity bloc in Chile, the progressive social and economic reforms in Peru, and the upsurge of the revolutionary movement in many countries of this truly turbulent continent. There is no doubt that Cuba's successes had a considerable effect on the development of events in Chile, where public opinion has always been sympathetically inclined toward the heroic island of freedom.

It is characteristic that the bourgeois press, unable to keep silent about F. Castro's visit to Chile and the interest shown by the Latin American countries in it is trying to dictate to them what policy they should pursue in the future with regard to Cuba. American newspapers and news agencies, as if by arrangement, reiterate that the Organization of American States (OAS) must "display firmness and inflexibility," in other words, ignore Cuba as hitherto. Such advice nowadays seems naive, to say the least, but the main thing is that it is useless, for everyone is well aware that throughout Latin America the movement to establish diplomatic and other relations with Cuba is broadening and many countries are already on the way to doing it, and the Cuban Government's opinion of the OAS as an obedient weapon of U.S. imperialism is widely shared.

The Soviet people follow Fidel Castro's visit to Chile with great interest. The USSR, a true friend of Cuba, has always been on its side, has done everything to support its socialist achievements, and has always rejoiced in its successes and the growth of its political prestige in the world. This is why the present visit is regarded in our country as yet another proof of the tremendous magnetic force of socialism, which is strengthening the unity of the Latin American peoples and their solidarity in the struggle against imperialism and reaction.

MIAMI HERALD
15 November 1971

Castro Out Shopping For His Soviet Masters?

By NATHAN A. HAVERSTOCK
And RICHARD C. SCHROEDER
Latin American Service

THE VISIT of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro to Chile is viewed in Washington as the start of an attempt by Cuba to forge a new anti-U.S. axis of nations in opposition to the United States.

By solidifying the ties between his government and that of Salvador Allende, his Marxist counterpart in Chile, Castro hopes to set up a base that other leftist and nationalist governments can adhere to. In the long run, his aim is to weaken the Organization of American States and to challenge U.S. leadership in the hemisphere.

Castro's brief stop in Lima, and his meeting with General Juan Velasco Alvarado, head of Peru's military junta, is interpreted as a step in this direction.

SOME authorities believe that the Soviet Union is lending its active encouragement to the Cuban initiative.

"The failure of Cuban-led guerrillas in Bolivia, and Allende's legitimate electoral victory in Chile have greatly strengthened the Soviet position . . ."

One such expert, James Theberge of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, recently noted that "The Soviet Union and Cuba are both interested in gaining allies outside of the Caribbean area — which is still generally friendly to the United States — in order to enable Cuba to break out of the diplomatic and economic blockade imposed by the OAS member states in 1964. And the Marxist government of Chile is providing such an opportunity."

Theberge emphasizes that Allende is a willing ally in the Cuban diplomatic thrust. "Allende clearly aims at establishing a broad foreign policy re-alignment in favor of Cuba, Russia and other "friendly Socialist states" against the United States, Brazil and other members of the OAS opposed to a policy change toward Cuba. The purpose is to split the OAS into antagonistic political blocks, end Cuba's political and economic isolation and enhance Communist and anti-American influence in the hemisphere."

IN RECENT months, Castro has repeatedly denounced the OAS, and has rejected all suggestions that Cuba might eventually return to active membership in the Organization. Most recently, Cuban foreign minister Raul Roa called the OAS "the colonial ministry of the U.S. State Department," and said his government would never consider reoccupying its OAS seat.

Instead, Roa suggested, a new hemisphere organization, free from U.S. domination, should be set up in the near future. Presumably, such an organization would also exclude Latin America's right-wing military governments.

It is believed by observers here that the Soviet Union is encouraging the Cuban initiative because it seems to adhere to the Soviet line that peaceful penetration of Latin America is possible. The new Cuban stance represents a sharp change in the previous Cuban support for anti-government guerilla movements in Latin America. The failure of Cuban-led guerrillas in Bolivia, and Allende's legitimate electoral victory in Chile have greatly strengthened the Soviet position in Latin America.

SOVIET influence has been rising noticeably in Chile since Allende's victory. The Soviets have offered aid for Chilean port development, and have extended a $50 million credit for the purchase of arms. Cultural missions have arrived out across the country, teaching Russian and presenting Soviet films and literature.

There has also been a marked increase in the Soviet presence in Cuba. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin toured the island last month. Cuba received a shipment of Soviet jet fighters, its first shipment of planes in four years. The Soviet naval presence has also undergone significant expansion. Some 20 to 30 deep sea fishing trawlers now operate out of Havana, from facilities developed with Russian aid funds.

The signs of rising Soviet influence are evident in several areas, according to Washington sources, but the Soviets nonetheless are expected to stay in the background during Castro's visit to Chile. A primary reason is that the trip is something of a personal triumphal tour for the Cuban Premier. He has come to South America as a celebrity and the Chilean government has mounted a celebrity's welcome.

U.S. officials are not worried, they say, by the cheering crowds and the mass enthusiasm for the bearded revolutionary. Much more serious is the intensive diplomatic campaign now being launched by Cuban and Soviet representatives, aimed at weaning away the growing number of Latin governments who show signs of disaffection for the United States.

WASHINGTON STAR
9 December 1971

CHARLES BARTLETT

Castro's Advice to the Chileans

Fidel Castro's parting word to Chile's Communist rulers was a warning: The exploiters are going to bag your revolution if you keep playing by the old rules.

The Cuban dictator put aside, in a startling farewell speech, the tactful reticence which had guided his behavior during a three-week visit to Chile. He was leaving, he said, "more radical, more extremist" than he came because he had seen how the Chilean revolutionaries are being thwarted by a mistaken deference to democratic traditions.

Anachronistic provisions of the Congress, freedom of the press are doomed by history, Castro declared, and they "exist as long as the people do not have enough strength to change them." Democracy is just a stage in the evolution of man, he said, and its institutions must crumble to make room for the new social order.

Castro's key point was that the Chilean oligarchy is wily and experienced, so much tougher than the opposition he faced in Cuba that it may manage, if democratic freedoms continue to be tolerated, to win the ideological struggle for the support of the middle classes.

Ironically, he spoke of the "brutal and barbarous forms" [illegible] day in which Chilean soldiers, acting on orders from President Allende, used guns to disperse a protest march by some 5,000 women carrying empty pots. "The fascists," Castro said, "are trying to go into the streets to win the middle classes."

Fidel is reviving an old and bitter debate over the "peaceful road" to power. His claim that force is the only alternative once angered most Chilean Communists, who saw huge differences between the cultures of Chile and Cuba. "After all," Allende remarked five years ago, "Castro took charge of a brothel."

But nevertheless, the Cuban example has consistently had an [illegible] Communists and it may be even more persuasive now that the Allende regime finds few real answers within the limits of its constitutional power to an awesome array of economic problems.

The indirect [illegible] democratic [illegible] proved to be difficult. The opposition can still be heard through the tenacity with which the Santiago newspaper, El Mercurio, is being kept alive. When the government recently moved to buy control of the newspaper's publisher, the stockholders rallied to succeed in keeping the stock in private hands.

The Marxists' attempts to take control of the University [illegible] brilliantly battled by its rector, Dr. Edgardo Boeninger, [illegible] has [illegible]

ed the sentiment necessary to force a plebiscite to determine whether the University Council will be left in Marxist Control.

The university confretemps, now a burning national issue, illustrates Allende's dilemma. His Socialist backers warn that the plebiscite will go against them so he must settle the dispute by force. But the price of the high-handedness will be widespread violence so the Communist faction of his government keeps pressing for a compromise solution.

Castro has history on his side in arguing that Marxists have never kept power by compromising with democracy. They resort always in the end to the destruction of people and institutions who challenge their claim to the loyalty of the working class.

So Chile is heading [illegible] its unavoidable crunch [illegible] of faith in its democratic traditions that will exert a heavy influence on the future of communism in many nations.

O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, Sao Paulo
24 October 1971

NOTAS E INFORMAÇÕES

Para Castro, o perigo agora vem de Moscou

Esta semana, Aleksei Kossigin, primeiro-ministro da URSS, atualmente passeando no Canadá, seguirá para Havana, atendendo um "convite da Comissão Central do Partido Comunista Cubano e do governo revolucionario de Cuba" para visitar a Ilha de Castro. Kossigin foi precedido em Havana, em setembro passado, por Vladimir Novikoff, vice-presidente do Conselho de Ministros da URSS. No fim do mês chegará a Cuba uma força-tarefa da Marinha de Guerra sovietica, formada por seis navios, entre os quais cruzadores armados com foguetes e destroieres, bem como por dois submarinos, navios anti-submarinos e um navio de abastecimento. Essa demonstração maciça do interesse dos sovieticos em Cuba confirma, por um lado, a opinião dos observadores internacionais, segundo a qual há algum tempo Moscou resolveu submeter a politica, a economia e mesmo a administração do regime castrista a seu controle direto e rigido; por outro lado, intensifica as especulações sôbre o destino politico do "chefe supremo da revolução cubana".

O jornal Tiempo, de Lima, já em maio passado divulgou rumores segundo os quais os sovieticos estariam coordenando a substituição de Fidel Castro [illegible] Rafael Rodriguez, [illegible]

[illegible] treinado em Moscou que conseguiu sobreviver aos expurgos castristas, que após 1962 dizimaram a Velha Guarda do PC cubano. As especulações também são alimentadas pelo fato de a visita de Kossigin a Havana preceder a viagem, há muito tempo planejada, de Castro ao Chile. Castro planejava pronunciar o discurso principal das comemorações do 1.o de maio em Santiago, confirmando sua imagem como o lider incontestado do movimento revolucionario da America Latina. Todavia, durante todo o mês de abril, os russos exerceram pesadas pressões sôbre o lider cubano por intermedio do Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Raul Castro e Nicolay Baybakov, vice-primeiro-ministro e presidente do GOSPLAN, que visitou Havana, para convencer Castro da conveniencia de desistir de seus planos. Um astuto lider comunista chileno, Volodia Teitelboim, explicou a Castro que sua visita ao Chile, após as viagens de Allende à Colombia, ao Equador e ao Peru, seria prejudicial à politica externa chilena, que bate na tecla do "pluralismo ideologico" e do combate às "fronteiras ideologicas". Estaria Castro sendo submetido a novas pressões para desistir da sua decisão de ir a Santiago? Não terá razões para temer sua substituição, durante a viagem, por Raul Castro ou por Carlos Rafael Rodriguez? Ou temeria ser relegado a um papel mais apagado de liderança, conforme sugerem alguns setores da extrema esquerda e [illegible]

Socialista do Salvador Allende? De qualquer forma, as especulações dos observadores internacionais sôbre a politica interna de Cuba são tão variadas e fantasiosas como as que se fazem sôbre a China. Desde 27 de setembro, Castro não apareceu em publico, nem mesmo no funeral dos que tombaram na luta contra os exilados desembarcados na noite de 12 de outubro. Esse fato estimula as especulações sôbre seu estado de saude e o declinio da sua estrela politica.

Mas o que importa é a realidade e não as especulações em torno da realidade. O fato é a crescente dependencia de Cuba do controle cada vez mais rigido e direto que sôbre ela exerce Moscou e cuja consequencia natural é a redução do papel de liderança, que, com base em seu carisma, Castro reivindica. O comunicado russo-cubano publicado no fim da visita que Raul Roa, o chanceler de Castro, fez no fim de junho a Moscou, confirma a aceleração da sovietização de Cuba, iniciada no ano de 1968. No fim de 1965, o marechal Grechko visitou a ilha, chegando com as primeiras remessas de equipamento belico pesado. Data dessa época a intensificação do treinamento das forças militares de Cuba por "conselheiros" sovieticos. A mencionada visita do ministro Baybakov, em abril, teve por objetivo colocar sob controle direto sovietico tanto a planificação quanto a produção cubana, nos Ministerios, nos institutos de pesquisa e nas instala- [illegible]

rais e tecnicos. A União Sovietica, que há anos destina a Cuba 400 milhões de dolares anuais, apenas para manter em funcionamento a sua economia, agora tem de gastar 600 milhões, simplesmente porque a produção cubana continua declinando, como a safra de açucar eloquentemente demonstra, já que este ano não alcançará nem 6 milhões de toneladas.

A esta altura, Cuba não apenas é o que sempre foi — um mostruario do malogro da produção socialista — mas também uma exposição da propria incapacidade sovietica de tornar viavel um país comunista no Hemisferio Ocidental. Os sovieticos e os demais paises socialistas da Europa Oriental simplesmente não podem mais tolerar a drenagem dos seus milhões de dolares para Cuba, incapaz de pagar dividendos economicos e politicos, especialmente a partir do momento em que Castro, frustrado em casa, na "construção da sociedade comunista", insistiu em exportar sua revolução, comprometendo a politica sovietica ortodoxa em relação à America Latina. É o que explica a decisão de Moscou de tomar em proprias mãos as rédeas do governo em Havana.

A URSS mantém aproximadamente 7.000 conselheiros militares, tecnicos e economicos em Cuba. Seu numero cresce diariamente. É o que explica a crescente impopularidade dos russos em Havana. São os unicos individuos bem vestidos na ilha. São ridicularizados pela paixão que nutrem por



câmaras fotográficas e relógios de pulso, pois usam dois ou três ao mesmo tempo. Enquanto os Estados Unidos, ignorando Cuba, não dão ensejo aos ataques histéricos que Castro costumava dirigir-lhes, entrevendo na superpotência do Norte o bode expiatório para todos os males e a justificação do seu extremismo e da austeridade econômica, a Rússia surge aos olhos cubanos como uma potência invasora, como responsável pela introdução do sistema stalinhanovista, pela militarização da produção, pelas leis drásticas do combate à "ociosidade" e à "vagabundagem" e pelo racionamento severo dos gêneros alimentícios e das roupas, idêntico ao que vigorava na década dos 30 na Rússia de Stalin.

Castro, a esta altura, já tem condições objetivas de fazer comparações úteis entre dois imperialismos. Subjetivamente, será bastante difícil para ele fazê-lo, pois optou pela Rússia. Mas, por uma ironia da História, enquanto os Estados Unidos absolutamente não planejam derrubá-lo, os russos e seus quislings em Havana já têm condições e, eventualmente, planos para substituí-lo, ou, pelo menos, privá-lo da sua auréola de chefe da revolução cubana e de esquerdismo revolucionário latino-americano.

O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, Sao Paulo
24 October 1971

SOVIETS BELIEVED READY TO DROP CASTRO

This week, Aleksey Kosygin, Premier of the USSR, currently visiting Canada, will continue on to Havana in response to an "invitation from the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party and the Cuban Revolutionary Government" in order to visit Castro's island. Kosygin was preceded to Havana, last September, by Vladimir Novikov, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR. A Soviet naval task force, consisting of six vessels, including missile-equipped cruisers and destroyers, as well as two submarines, antisubmarine vessels, and a supply ship, is scheduled to arrive in Cuba at the end of the month. This massive demonstration of Soviet interest in Cuba on the one hand confirms the opinion of international observers to the effect that Moscow some time ago decided to subject the policy, economy, and even administration of the Castro regime to its direct and rigid control; on the other hand, this event intensifies speculations as to the political destiny of the "Supreme Chief of the Cuban Revolution."

The journal Tiempo, of Lima, last May printed rumors to the effect that the Soviets were coordinating the replacement of Fidel Castro with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a Moscow-trained communist who managed to survive the Castro purges which after 1962 decimated the Old Guard of the Cuban Communist Party. Speculations have also been fed by the fact that Kosygin's visit to Havana was preceded by the long-planned visit of Castro to Chile. Castro had planned to deliver a major speech commemorating 1 May in Santiago, thus confirming his image as the undisputed leader of the revolutionary movement in Latin America. However, throughout the entire month of April, the Russians exerted heavy pressure on the Cuban leader through Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Raul Castro, and Nikolay Bayakov, vice-premier and president of the GOSPLAN (State Planning Committee of the Council of Ministers USSR), who visited Havana in an effort to persuade Castro as to the advisability of dropping his plans. An astute Chilean communist leader, Volodia Teitelboim, explained to Castro that his visit to Chile, prior to Allende's trip to Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, would be harmful to Chilean foreign policy which is caught between "ideological pluralism" and the fight on the "ideological frontiers." Will Castro be subjected to new pressures in order to get him to drop his decision to go to Santiago? Would he not perhaps have reasons to fear that he would be replaced -- during his trip -- by Raul Castro or by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez? Or would he have reason to fear that he would be relegated to a minor leadership role, in accordance with the suggestions from pro-Soviet left-wing elements in the Socialist Party of

Salvador Allende? In some way, the speculations of international observers on internal politics in Cuba are as varied and as fantastic as they were on China. Castro has not appeared in public since 27 September, not even at the funeral of those who had fallen in action against the exiles who had landed during the night of 12 October. This fact has stimulated speculations on his state of health and on the decline of his political star.

But the thing that is really important here is facts, not speculations about facts. The fact is that Cuba is increasingly dependent on the ever more rigid and direct control which Moscow exercises over it and whose natural consequence is the reduction of the leadership role which Castro claims on the basis of his charisma. The Russian-Cuban communique published at the end of the visit of Castro's Foreign Minister Raul Roa to Moscow in June confirms the acceleration of the Sovietization of Cuba which was begun in 1968. At the end of 1969, Marshal Grechko visited the island, bringing the first shipments of heavy military equipment. That was the start of the period of intensification of training for the Cuban military forces by Soviet "advisers." The previously-mentioned visit by Minister Baybakov, in April, was designed to place both Cuban planning and Cuban production directly under Soviet control, in the ministries, research institutes, as well as industrial, agricultural, and technical installations. The Soviet Union -- which for many years has been spending 400 million dollars per year on Cuba, merely to keep its economy going -- must now spend 660 million dollars simply because Cuban production continues to decline, as eloquently demonstrated by the sugar harvest which this year will not even amount to 6 million tons.

At this time, Cuba is not only what it always has been -- living demonstration of the failure of socialist production -- but it is also an exhibit of Soviet inability to make a communist country viable in the Western Hemisphere. The Soviets and the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe simply can no longer tolerate the drainage of their millions of dollars for Cuba which is incapable of paying economic and political dividends, especially the moment Castro, frustrated at home, in his "construction of the communist society," insisted on exporting his revolution, thus compromising orthodox Soviet policy toward Latin America. This is what explains Moscow's decision to take over control of the Government in Havana.

The USSR maintains approximately 7,000 military, technical, and economic advisers in Cuba. Their number keeps growing day after day. This explains the growing unpopularity of the Russians in Havana. They are the only well-dressed people on the island. They are ridiculed by their passion for cameras and wristwatches, since they carry and wear two or three at the same time. The United States ignores Cuba and pays no attention to Castro's hysterical attacks against it; in the superpower to the North, he professes to find the whipping boy for all of the evils and the justification for his extremism and for economic austerity, to the point where Russia is now an invading power in Cuban eyes, a power responsible for the introduction of the Stakhanovite system, for the militarization of production, for drastic laws against "idleness" and "loafing as well as truancy" and the severe rationing of food products and clothing -- similar to the kind that prevailed in Stalin's Russia during the decade of the thirties.

At this point, Castro already has the objective conditions with which to make useful comparisons between these two forms of imperialism. Subjectively speaking, it would be very difficult for him to make these comparisons because he opted for Russia. But, through an irony of history, while the United States absolutely is not planning to overthrow him, the Russians and their quislings in Havana already have the requirements and possibly also the plans for replacing him or, at least, depriving him of his halo as Chief of the Cuban Revolution and of Latin American revolutionary Leftism.

THE GUARDIAN
22 October 1971

CPYRGHT

Soviet warships to visit Cuba

By JONATHAN STEELE

The Soviet Union is to follow up Mr Kosygin's forthcoming visit to Cuba with some gunboat diplomacy. Tass announced yesterday that five Soviet warships will pay an official 10-day call at Havana, starting on October 31. Mr Kosygin arrives there from Canada on Tuesday.

The warships — two anti-submarine boats, two submarines, and a tanker — will be making what is the second goodwill visit by the Soviet navy to Cuba this year.

Soviet relations with Cuba have become more businesslike during the year. There are signs that the Russians are not too happy with the island's economic performance and the use to which their massive economic aid is being put.

In April and May, Mr Nikolai Baibakov, the head of the Soviet planning organisation, Gosplan, paid a long visit there and at the end of his investigations told the Cubans to become more self-sufficient. He advised them to seek less new investment from Eastern Europe and to put the capital equipment which they have already been given to better use.

He also implicitly criticised the massive diversion of effort two years ago when the island set itself a target of 10 million tons of sugar. In the end the harvest just failed to reach nine million tons. Last month Dr Castro said that next year's harvest would be even less than the six million tons achieved this year.

The 10-million-ton target revealed the country's shortage of efficient mechanised cutting and transport equipment. The latest Soviet aid agreement, signed in September, provides for Moscow to send 1,600 trailers for transporting cane and for experts to try out new cutting machines.

Mr Kosygin will now ask for a more detailed picture. Earlier this year there were rumours that the Soviet Union even wanted Fidel Castro to hand over the premiership to Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, an old and loyal Communist.

But in spite of some economic tension, which must be viewed in the light of subsidies worth about a million dollars a day that Cuba receives from Communist countries, the island's foreign policy has become much more acceptable to Moscow. The emergence of a parliamentary Marxist Government in Chile and the growth of anti-US nationalism elsewhere have been welcomed by both Havana and Moscow.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
24 October 1971

CPYRGHT

CASTRO ILL IN HOSPITAL AS RUSSIANS PUT ON PRESSURE

By BRIAN CROZIER

DR. FIDEL CASTRO is seriously ill. The Russians are taking advantage of the illness of the Cuban Prime Minister and Communist party leader to step up the pressure on his Government.

According to strong reports reaching me over the past few days Dr. Castro, who is 44, is being treated at a naval hospital in Havana for enlargement of the right bronchial tube.

Doctors treating him say that he first developed this condition after falling ill with a bronchial infection when leading his guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra in the late 1950s.

The infection was never properly treated. After years of chain-smoking and the giant cigars for which Havana is famous, short sleeps and marathon speeches, Dr. Castro now finds himself with a chronic condition.

Treatment consists of radiological therapy. No word of this has been allowed to appear in the controlled Cuban Press.

Kosygin's visit

There appears to be no unhap

piness among the Russians at the thought that Dr. Castro may have to step down because of ill-health. Indeed, they have been encouraging speculation on these lines.

This week will provide important clues to the future. Mr. Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, is to visit Havana, arriving on Tuesday.

The Russians have never been happy in their relations with the charismatic "great leader" of the Cuban revolution. He is a late, and by their standards half-baked, convert to Marxism-Leninism.

There have been many clashes between Moscow and Havana. There was one, for instance, over Dr. Castro's expulsion of the leading Moscow-line Communist, Anibal Escalante, with 40 others, from the ruling Communist party, in January, 1968.

Since then the Russians have used ruthless economic pressure to get Dr. Castro to drop his plans for fomenting rural guerrilla insurgencies all over Latin America.

Relations cool

Relations are again very cool. When Mr. Vladimir Novikoff, a Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, visited Cuba last month, no state banquet or reception was laid on for him.

The visit got bare coverage in the Press. Dr. Castro, who had not yet started his chest treatment, was not at the airport to meet the visitor, despite his high rank.

Dr. Castro did, however, take part in the acrimonious discussions that followed. The acrimony was understandable.

Mr. Novikoff arrived with a blunt demand for the reorganisation of the Cuban Government. With him he had a precise list of Soviet experts or Soviet-trained Cubans to fill anticipated vacancies after the requested transfer to lesser duties of many of Dr. Castro's closest aides.

Significantly, the man who did meet Mr. Novikoff at the airport, then escorted him everywhere he went, was Carlos Rafeal Rodríguez, now the leading Moscow-line Communist. A former member of the pre-Castro communist party (named the Popular Socialist party or P.S.P.), Señor Rodríguez has been on the ascendant since the Escalante purge nearly three years ago.

The P.S.P., in common with other Cuban Leftist organisations, was incorporated into the single ruling party, renamed the Communist party of Cuba in October, 1965.

Perhaps because of his physical weakness, Dr. Castro was said to be ready to yield to some at least of Mr. Novikoff's demands.

Meanwhile, the Soviet pressure is still mounting. Almost certainly the appearance in mid-Atlantic of a Soviet naval task force is a sign that a new exercise in Russian gunboat diplomacy is on the way.

It is believed that the task force includes a cruiser, destroyers, support ships and a couple of submarines. The timing, however, is perhaps more important than the composition of the force.

Powerful man

If it keeps up its observed speed, it ought to reach Cuba about next Sunday. If Dr. Castro's health permits him to stick to his diary plans, he will be in Chile, visiting his fellow-revolutionary, President Allende, during the Soviet naval visit.

His absence would give the Russians opportunities for political pressures which they are unlikely to neglect. But their purposes would be almost equally well served if he were still in Cuba but out of action through illness.

Past experience suggests, however, that it is probably much too early to write off Fidel Castro. A big, powerful man, he was an athlete of Olympic standard in his youth.

His robust constitution may well enable him to throw off, or contain, his bronchial condition if the years of strenuous leadership and medical neglect have not taken an excessive toll.

He has not, however, been seen in public since September 26. As he is normally constantly on view his absence has been noticed.

The visit of Mr. Kosygin is a climax to the latest Soviet pressure campaign. The news that the Soviet Prime Minister was to go to Cuba was not announced before his recent departure from Moscow but during his visit to Canada.

Much may now hinge on the answer to the question: Will Castro be at the airport to meet Kosygin?

January 1972

SHORT SUBJECTS

Moscow's Plan for South Asia. Moscow saw in the Indo-Pakistani crisis a chance to undermine India's democratic experiment in Asia, to weaken Washington's long association with India, to create a new alliance with India and weaken China, to dismember Pakistan and to do so at a time when the snow-choked passes between India and China prevented Chinese military involvement from the North. As of 16 December when India had won the battle for East Pakistan, Moscow looked to have scored some pluses from this squalid tragedy. But the story is far from over and the future may hold more hazards than triumphs.

In the Islamic world, for example, many Moslem nations see the Soviet Union's abetment of India as symptomatic of the USSR's anti-Islam policies. Some even view the Soviet approach to the Asian subcontinent as an effort to divide the Islamic world for conquest as was done at home in Turkestan. In Morocco and Jordan the press called the Soviet Union to task for making "the Indian aggression possible." In Libya, the press savagely attacked the USSR for its role in fostering the subcontinental war. Editorials in the 15 and 16 December issues of the Libyan government's official daily, Ath-Thawarah, recalled how "Russian tanks and armor went berserk" in Hungary and Czechoslovakia against those seeking "salvation from bondage to Moscow" and saw current Soviet efforts as aimed at the extermination of Moslems and Islam in Pakistan.

Even during the early days of the Indo-Pakistani war, press editorials pinpointed one of Moscow's long-range plans for South Asia: namely, influence and eventual control of Bangla Desh. The Moroccan Istiqlal Party daily L'Opinion on 7 December summed it up by saying: "In fact, the Soviet Union's use of the veto at the moment when thousands are dying as a result of war might signify that the USSR wants to gain time for India and eliminate the possibility of a cease fire halting the advance of Indian troops in East Pakistan and make impossible any intervention before establishment of a separatist government. By its support, the USSR has not lost sight of the ideological conflict it has with Islam nor of the advantages which the Communist Party might draw from a new regime in Dacca."

A foretaste of what is in the offing for India is evident in Soviet demands that any Bangla Desh government include the Communist Party --- a party so impotent that its legal front (the National Awami Party) wisely withdrew from the 1970 elections rather than suffer an embarrassing total election defeat at the hands of the moderate Awami League.

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Czechoslovakia's "Consolidation" Election. When the Soviets installed Gustav Husak to replace Alexander Dubcek as head of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in April 1969, the euphemism "normalization" was used to describe the Soviet program for reestablishment of repressive controls over the whole Czech population. Last August under the catchword "consolidation," Husak called for a new stage in pressuring Czechoslovakia back into her role of a subservient, orthodox satellite of the USSR. (See the attached analysis by Ota Sik, chief architect of Dubcek's plans for economic reform, now living in exile in Switzerland). Basically, "consolidation" may be regarded as a systematic effort by the current Czechoslovak leadership to wipe out every remaining vestige of non-conformity within the Party as well as outside of it. To this end, vast purges have been conducted in the Party and, with a view toward the elections which took place 26-27 November 1971 (three years overdue), a careful screening of all unpurged candidates for electoral office has taken place. One, and only one, candidate was chosen for each of the more than 200,000 electoral posts (to the federal legislature, the national councils, and regional, district, and local national committees), leaving voters no choice.

Fearing both disruptive activities and passive resistance (refusal to vote) on the part of a hostile population, the Czech regime mounted a vast propaganda campaign to get out the vote but did not permit candidates to appear in person to make campaign speeches (in fact, in this strange "election," no list of candidates was published so that it was not known for some time who was on the ballot, or therefore who the new officeholders were!).

The electoral results were a foregone conclusion: almost 100% in favor of the single government list of candidates. The government claimed that 99.45% of the electorate participated, but admitted at the same time that there were "isolated negative phenomena and attempts at disruption, especially during the first day of the election." Internal opposition groups, which had called for boycotting the elections as a means of protest, estimate that 5% of the electorate (roughly 500,000) abstained and that additional hundreds of thousands cast invalid ballots.

Government claims of a nearly unanimous vote are as good a symbol as any for the full restoration of old-fashioned monolithic control by the Communist regime, exactly like the Soviet, Bulgarian, and Albanian regimes, which have not a flicker of individuality.

Even in this dark situation, the Czech people's sense of humor allows the presumption that they are not in complete despair. The favorite story circulating before the elections was that they had to be postponed because the results of the election had been stolen from Husak's office!

* * * * * *

Uruguay Rejects Leftist Election Bid. In spite of economic stress and the threat of terrorist action by urban guerrillas, the Uruguayan voters, among the most literate and sophisticated in Latin America, made clear their choice in the election of 28 November, of a democratic system with their two traditional parties over a leftist coalition backing a single presidential candidate, similar to the one now in power in Chile. The Frente Amplio or Broad Front, made up of Communists, Socialists, radical Catholics and others, received less than twenty per cent of the vote and ran a poor third to the Colorado and National parties. It therefore raises some doubts about the wide-spread idea that Marxist-dominated coalitions are the wave of the future in Latin America. Nevertheless, the coalition did cut into the votes usually won by the two major Uruguayan parties, and this should serve as a warning to the present moderate leadership of the country that economic reform is an urgent priority, together with more effective national security against the terrorist actions of the Tupamaros.

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The Italian Communists and Europe. The latest initiative in the perennial Italian Communist Party (PCI) quest for respectability and influence with the European left was a PCI-sponsored meeting to discuss the Communist role in Europe (Rome, 23-25 November). This time, however, the Italian comrades departed from their usual practice of inviting only sympathetic individuals from East and West Europe and sent invitations to the parties as such. As a result, in addition to the Communist faithful from East and West Europe, the meeting was attended by members of several Italian parties (including the socialists and the left wing of the Christian Democrats) as well as by the heads of two large government-controlled Italian commercial enterprises (ENI and IRI). Almost all European socialist parties sent their regrets (including the German SPD, the British Labor Party and the Belgian socialists); however, a representative of the French PSU and the Dutch Labor Party attended and addressed the meeting.

In addition to genuine concern over its role in a changing Europe, the Italian Communist Party in the past has also used this theme to enhance the PCI's moderate and forward-looking image and as part of its effort to entice European leftist parties into joint action programs. Giorgio Amendola, PCI Politburo member and head of the PCI delegation, urged West European communists to face up to the "reality" of the European Community and stressed the need for active Communist participation.

He proposed a Europe "from the Urals to the Atlantic and from the North Sea to the Mediterranean," in which the Economic Community and CEMA, its Eastern counterpart, would both be represented as part of a pan-European association of states. Other Italian Communist speakers stressed the desirability of a Europe wide labor movement to combat the "Europe of the monopolies" - another favorite theme.

The CPSU representative, reflecting Moscow's distaste for the immediate subject of the meeting, ignored its basic theme completely and instead used the forum to put in another plug for a conference on European security and detente. The French Communist representative, Jacques Kahn, member of the economic bureau of the French Communist Party and an editor of l'Humanite, supported the Italian line cautiously and with evident reservations, while echoing the Soviet call for a pan-European conference as the "indispensable prelude to active cooperation among the peoples of all Europe." The British CP delegate, for his part, flatly opposed Communist participation in the European Community.

One of the more original contributions to the discussion came from Gilles Martinet of the French PSU. Speaking without the customary rhetoric, Martinet contrasted the theoretical objectives proposed by the Italian comrades with reality and noted: "...It is necessary to state unequivocally that on both the economic and political levels, the experience of the 'socialist' countries has been negative to the extent that East Europe has been subjected to Soviet influence." In this regard, he cited the example of Czechoslovakia. Referring to Amendola's concept of a Europe converging "from the Atlantic to the Urals," the French socialist called the definition vague and added: "Nobody believes in such a Europe, neither the socialists nor the Soviet Union. The 20th CPSU Congress (Khrushchev's exposé of Stalin) opened up the possibility of such a Europe; however today the hope of achieving it in the near future is very small."

Although the Italian Communists were actually disappointed at the lack of socialist participation in the meeting, they made a virtue of necessity and are treating the get-together as a rare achievement. Thus, the party organ, l'Unita, referred to the meeting as "a useful confrontation of positions concerning Europe, which included critical and discordant opinions." The paper also promised that "Italian communists will evaluate attentively all points which have emerged in this broad, civilized and passionate debate among members of various parties and movements on the problems of European unity."

Despite transparent PCI efforts to placate all shades of opinion represented at the meeting, it is doubtful that this "civilized and passionate debate" (read: total disagreement) did much to advance PCI aims. The European socialists, accustomed to the anodyne prescriptions of the Italian comrades, are unlikely to succumb to the latest pleas for united action, particularly when the Communist parties of East Europe would also be involved.

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South Korea is Setting an Example. The Seoul government has just approved construction of a $60 million shipyard capable of turning out five large oil tankers annually. Loans totalling $50 million are being extended to South Korea's Kyundai Construction Company by Confei of Spain, Barclays Bank of Britain, Ferrostaal and Kirchafeld of West Germany and the Banque de Suez of France. The enthusiasm of such a variety of foreign investors for the South Korean economy appears well founded, for by all accounts Seoul will close out her present three-year economic plan in December 1971 with one of the most impressive records yet put forward by the developing nations.

Since the early 1960's the South Korean economy has grown at an average real rate of about 10 percent annually with exports increasing at the astonishing pace of some 40 percent annually. The ROK Gross National Product reached $8.2 billion last year, an estimated two and one-half times that of the northern half of the divided Korean peninsula. Experts claim that until Pyongyang is willing to forego its concentration on the USSR and Communist China as major trading customers, the sizeable economic gap will surely remain.

In the meantime, South Korea continues to attract private capital investment from the free world. Her rapid growth, low labor costs, political stability and liberal investment laws are pulling in capital this year even more rapidly than last year. However, Seoul is not permitting her economy to go unharnessed simply because the economic plan for 1969-1971 was such a success. Her new economic plan, which is geared to put South Korean growth on a sounder footing, is concentrating on the promotion of balanced development rather than emphasizing export expansion. Economic experts are predicting that this will keep the South Korean economy on an even keel through the international adjustment period which must follow in the wake of dramatic changes in the trade policies of the U.S. and Japan.

What will happen to North Korea's somewhat shakier economy during this adjustment period is harder to predict. There have been indications recently that the regime is looking beyond its Communist trading partners for greener pastures. If Pyongyang were willing to take a lesson from its neighbor to the immediate south instead of those to the north, a cure for its disease, generally known as "flabby economy," might be faster in coming.

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Get Out of My Cabbage Patch! Hanoi's somewhat improbable three year campaign (1969-1971) to put glamor and punch into the collective farm system in rural North Vietnam has, so to speak, come a cropper. From the very beginning, as the leadership went through the usual gyrations to prepare an unenthusiastic population for an unpopular campaign, there were signs that it would not work. The carrot and stick approach, which offered the workers dubious incentives laced with quotas and restrictions, were immediately viewed with suspicion by the workers, who have since bent every effort to get round the regime. Now, as the three year campaign winds up, North Vietnamese party and state media are beginning to reflect the regime's suspicion that the so-called "collective mode of work" has not caught on. Among media complaints have been "misappropriation and waste of cultivatable land," "too few hours spent by the North Vietnamese workers in collective labor," "disregard 'on all sides of the peoples' duties to the state" and "corruption throughout the ranks."

Regime indignation focuses on the propensity of farm workers to increase their private plots at the expense of the collective lands. Official spokesmen commenting on this tendency appear, oddly enough, to be surprised that most of the agricultural workers were not satisfied with the statutory five percent allocated for private plots. Nhan Dan seemed shocked that "some citizens have even encroached on the ricefields of the collectives to dig ponds and to create private gardens." The Hanoi youth newspaper Tien Phong told its readers about one enterprising young collective member who had extended his original plot four times and when apprehended, was "growing his own fruit trees and had harvested nearly a ton of paddy from his own land." Hanoi Moi, the capital's daily, pointed out sternly from its urban vantage point, that the entire rural situation shows a "lack of unified guidance and spirit of responsibility" and reminded the grasping farm workers that "in a country where only 12 percent of the total acreage is cultivatable, an inch of land should be considered worth an ounce of gold."

The regime's concern is well-founded. North Vietnam is basically an agrarian subsistence economy with little export potential and few sources of domestic development capital. Failure of her collective program would put her into even deeper debt to the Soviet Union and China (already furnishing her with such staples as flour and rice). This dependence on the largesse of Moscow and Peking is no source of satisfaction to Hanoi's leadership. In recent months no less a personage than Deputy Prime Minister Do Muoi pointed out in the party's theoretical journal Hoc Tap that "the tendency to rely on aid from the Socialist camp or to solicit loans to satisfy national needs is erroneous." But how can pleas from a distant, little understood regime compare in appeal with the moonlight vista of an unguarded section of the collectives' cabbage patch?

WASHINGTON POST
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Czech Vote Seen Consolidating Husak Regime

By Richard Homan
Special to The Washington Post

VIENNA, Nov. 28—Czechoslovakia held its first general elections in seven years this weekend, three years late and in an atmosphere of restriction and Communist Party control that contrasted sharply with recent elections in other Eastern European nations.

Today, the regime of party leader Gustav Husak said that the election, in which 99.45 per cent of the 10.3 million eligible voters reportedly participated, had achieved its purpose of erasing the last vestiges of the 1968 liberal reforms attempted by Alexander Dubcek.

CTK, the official Czechoslovak news agency, said 99.8 per cent of the votes supported the official slate.

The results of the apparently peaceful election were interpreted in Czechoslovakia and in the West as a successful consolidation of the mechanisms of government, from the national congress to local administrative bodies, by Husak, who took control of the party less than a year after Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

In a campaign to blunt the effect of expected disruptive activities, Czechoslovakia radio and press had begun predicting them as early as last July. But the 24-hour election period, from Friday afternoon to Saturday afternoon, was peaceful, according to reports received here, with only scattered antiregime incidents.

At stake in the elections, the first since 1964, were 700 seats in the federal and regional Czech and Slovak legislatures and 200,000 positions on local governing boards.

A statement by Czechoslovakia's Communist Party central committee tonight called the election "a spontaneous plebiscite" of confidence in the party's policies.

Defense Minister Martin Dzur told the Czechoslovak armed forces today that "an absolute majority of the Czechoslovak citizens have clearly shown on whose side they stand." He interpreted the outcome as, among other things, a vote of support for Warsaw Pact policies.

The elections, originally scheduled for 1968 and postponed first by Dubcek and later by Husak, were conducted under new procedures adopted by the Husak regime earlier this year.

They provide for only one candidate for each office, unlike recent elections in Hungary, for example, where voters had a choice of approved candidates for each position.

The current Czechoslovak election procedures are even more restrictive than those adopted by the regime of Antonin Novotny in 1967, which Dubcek intended to liberalize before holding elections. Novotny would have had candidates present themselves publicly before campaign rallies. Under Husak's procedures, there were no public appearances and, in fact, names of many of the candidates still have not been made public.

"The list (of those elected) will be announced in the course of this week," CTK said today.

The Czechoslovak candidates were selected by the National Front, the party-controlled umbrella organization of party, labor, youth and other mass organizations. A year ago, to make clear his authority over the National Front, Husak removed its chairman and installed himself in the job.

Less than two weeks before the election, the regime moved to cut off expected Roman Catholic opposition by establishing "Pacem in Terris," a federal association of Catholic clergy that in turn is a consolidation of two groups formed earlier this year in opposition to the Vatican and the Czechoslovak Bishops Conference.

In its initial session, Pacem in Terris adopted a statement, according to CTK, "stressing that Catholic believers will contribute to making the election a real manifestation of moral and political unity of Czechoslovak people represented by the National Front." By doing this, the statement said, the Catholic voters "will express approval of the program of the National Front, which complies with the principles of Christian morals, love for one's fellow citizens and social justice."

The election, according to observers here, is the culmination of what Czechoslovakia calls the "consolidation" of the Communist Party after the ouster of Dubcek's regime.

A year-long purge of party ranks in 1969 was followed by a series of party plenums and a congress that, in effect, cleared the slate for Husak's regime and put the party chief clearly at the head of the party and government officials installed after the Soviet-led occupation.

"We can say today," Husak told party workers a few days before this weekend's election, "that Czechoslovakia is a politically and economically consolidated state in which the rule of law is effective, in which certainty and calm are insured, and we can now occupy ourselves with our future . . . This is the end of this stage of

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA UNDER SOVIET PRESSURE

by Professor Ota Sik, Basel

In what follows we give space to reflections by Professor Ota Sik, the leading initiator of the Czechoslovak reform movement, on the present situation in Czechoslovakia.

At the end of November, elections will be held in Czechoslovakia; they are supposed to "prove" the "consolidation" of political and economic life in Czechoslovakia. The campaign, which is oriented toward this goal, was opened with Husak's speech on 29 August in Straznice. The emulation of Novotny-era tactics cannot be overlooked. The necessities of an efficient organization of the economy are "replaced" again and again by the Eastern rulers with political appeals to the population to increase achievements at work. The present situation in Czechoslovakia shows, in a tragi-comic way, where a regime ends up when it assumes the political and ideological defense of an anachronistic system which was, in addition, forced on Czechoslovakia by a foreign power.

From Novotny To Husak

It would by no means be very difficult to documentarily prove the political parallels between Novotny and Husak. Novotny constantly oscillated between emotional appeals, threats, and persecutions, without however thereby succeeding in overcoming the weaknesses of the system. Rather, this policy led to a constantly sinking standard of living of the population because it could not attack the problems at their source.

In 1971, Husak is again following in the tracks of this same policy. With a diction hardly changed from old times, he recently stated that "Also in the sphere of the standard of living we will, in the course of five years, solve, step by step, urgent problems of the workers. The precondition for this is, of course, the development of intensified work initiative.... Bourgeois society had, and continues to have, an interest in the concealment and disguising of the weaknesses of its system. It does not want millions of workers to see through the exploitive regime of the ruling class. We have other interests. We have an interest in removing and overcoming weaknesses and disorders wherever they occur.... And there are enough of them; there are enough lackadaisical workers, there is enough disorder; there are enough matters which have to be improved and removed. People from all parts of the republic write and state that 'You up there perhaps have good intentions or speak well, but you should once take a look around in our village, in our city.' And they list concrete weaknesses which occur where they live." (G. Husak, Speech in Straznice, Rude Pravo, 30 July 1971.)

methods have not changed in the meantime. Of course, Husak now has to proclaim this thesis after the experiences of the Prague Springtime, that is to say after an event which caused everyone to see the actual weaknesses of the system. His point of departure has become more difficult; it causes his efforts to become a farce in the public eye.

Naturally the majority of the political representatives have long known that the central and directive-based planning system is not in a position to bring about a qualitatively higher grade, more valuable, and structurally flexible development of production, one which could guarantee an increase in individual standard of living, which is the case with a market economy. It has been known for a long time that the workers cannot, with increased work enthusiasm alone, make up for weaknesses in the system -- outdated production techniques, unsatisfactory delivery of materials, losses from production which does not reflect consumer demands and from unsuitable investment policies, increases in the amount of uncompleted investments, terms of trade in foreign countries which get worse and worse. Increased work enthusiasm does not help in such a situation.

Distorted Reform Policies

The science of economics in Czechoslovakia has long exposed the connections between individual achievements and those of collectives to the weaknesses of the system. It has been unambiguously shown that the economic processes in a maturing economy cannot be governed by any central planning apparatus, no matter how it is structured, not even with the help of the most modern computers. It has been proved that only with the help of the market mechanism, in spite of its weaknesses and imperfections, can the extremely complicated processes within a highly developed industrial economy be harmonized. Also a socialist society may not negate market relations if it is to maintain its functional ability and proficiency.

During the last years of the Novotny regime, Husak was an enthusiastic supporter of those reforms which were based on a planned regulation of the market relationships. To be sure, he did not understand the economic problems which are hidden behind the reforms, but he recognized and supported the struggle for the consistent realization of the reforms, which intensified more and more into a political struggle. Naturally he saw in the reforms above all the preconditions for his own political career. He therefore also tried to make political capital from them.

But Husak had obviously never comprehended the inner relationships of the reform and also not sincerely accepted them, because after the fall of Novotny he again turned into a centralist of a Stalinist cast.

In the meantime, the reforms and the reformers made still other enemies, as, above all, the Planning Office and the central ministries, which feared their liquidation as a result of this development. They chose the tactic of a drawn out delay in realizing the reforms, which was not difficult for them since the party leadership had given responsibility for the introduction of

the reforms into practice to the central state apparatus. It was asserted that first, with the help of planned structural production changes and price increases, market balance was to be achieved before the enterprises could be exposed to the market relations. By means of this clever course of argumentation, the planning apparatus attempted, along with other goals, to discredit the reforms in the eyes of the population. The reformers led a hard struggle against this demagogy. In many proclamations, articles, and polemics they attempted to expose the hypocrisy of this tactic and the fragility of its theoretical foundation. In essence it was a struggle against so-called "controlled" inflation. It seems grotesque when Czechoslovak propaganda today represents me personally as the defender of "controlled" inflation, although my stand against this theory of the Planning Office, and even my active opposition to these tendencies in the meeting of the central committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on 3 May 1967, are known facts.

What Did The Reformers Want

In the last analysis it was a question of arousing the understanding in the population for the idea that the discrepancy between salary developments and the production of consumer goods as well as services was the consequence of a false investment policy. A change in this development would have required a relative reduction in investments (measured by proportion of national income) while at the same time increasing market pressure on the enterprises in order to achieve a more rapid development of quality, of technical innovations, of balancing production to market demand, and of economical operation. It was a question of increasing the effectiveness of investments. The reformers had worked out a program of gradually eliminating the system of central control and of gradually increasing market price, competitive pressure, and the influence of world market prices on the enterprises. They knew that domestic production could not suddenly be exposed to market pressure.

The politicians, interested in the maintenance of the central planning system because they saw in it a guarantee of their political positions, had identified themselves with the argumentation of the Planning Office both before and after Novotny's fall. The struggle between the Planning Office and the reformers during the months of the Prague Springtime about these reform problems, which was in reality a struggle for the preservation or the modification of the Stalinist economic system, resulted in a schism in the political camp. Even a great number of those politicians who fought against Novotny because of personal desires for power, but who never considered a systematic change in the system, began to detach themselves from the reformers after Novotny's overthrow. Since the reform suggestions found strong and constantly growing support within the population, these politicians feared the exposure of their anti-reform posture. Husak also belonged to these wavering figures. To counter this maneuvering, the reformers demanded the elimination of secret cabinet politics.

Omnipresent Soviets

After the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Husak had the great "advantage" of being bearable to the Soviets because of his political past. For the realization of their goals he was more useful to them than were the actual collaborateurs. Naturally Husak had to win the trust of the Soviets by carrying out the demanded cadre changes and the elimination of all reform measures. Dependable Stalinists were placed at his side.

Husak was thereby again forced onto the line of his personally so hated predecessor. As in the fifties, he had to persecute communists and non-communists, and, just as in former times, invent "antisocialist counterrevolutionary conspiracies."

The parallel to Novotny cannot be overlooked. Here is an example: In 1954 Husak was sentenced to life-long imprisonment after severe torture and an invented accusation "of an attempt to destroy the independence and unity of the republic and its people's-democratic system. At the 10th Party Congress (1954) Novotny emphasized in a report that "What all the bearers of bourgeois nationalism are capable of was shown by the recently conducted trial in Bratislava against Husak and his accomplices. ...they were exposed as destroyers of the republic. They have caused an enormous amount of damage in the economy and in other realms of society. By means of nationalistic solutions they wanted to conceal their actual goals -- return to the old capitalist conditions. It was their goal to destroy the republic, to play off the brotherly nations of the Czechs and the Slovaks against each other, to alienate the other nations which live in Slovakia from the Slovak people, so that the bourgeoisie can reap profits from this animosity." (Rude Pravo, 12 June 1954).

In 1971 Husak accused people whom he knew did not want to turn developments back to capitalism, saying they were "trying to destroy, to splinter, our society, to tear it out of the socialist camp" (Speech of 30 August 1971). He characterized them as counterrevolutionaries who were under the same power which was once used to motivate his own sentencing. He let loose the same antisemitic wave which accompanied the trial against Slansky and the trial against the "bourgeois nationalists" in 1954. The methods have not changed!

It is of course true that the penalties after the Prague Springtime were not so severe in comparison with those of the fifties. But this makes them by no means less effective because they extend to the destruction of the material foundations of existence of those persecuted. From the point of view of "purposes and goals" of these political persecutions, there is no difference to be seen as compared with former times. The elimination of "dangerous" people is just as effective today as previously. Whoever does not subordinate himself to the goals of the Soviet rulers has to count on his political removal and punishment sooner or later. It is an irony of fate that Husak, who once fell into disgrace because he attempted to bring about a modification of party policies suited to the specific Slovak conditions, and was severely punished for this, himself appears in the role of the punisher today.

It is a reflection of the "logic" of this development that everyone who once began with serving political rulers who only used the designation "socialism" as a pretence for their power-political goals has to serve them forever, up until his own political end. As long as he continues to carry out the policies which reflect the foreign interests, he can sit in "attractive" political armchairs. As soon as he does something independently, even if only once, he has to count on his political downfall. In a speech, Husak announced, as Novotny had done innumerable times before him, that "Those who do not fill the bill as far as work or morals are concerned, cannot have responsible functions in a socialist society." Who does not think of "Mirror, mirror on the wall ..." here?

Manipulated Elections

Everyone knows that cadre politics always was, and will continue to be, the decisive instrument of the party apparatus for the control of all spheres of social and economic life. In accordance with the selection criteria of the party apparatus at the center, in the Bezirks, and Kreises, all important and leading functions are filled with obedient and devoted cadres. Not only the realization of all directives and regulations of the party is thereby "assured" but at the same time the power base of the party secretaries is guaranteed. Every technical or public-ethical point of view must yield to these "personnel politics." For this reason the "enterprise councils of the workers," that is to say the representatives of the workers in the individual enterprises, who took over the control and selection of leading cadres in the economy during the Prague Springtime, also had to disappear because they endangered the manipulation of cadre appointment by the party apparatus.

The elections in the representative political organs were, and continue to be today, a truly grotesque farce. They have nothing in common with true elections. The Soviet regime tried from the very beginning to preserve the appearance that it had the support of the entire working population. In the course of time, the Soviets worked out a practice of politically completely coordinated and in all details manipulated "elections." In the meantime, the whole world, and also the domestic population, saw through the formalism of this procedure. But it is a part of the bureaucratic character of this regime that the formalistic is considered the essential. The system has become completely petrified in bureaucratic formalism. True elections are dismissed as "bourgeois formalities"!

It is to be expected that in spite of all manipulations and falsifications of the elections in Czechoslovakia, many people will express their protest against the regime through their absence from elections or through negative ballots. Every protest action, even if kept secret or suppressed by the regime, has significance as a component of an intensifying struggle against the regime. Only the struggle for liberation against socialistically-disguised tyranny can be the orientation of the Czech and Slovak people.

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Die Tschechoslowakei unter sowjetischem Druck

Die Reformer auf der Anklagebank

Von Prof. Ota Sik, Basel

Wir geben im folgenden einer Betrachtung von Prof. Ota Sik, dem maßgeblichen Initianten des tschechischen Reformkurses, zur gegenwärtigen Lage in der Tschechoslowakei Raum.

Ende November werden in der CSSR *Wahlen* durchgeführt; sie sollen die «Konsolidierung» des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Lebens in der Tschechoslowakei «beweisen». Die auf dieses Ziel ausgerichtete Kampagne wurde mit der Rede von Husak am 29. August in Straznice eröffnet. Die Anlehnung in der Taktik an die Novotny-Aera ist nicht zu übersehen. Die Notwendigkeiten einer rationellen Organisation der Wirtschaft werden von den östlichen Machthabern immer wieder durch *politische Aufrufe* an die Bevölkerung zur Steigerung der Arbeitsleistung «ersetzt». Die heutige Situation in der Tschechoslowakei zeigt in tragikomischer Weise, wohin ein Regime gerät, das die politische und ideologische Verteidigung eines anachronistischen Systems auf sich nimmt, das der CSSR zudem von einer fremden Macht aufgezwungen wurde.

Von Novotny zu Husak

Es wäre keineswegs sehr schwierig, die politischen Parallelen zwischen Novotny und Husak dokumentarisch nachzuweisen. Novotny schwankte ständig zwischen pathetischen Appellen, Drohungen und Verfolgungen, ohne daß es aber gelungen wäre, damit die Systemmängel zu überwinden. Diese Politik führte vielmehr, weil sie die Probleme nicht an der Wurzel anpacken konnte, zu einem ständig *sinkenden Lebensstandard* der Bevölkerung.

Husak folgt im Jahre 1971 wieder den Spuren derselben Politik. Mit einer gegenüber den alten Zeiten kaum veränderten Diktion hielt er kürzlich fest: «Auch in der Sphäre des Lebensniveaus werden wir im Laufe von fünf Jahren Schritt um Schritt dringende Fragen der Werktätigen lösen. Die Voraussetzung dazu ist natürlich die Entwicklung einer verstärkten *Arbeitsinitiative* ... Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft hatte und hat weiterhin Interesse an der Verdeckung und Maskierung der Mängel ihres Systems. Sie will nicht, daß Millionen von Werktätigen das ausbeuterische Regime der regierenden Klasse durchschauen. Wir haben *andere* Interessen. Wir haben ein Interesse, Mängel und Unordnungen, wo immer diese eintreten, zu beseitigen und zu überwinden ... Und solche gibt es genug; es gibt genug Schlendriane, genug Unordnung, es gibt genug Sachen, die verbessert und beseitigt werden müssen. Es schreiben Menschen aus allen Teilen der Republik und sagen: „Ihr dort oben meint es vielleicht gut oder sprecht hübsch, aber Ihr solltet einmal in unser Dorf, in unsere Stadt schauen." Und sie führen konkrete Mängel an, welche bei ihnen auftreten.» (G. Husak, Rede in Straznice, RP, 30. 7. 71.)

Diese Rhetorik war schon in den fünfziger und sechziger Jahren gebräuchlich! Die Methoden haben sich in der Zwischenzeit nicht geändert. Allerdings muß Husak diese These nun nach den Erfahrungen des *Prager Frühlings* verkünden, nach einem Ereignis also, das jedermann die eigentlichen Systemmängel offenbar werden ließ. Seine Ausgangslage ist *schwieriger* geworden; sie läßt seine Bemühungen in der Oeffentlichkeit zur Farce werden.

Selbstverständlich weiß die Mehrheit der politischen Repräsentanten längst, daß das zentrale und auf Direktiven beruhende Planungssystem nicht imstande ist, eine qualitativ höherwertige, strukturell flexible Produktionsentwicklung, die eine individuelle Wohlstandssteigerung garantieren könnte, zustande zu bringen, wie das für die Marktwirtschaft zutrifft. Es ist längst bekannt, daß die Arbeiter die Systemmängel — veraltete Technik in der Produktion, unzufriedenstellende Zulieferung von Materialien, Verluste aus nicht konsumnahen Produktionen, aus einer unzweckmäßigen Investitionspolitik, Anwachsen des Bestandes an nicht vollendeten Investitionen, sich verschlechternde «Terms of Trade» im Außenhandel — allein mit erhöhtem Arbeitseifer nicht überspielen können. Gesteigerter Arbeitseifer nützt in einer solchen Situation nichts.

Entstellte Reformpolitik

Die Wirtschaftswissenschaft in der CSSR hat die Beziehungen zwischen den individuellen Leistungen und solchen von Kollektiven zu den Systemmängeln längst aufgedeckt. Es hat sich eindeutig gezeigt, daß sich die wirtschaftlichen Ablaufprozesse in einer reifer werdenden Wirtschaft durch keinen wie auch immer strukturierten zentralen Planungsapparat, auch nicht mit Hilfe modernster Computer, steuern lassen. Es wurde bewiesen, daß nur mit Hilfe des *Marktmechanismus*, trotz seinen Mängeln und Unvollkommenheiten, die höchst komplizierten Prozesse innerhalb einer hochentwickelten industriellen Wirtschaft harmonisiert werden können. Auch eine sozialistische Gesellschaft darf die Marktbeziehungen nicht negieren, wenn sie ihre Funktionsfähigkeit und Funktionstüchtigkeit erhalten will.

Während der letzten Jahre des Novotny-Regimes war Husak ein begeisterter *Anhänger jener Reformen*, die sich auf die planmäßige Regulierung der Marktverhältnisse abstützen. Er

verstand zwar die ökonomische Problematik, die sich hinter den Reformen versteckt, nicht; aber er anerkannte und unterstützte den Kampf um die konsequente Realisierung der Reformen, der sich immer mehr auf einen *politischen Kampf* zuspitzte. Natürlich sah er in den Reformen vor allem die Voraussetzungen für seine eigene politische Karriere. Deshalb versuchte er aus ihnen auch politisches Kapital zu schlagen.

Offensichtlich hatte Husak aber die innern Zusammenhänge der Reform nie begriffen und auch nicht ehrlich akzeptiert, denn nach dem Sturze Novotnys wandelte er sich wieder zu einem *Zentralisten* stalinistischer Prägung.

Die Reformen und die Reformer schafften sich indessen noch andere Feinde, so vor allem das *Planungsamt* und die *zentralen Ministerien*, die mit dieser Entwicklung ihre Liquidierung befürchteten. Sie wählten die Taktik einer dauernden *Verzögerung* der Reformrealisierung, was für sie nicht schwer war, da der Parteivorstand die Einführung der Reformen in der Praxis dem zentralen Staatsapparat übergeben hatte. Es wurde geltend gemacht, daß zuerst mit Hilfe *planmäßiger* struktureller Produktionsänderungen und Preissteigerungen das Marktgleichgewicht herzustellen sei, *bevor* die Betriebe den Marktbeziehungen überlassen werden könnten. Mit dieser raffinierten Argumentation versuchte der Planungsapparat neben andern Zielen die Reformen in den Augen der Bevölkerung zu diskreditieren. Gegen diese Demagogie führten die Reformer einen aufreibenden Kampf; sie versuchten in vielen Kundgebungen, Artikeln und Polemiken die Heuchelei dieser Taktik und die Brüchigkeit ihres theoretischen Unterbaues aufzudecken. Es war in der Substanz ein Kampf gegen die sogenannte *«geleitete»* Inflation. Es mutet grotesk an, wenn mich heute die Propaganda in der CSSR persönlich als den Verfechter der «geleiteten Inflation» darstellt, obwohl meine Haltung gegen diese Theorie des Planungsamtes und sogar mein Auftreten gegen diese Tendenzen in der Sitzung des ZK-KPC am 3. Mai 1967 bekannt sind.

Was wollten die Reformer?

Es ging letztlich darum, das *Verständnis* in der Bevölkerung dafür zu wecken, daß das Auseinanderklaffen zwischen der Lohnentwicklung und der Produktion an Konsumgütern sowie Dienstleistungen die Folge einer *verfehlten Investitionspolitik* war. Die Aenderung dieser Entwicklung hätte eine relative Verkleinerung der Investitionen (gemessen am Anteil des Nationaleinkommens) gefordert, bei gleichzeitiger Verstärkung des Marktdruckes auf die Betriebe, um eine schnellere Entwicklung der Qualität, der technischen Innovationen, der Produktionsanpassungen an die Marktnachfrage und der Wirtschaftlichkeit zu erreichen. Es ging um die Steigerung der Effektivität der Investitionen. Die Reformer hatten ein Programm der *allmählichen* Beseitigung des zentralen Dirigismus und der *allmählichen* Erweiterung der Marktpreise, des Konkurrenzdruckes und des Einflusses der Weltpreise auf die Betriebe ausgearbeitet. Sie waren sich bewußt, daß die Inlandproduktion *nicht* plötzlich dem Marktdruck ausgesetzt werden konnte.

Die Politiker, denen es um die Aufrechterhaltung des zentralistischen Planungssystems ging, weil sie in diesem die Garantie ihrer politischen Positionen erkannten, hatten sich vor und nach dem Sturz Novotnys mit der Argumentation des Planungsamtes identifiziert. Der Kampf zwischen dem Planungsamt und den Reformern während der Monate des Prager Frühlings um diese Reformprobleme, welcher in Wirklichkeit ein Kampf um die Aufrechterhaltung oder die Aenderung des stalinistischen Wirtschaftssystems war, brachte eine *Spaltung des politischen Lagers*. Auch ein großer Teil jener Politiker, die gegen Novotny mit persönlichen Machtzielen kämpften, aber nie an eine konsequente Aenderung des Systems dachten, begann sich nach dem Sturz Novotnys von den Reformern zu distanzieren. Da die Reformvorschläge innerhalb der Bevölkerung eine starke und ständig wachsende Unterstützung fanden, fürchteten diese Politiker die Aufdeckung ihrer Antireform-Einstellung. Zu diesen *schwankenden Gestalten* gehörte auch Husak. Gegen dieses Lavieren erhoben die Reformer die Forderung der Beseitigung der geheimen Kabinettspolitik.

Allgegenwärtige Sowjets

Husak hatte nach der Besetzung der Tschechoslowakei den großen «Vorteil», auf Grund seiner politischen Vergangenheit für die Sowjets tragbar zu sein. Bei der Verwirklichung ihrer Ziele war er ihnen nützlicher als die *eigentlichen Kollaborateure*. Husak mußte natürlich das Vertrauen der Sowjets mit der Durchführung der geforderten Kaderänderungen und der Beseitigung aller Reformmaßnahmen erwerben. Verläßliche Stalinisten wurden an seine Seite gestellt.

Damit geriet Husak zwangsweise wieder auf die Linie seines persönlich so gehaßten Vorgängers. Er mußte, wie in den fünfziger Jahren, Kommunisten und Nichtkommunisten verfolgen und, ebenfalls wie in früheren Zeiten, «antisozialistische konterrevolutionäre Verschwörungen» erfinden.

Die *Parallele zu Novotny* ist unübersehbar. Hier ein Beispiel: Im Jahr 1954 wurde Husak nach schweren Folterungen und einer erfundenen Anschuldigung «wegen Versuchs, die Selbständigkeit und Einheit der Republik und ihres volksdemokratischen Systems zu vernichten», zu lebenslänglichem Kerker verurteilt. Am X. Parteitag (1954) betonte Novotny in einem Referat: «Wozu die Träger des bürgerlichen Nationalismus alles fähig sind, zeigte der kürzlich durchgeführte Prozeß in Bratislava gegen Husak und Konsorten. ... sie wurden als Schädlinge der Republik entlarvt. Sie haben ungeheure Schäden in der Wirtschaft und in andern Bereichen der Gesellschaft angerichtet. Mit nationalistischen Lösungen wollten sie ihre wirklichen Endziele tarnen — die Rückkehr zu den alten kapitalistischen Verhältnissen. Ihr Ziel war es, die Republik zu zerschlagen, die brüderlichen Nationen der Tschechen und Slowaken gegeneinander auszuspielen, die andern Nationen, welche in der Slowakei leben, mit dem slowakischen Volk zu verfeinden, damit aus dieser Feindschaft die Bourgeoisie ihren Gewinn ziehen kann.» («Rude Pravo», 12. Juni 1954.)

Im Jahr 1971 klagte Husak Menschen an, von denen er wußte, daß sie die Entwicklung nicht

zum Kapitalismus zurückdrehen wollten, sie würden «versuchen, unsere Gesellschaft zu zerschlagen, auseinanderzubrechen, sie aus dem sozialistischen Lager herauszureißen» (Rede vom 30. August 1971). Er bezeichnete sie als Konterrevolutionäre, die unter derselben Macht stünden, mit welcher einst seine eigene Verurteilung motiviert wurde. Er hat dieselbe antisemitische Welle ausgelöst, die den Prozeß gegen Slansky und den Prozeß gegen die «bürgerlichen Nationalisten» im Jahr 1954 begleitete. Die Methoden haben sich nicht geändert!

Es ist zwar zutreffend, daß die Strafen nach dem Prager Frühling im Vergleich mit jenen in den fünfziger Jahren nicht so hart ausgefallen sind. Aber sie sind deswegen keineswegs weniger wirkungsvoll, weil sie bis zur Zerstörung der materiellen Existenzgrundlagen der Verfolgten reichen. Vom Gesichtspunkt der «Ziele und Zwecke» dieser politischen Verfolgungen ist gegenüber den alten Zeiten kein Unterschied zu erkennen. Die Eliminierung «gefährlicher» Personen ist heute so wirksam wie früher. Wer sich nicht den Zielen der sowjetischen Machthaber unterwirft, muß früher oder später mit seiner politischen Beseitigung und Bestrafung rechnen. Die Ironie des Schicksals will es, daß Husak, der einst in Ungnade fiel, weil er versuchte, eine Anpassung der Parteipolitik an die spezifischen slowakischen Bedingungen zu erreichen und dafür hart bestraft wurde, heute selbst in der Rolle des Strafenden auftritt.

Es entspricht der «Logik» dieser Entwicklung, daß jeder, der einmal begonnen hat, politischen Machthabern zu dienen, die die Bezeichnung «Sozialismus» nur als Aushängeschild für ihre machtpolitischen Ziele verwenden, ihnen dauernd, bis zu seinem politischen Ende, dienen muß. Solange er die Politik betreiben wird, welche den fremden Interessen entspricht, kann er auf «attraktiven» politischen Sesseln sitzen. Sobald er sich nur ein einziges Mal «verselbständigt», muß er mit seinem *politischen Fall* rechnen. In einer Rede verkündet Husak, wie schon unzählige Male vor ihm Novotny: «Die, welche arbeits- oder moralmäßig nicht bestehen, können in einer sozialistischen Gesellschaft *nicht* in verantwortlichen Funktionen sein.» Wer sollte da nicht an «Spieglein, Spieglein an der Wand . . .» denken?

Manipulierte Wahlen

Jedermann weiß, daß die *Kaderpolitik* immer das entscheidende Instrument des Parteiapparates zur Beherrschung aller Sphären des gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Lebens war und weiter bleiben wird. Gemäß den Selektionskriterien des Parteiapparates im Zentrum, in den Bezirken und Kreisen werden alle wichtigen und leitenden Funktionen mit gehorsamen und ergebenen Kadern besetzt. Damit wird nicht nur die Durchsetzung aller Direktiven und Anordnungen der Partei «gesichert», sondern zugleich die *Machtbasis* der Parteisekretäre garantiert. Dieser «Personalpolitik» muß jeder fachmäßige oder öffentlich-ethische Gesichtspunkt weichen. Deshalb mußten auch die «Betriebsräte der Werktätigen», das heißt die Repräsentanten der Belegschaften in den einzelnen Betrieben, die während des Prager Frühlings die Kontrolle und Auswahl leitender Kader in der Wirtschaft übernahmen, verschwinden, denn sie gefährdeten die Manipulation der Kaderbesetzung durch den Parteiapparat.

Die Wahlen in die repräsentativen politischen Organe waren und sind auch heute eine völlige *Groteske;* sie haben mit wirklichen Wahlen nichts zu tun. Das sowjetische Regime versuchte von Anbeginn an den Schein zu wahren, als habe es die Unterstützung der gesamten arbeitenden Bevölkerung. Mit der Zeit erarbeiteten die Sowjets eine Praxis völlig gleichgeschalteter und in allen Details manipulierter «Wahlakte». Inzwischen hat die ganze Welt und auch die einheimische Bevölkerung den Formalismus dieses Vorgehens durchschaut. Aber es gehört zum bürokratischen Charakter dieser Regime, daß das *Formelle* als das Wesentliche bezeichnet wird. Das System ist vollkommen im bürokratischen Formalismus erstarrt. Wirkliche Wahlen werden als «bürgerliche Formalität» abgetan!

Es ist zu erwarten, daß trotz allen Manipulationen und Fälschungen der Wahlen in der CSSR viele Menschen durch ihre *Wahlabsenz* oder durch ablehnende Wahlzettel ihren *Protest* gegen das Regime ausdrücken werden. Eine jede Protestaktion, auch wenn sie das Regime verheimlicht und unterdrückt, hat als Bestandteil eines sich steigernden Kampfes gegen das Regime ihre Bedeutung. Nur der *Freiheitskampf* gegen sozialistisch getarnte Tyrannei kann die Perspektive des tschechischen und slowakischen Volkes sein.



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January 1972

PERVERSION OF SOVIET PSYCHIATRY

The world's foremost psychiatrists, gathered in Mexico City from 28 November to 4 December for the Fifth World Congress of Psychiatry, focused international attention on increasing Soviet use of mental hospitals as prisons for dissenting citizens and their ideas. The immediate reason for this renewed attention was an appeal made in October 1971 by the courageous Soviet Human Rights Committee, headed by the prominent Soviet nuclear physicist, Andrei Sakharov, that the Congress give its attention to the rights of people ruled to be mentally ill, especially the practice of forcible detention in mental hospitals without adequate cause. An earlier appeal, in March 1971, from the Soviet dissenter Vladimir Bukovsky, had forwarded documentary evidence of Soviet psychiatric malpractice to the world psychiatrists, requesting them to discuss the subject at their next international congress.* Despite discussion of the issue at the Mexico Congress, attendees could not agree to a resolution calling for investigation of Soviet psychiatric abuses on the grounds that such a move would in itself be political. No machinery existed, they explained, for the World Psychiatric Association to file a complaint against a fellow member. The president of the Congress, as reported in the press, decried treatment of political opponents as insane -- without, however, mentioning the Soviet Union by name.

A few Western delegates at the Psychiatry Congress argued that diagnosis of mental illness has occasionally been distorted in their own countries as an excuse for confining troublesome individuals. But an occasional, privately committed abuse can scarcely compare with the systematic Soviet policy initiated by the government itself to treat prominent intellectuals and other citizens as mentally unbalanced because they express their disagreement with the Soviet government's policies. While western practitioners worried over means of eliminating the infrequent misuse of psychiatry in their

* After word of Bukovsky's appeal broke in the Western press, he was arrested and held without trial for many months. For a period he was placed under observation in the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute, but declared "normal," according to press reports, and recommitted to prison. He is now about to stand trial for "anti-Soviet acts." Bukovsky could face up to seven years imprisonment. At 28, he already has spent some five years in forced labor camps and "special psychiatric hospitals" for such "crimes" as possession of unauthorized (samizdat) literature and for taking part in protest demonstrations.

own countries, the chief Soviet delegate, A. Snezhnevsky, coolly denied in an interview in Mexico City that Soviet psychiatry ever made such errors or committed such abuses...this despite the fact that he was quoted in Soviet biologist Zhores Medvedev's book, A Question of Madness*, (p. 63) as fearing how the psychiatric persecution of Medvedev "is going to make our delegation look" in Mexico City.

The brutal practices at Soviet psychiatric prisons (many recent victims, notably Gershuni and Grigorenko, are tortured and drugged) apparently began under Stalin and were officially abandoned during the brief thaw of 1956 when Stalinesque cruelties were denounced. Why are they now being revived and their use greatly increased? Concentration camps and political trials have served as the standard means of stifling and deterring dissent in the Soviet Union, but in this day of instant communication both have attained too much public notice (to the discomfiture of Soviet authorities), even though the camps are widely scattered and the trials are usually closed. The Soviet leadership seems to have made a major error in assuming that spiriting any citizen away to an asylum without a public hearing would be a subtler, less noticeable means of silencing him. G. Morozov, Director of the Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, is supposed to have remarked, according to Medvedev's book (p. 67): "Why bother with political trials when we have psychiatric clinics?"

Their second major error lay in committing persons of international renown like the war hero General Grigorenko and biochemist Zhores Medvedev. The samizdat press, then the world press, have picked up names and first-hand accounts of their suffering from many victims, including Grigorenko. Now Medvedev has described his own experiences in a psychiatric prison in A Question of Madness. (Documentation of individual cases of psychiatric abuse is contained in the attached reproduction of a pamphlet by Cornelia Mee "The Internment of Soviet Dissenters in Mental Hospitals.")

Amnesty International, which works for release of political prisoners, estimates that a minimum of 200 political prisoners are now locked up with actually mentally deranged persons. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel prize winner whose One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich gave many of his countrymen their first look at concentration camps, referred to incarceration of healthy people like Medvedev as a case of "spiritual murder" and a "variant of the gas chamber." "These crimes," he continued, "will never be forgotten and all those who take part in them will be condemned endlessly while they live and after they are dead."

* Published by Alfred Knopf

Solzhenitsyn may have prophesied correctly. With continued press attention, these crimes may boomerang against the Soviet leaders by:

-- proving that after 50 years of Communism the ruling cabal still fears its intellectuals and their free expression of opinion. "Can't you get it into your head," a Soviet physician said to a political prisoner, "that we couldn't care less what your views are -- the main thing is that you shouldn't have any views at all." (from Chronicle of Current Events #18, p. 106)

-- depicting the Soviet medical profession as prostituted by the exigencies of Soviet politics.

-- confirming to international scientific and literary circles the extent of Communist censorship of creative work.

-- describing the dehumanizing effect on the Soviet citizen forced to serve such tyranny. "On duty I have no feelings, only instructions," said the director of the psychiatric prison to Grigorenko's wife.

-- providing fuel for the samizdat press and thus alerting and inspiring, rather than deterring, further opposition (see attached translation of the Chronicles from Wiener Tagebuch, the Austrian Communist dissident journal).

-- leading to the supposition that all Communist states may use similar control methods over their own dissenters.

-- repelling even those most in sympathy with Soviet leaders, viz., Communist Party members in other countries or potential new friends among neutrals and developing countries.

The USSR has manifested acute sensitivity to world opinion of Soviet psychiatric malpractices. The first Soviet mention of the subject, by K. Bryantsev in the 23 October issue of Izvestiya, was a weak denial that it existed. The second, by Makarov in Za Rubezhom of late November 1971, was a rather frantic attempt to refute criticisms appearing in the British and German press, among others. Continuing world press attention may encourage the Soviets to modify this inhumane practice.

Postscript: Much of the evidence of psychiatric abuse and other violation of civil rights in the Soviet Union comes from the unofficial, samizdat Soviet serial publication, Chronicle of Current Events. It has recently become available in English as well as Russian. For those wishing to follow the civil rights struggle in the Soviet Union, there is attached a subscription order form, which includes a brief description of the publication.

Contents:

1. LONDON TIMES
23 October 1971

Soviet group's plea to psychiatrists

By Peter Reddaway

The Soviet Human Rights Committee, formed a year ago in Moscow, has appealed to the forthcoming congress of the World Psychiatric Association to take measures to prevent the corruption of psychiatry for political ends.

The appeal, which has just reached the West, is signed by the four full members of the committee, Mr Andrei Sakharov, Mr Andrei Tverdokhlebov, Mr Valery Chalidze and Igor Shafarevich. Mr Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel prize winning author, who is only an honorary member, is not among the signatories. The committee is affiliated to the International League for the Rights of Man in New York and to the Institute for the Rights of Man, headed by M René Cassin, the Nobel peace prize winner, in Strasbourg.

The congress opens in Mexico City on November 28. The issue of the internment of Soviet political dissenters in prison-hospitals is reported already to be on the agenda, mainly as a result of an earlier appeal to Western psychiatrists by Mr Vladimir Bukovsky, first published in March in *The Times*. A response to that appeal from 44 psychiatrists, mostly British, appeared in *The Times* on September 16, urging among other things, a thorough discussion of the matter in Mexico.

In the last two years the subject has become the most disputed single issue between the regime and the Democratic Movement in the Soviet Union. Mr Bukovsky was arrested shortly after making his appeal. Recently he was put in Moscow's Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry for an in-patient examination, the result of which is not yet known.

Here is the full text of the appeal:

"The Human Rights Committee appeals to the congress in order to draw psychiatrists' attention to the complex of questions concerning the rights of people ruled to be mentally ill. The committee considers that the unresolved nature of these questions, both from the theoretical and medical viewpoints, has created a most alarming situation.

"Especially serious is the problem of the rights of people forcibly held in psychiatric hospitals by court order or on any other basis. The lack of firm guarantees to ensure the rights of people ruled mentally ill, or subjected to in-patient psychiatric examinations, facilitates abuses in this area. The result is that any unfounded ruling may have irreversible consequences. It is easy to understand how a person's psyché can be traumatized if he is interned in a hospital without sufficient medical cause, and then subjected to prolonged isolation from society, to unavoidable association with disturbed people, to the influence of drugs which affect the psyché, and to the whole torturous procedure of treatment.

"No less serious is the danger involved in the application of procedures and means of treatment which result in irreversible clinical changes. It should not be forgotten that such abuses can be practised as a method of political persecution, ie, of persecuting people for their beliefs. In this way the path is opened for completely unrestrained illegal acts, the limits of whose application it is impossible to estimate.

"Our century has already seen what fearful consequences can flow from the abuse of the achievements of science and its authority. Before it is too late everything must be done to prevent a new such occurrence. We are dealing here with a danger which threatens all mankind, and it can be averted only by the efforts of all mankind, in particular by the scientists of all the world. The problem has many aspects, but none the less much clearly depends on the psychiatrists, on their respect for human rights, and on their taking responsibility for all the practical applications which their science can have.

"The committee considers that the problem requires at this stage the adoption of these measures: (1) The creation of permanent commissions of psychiatrists in various countries, which will study psychiatric practices and conduct a full-scale exchange of their results; (2) the systematic publication of materials; (3) the cooperation in these matters of both legal organizations and the United Nations, with a particular view to the working out of international norms regarding the civil rights of people ruled mentally ill."

THE INTERNMENT OF SOVIET DISSENTERS IN MENTAL HOSPITALS

"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart informaton and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19.

"In conformity with the interests of the workers, and in order to strengthen the socialist order, the law guarantees the citizens of the USSR:
(a) Freedom of speech, (b) Freedom of the press,
(c) Freedom of association and assembly,
(d) Freedom to hold processions and demonstrations in the street . . ."

Constitution of the USSR, Article 123.

"A crime is a deviation from the generally recognized standards of behaviour, frequently caused by mental disorder. Can there be any diseases, mental disorders, among certain men in commmunist society? Evidently there can be. If that is so, then there can be delinquencies characteristic of people of an abnormal mind."

N. Khrushchev, quoted in *Pravda*, 24 May 1959.

The practice of declaring political and social dissenters to be mentally ill is not altogether new in Russia. The earliest known case is that of the philosopher Chaadaev, who in 1836 was officially declared insane after the publication of an essay in which he expressed the view that the only cure for Russia's backwardness lay in Western traditions and the Roman Catholic Church. He was not, however, confined to an asylum.

In Soviet Russia the practice of declaring dissenters to be insane, and of confining them for indefinite periods to special (prison) psychiatric hospitals was started massively under Stalin, apparently in the late 1930's. Today this is still quite commonly the fate of those who hold views different from those in authority and who express them publicly. The practice is considered by Soviet citizens with knowledge of it to be a worse form of repression even than prison or strict-regime labour camp; and because of this, urgent appeals have reached the West for help in its abolition.

That the practice exists is now known to a certain extent in the West. Tarsis's only slightly fictionalized *Ward 7* was published here in 1965; in 1968 it was denounced in the "letter of the twelve" to the Budapest Conference of Communist parties, also in May 1969 in a letter to the United Nations; and three famous cases have highlighted the question: that of the poet-mathematician Esenin-Volpin in 1968 (see Appendix II, 9, 10), of the biologist Zhores Medvedev (see Appendix II, 11) in July 1970; and of Vladimir Bukovsky (see Appendix I and II, 8), who spoke of his experiences in special hospitals in an interview filmed and taped in Moscow by William Cole and broadcast first in USA (July 28, 1970) and later in other countries.

Inside the Soviet Union accounts of dissenters being confined to mental hospitals are given in the *Chronicle of Current Events*, a bi-monthly newsletter brought out by the emergent civil rights movement in the Soviet Union. It circulates unofficially in "samizdat" (literally "self-publishing"), i.e. in typescript passing from hand to hand, and reaches the West regularly by various means.* It records trials and other forms of political persecution, events in camps and prisons, provides biographical information on dissenters, and notices of other material relevant to the civil rights movement also circulating in "samizdat": essays, protest letters, petitions. In everything it strives to maintain the strictest accuracy, and avoid value judgments as far as is possible in dealing with such disturbing material. Now in its third year of appearance, it has proved extremely reliable.

The information contained in this pamphlet has been provided by the *Chronicle*, much of it corroborated from other sources: by personal testimonies both private and public (such as Bukovsky's televised interview), and the official diagnoses given to patients' relatives. Some of the latter have also reached the West, and will be quoted in three individual cases to be described here.

Prominent Soviet citizens, amongst them leading Communists, have protested at the practice. In January, 1953, after the notorious Tass communiqué concerning a "plot" on the part of nine medical professors (mostly Jews) to poison party and government leaders, S. P. Pisarev, a party official, sent to Stalin, as general secretary of the CPSU, a report on the misdeeds of the security organs and stressed the need to verify, independently of them, the charges against the "poisoners". On the day of Stalin's death Pisarev was arrested, and, after diagnosis by the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry (which plays a central role in the diagnosis of those charged with political offences), he was confined for nearly two years in psychiatric hospitals. He was released on the personal intervention of the USSR Procurator-General after a copy of his 1953 report to Stalin had come into the hands of a secretary of the Central Committee of the party. At his own insistence, however, Pisarev was given a further diagnosis by the Gannushkin Scientific Research Institute for Psychiatry, necessitating another two months in hospital in order to have the diagnosis of "schizophrenia" and "paranoid psychopathy" finally disproved.

As a result of his experience in finding normal people, including eminent scholars, writers, and other intellectuals who had committed no crimes, confined indefinitely with the mentally sick, Pisarev once again wrote to the CPSU Central Committee. As a result, in 1955 a commission under A. I. Kuznetsov, a senior official of the Central Committee was appointed to investigate the whole practice. The commission carried out searching investigations at the Serbsky Institute and visited the two "special" (prison) hospitals at Kazan (Address: Kazan, UE 148/st.6) and Leningrad (Address: Lenin-

*Starting with issue No. 16, (31 October 1970), Amnesty International, Turnagain Lane, Farringdon Street, London, E.C.4, is publishing *The Chronicle*. Subscription £3.50 per year for issues 16-21.

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grad, Arsenalnaya Ul 9, p/ya US—20, st.5), besides normal psychiatric hospitals also being used for this purpose. All the facts Pisarev had presented were corroborated. "Among the 'mentally ill' sentenced to indefinite isolation were hundreds of healthy persons. The perversions of the truth in the diagnoses of the Serbsky Institute, especially by D. R. Lunts (at that time a senior lecturer) and others were systematically listed". (Pisarev's letter to the Praesidium of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, 4 April, 1970). The Kazan and Leningrad institutions operated under the official description of 'psychiatric prison hospitals', though no treatment was given for the really mentally ill patients. The commission reached the unanimous conclusion that there was a need for a radical reorganization in the field of psychiatric diagnosis, and that the prison-hospitals should be removed unreservedly from the sole control of the administrative-investigation organs and transferred completely to the supervision of the USSR Ministry of Health.

Kuznetsov's superior (almost certainly V. M. Churayev), to whom the report was submitted, concealed it from the leaders of the Central Committee and finally succeeded in committing it to the archives. Kuznetsov and his colleagues on the commission were removed from the Central Committee apparatus.

However, the very activity of the commission stimulated some improvements: a start was made in giving treatment to the genuinely mentally ill; the percentage of political prisoners among them (under Stalin very high indeed) decreased; and with the addition of a few young freshly-trained specialists in the hospitals some of the unfounded diagnoses of the Serbsky Institute were—ultimately—repudiated.

This was all. In the Serbsky Institute, though now nominally listed as administered by the Ministry of Health, there have been no real changes. On the contrary, D. R. Lunts, now Professor, has retained his post as director of all diagnoses connected with political cases, and is one of those responsible for training fresh personnel. Major-General Grigorenko, a political 'patient' (1964-5, and again now) has written: "I myself on more than one occasion have seen Professor Lunts, the head of the department diagnosing me, arrive at work in the uniform of a KGB. (security police) colonel. True, he always came into the department in his white coat. I have also seen other doctors of this institute in KGB uniform . . ." (*Chronicle*, December 1969).

The *Chronicle* of June 1969, after mentioning a number of cases involving protesters and demonstrators investigated by the Serbsky Institute, concludes: *"It is difficult to point to a single one of these cases in which the results of the diagnosis could be said to be justified on scientific and medical grounds. Experience makes it clear that each decision is taken at the KGB level, and Professor Lunts only has to wrap it up in the form of a medical conclusion."*

Not only have the two oldest "special" psychiatric hospitals outside the system of the Ministry of Health been retained, but *additional* new hospitals of similar type have appeared: at Sychyovka, Smolensk Province, where *"people are reduced to a condition of complete mental collapse"*; (*Chronicle*, June 1969) in 1965 one was opened at Cherñyakhovsk, Kaliningrad Province, in a building which was formerly a German convict prison (Address: Py/a 216, st.2). In 1966 one was opened at Minsk; in 1968 in Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine.

In April, 1970, Pisarev wrote to the Praesidium of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, the letter quoted above, reviewing the whole problem and pleading with them to investigate it*; as far as is known, with no positive result.

That the prison psychiatric hospitals are still directly under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and thus wide open to K.G.B. control was proved early in 1970 by No. 5 of the Ministry's journal *"Towards a New Life"*: It announced the Ministry's decision to replace the designation "warder" by that of "controller" in "investigation prisons, ordinary prisons, *psychiatric hospitals of special type*, educational labour colonies and the juvenile remand centre of the Moscow Soviet". (quoted by the *Chronicle, June* 1970).

"All these "special" psychiatric hospitals have the following features in common:—political prisoners, although of sound mind, are kept in the same wards as seriously disturbed psychiatric patients (who may have committed such crimes as murder, rape, thuggery); if they will not renounce their convictions they are subjected, on the pretext of treatment, to physical torture, to injections of large doses of "aminazine"[1] and "sulfazine",[2] which cause depressive shock reactions and serious physical disorders". (*Chronicle*, June 1969). *"Sulfazine causes the temperature to rise to 40°C—104°F—with weakness, rheumatism of the joints, headaches, pains in the buttocks where the injections are given. This condition lasts for a day or two after one dose. Aminazine is administered by intramuscular injection, in such a way that the injected aminazine is not absorbed but forms malignant tumours which have to be removed later by operation."* (*Chronicle*, October 1969). Another form of punishment is the "roll-up", described by Bukovsky and Fainberg, in which the patient is rolled from head to foot in wet canvas so tightly that it is difficult for him to breathe. As the canvas begins to dry it gets even tighter. However, a medical attendant is present while this is taking place and if the patient's pulse weakens the canvas is eased. Or, as at Kazan, *"patients are strapped into their beds for three days, sometimes more; and with this form of punishment the rules of sanitation are ignored: the patients are not allowed to go to the lavatory and bedpans are not provided."* (*Chronicle*, October 1969).

"The regime is the same as for closed prisons, with one hour's exercise a day. Sometimes before interrogation sodium aminate, a strong narcotic, is administered by injection. The staff consists of

*Published by *Novoe Russkoye Slovo*, New York, 9-11 and 13.7.70; by *Possev*: *4-y Spetsialnyi Vypusk*, Frankfurt, June 1970, pp. 31-2; Summary in *Chronicle* of April 1970.

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orderlies recruited from MVD forces [police], their uniforms concealed by white overalls, male nurses chosen from among the criminal prisoner-patients, also in white overalls, and the senior and junior medical personnel, many with officers' shoulder-straps beneath their white overalls. The brick walls surrounding these prison hospitals are even more impressive than those of other kinds of prison. The most terrifyingly arbitrary regime prevails at the Sychyovka and Chernyakhovsk hospitals, where the sick patients as well as the politicals are the victims of daily beatings and sadistic humiliations on the part of the supervisory personnel and the nurses, whose rights are absolutely unlimited. Here, in the spring of 1969 the patient Popov was beaten to death, though it was officially reported he died of a 'brain haemorrhage'." (*Chronicle*, June 1969.)

Apart from the "special" psychiatric hospitals, political prisoners may also be sent to a more respectable, normal type of psychiatric hospital, appearing in the telephone book. In these only one wing comes under the greater or lesser control of the KGB. Such, in Moscow, are No. 1 Kashchenko Psycho-neurological Hospital, No. 4 Gannushkin Psychiatric Hospital, No. 3 Psycho-neurological Hospital and several others.

There are two legal procedures for forcibly committing people to mental hospitals, one involving civil law, the other criminal law. Civil cases are governed principally by a Health Ministry "instruction" of 1961, which probably stemmed in part from Khrushchev's equation, quoted above, of social deviation with insanity. It reads: "If there is a clear danger to those around him or to himself from a mentally ill person, the health organs have the right to place him in a psychiatric hospital without the consent of the person who is ill or his relatives or guardians." This may be done by a single psychiatrist or ordinary doctor, and then the patient is detained or not, depending on the verdict of a panel of three psychiatrists. The latter decide whether or not his condition in the present and for the foreseeable future is one of legal accountability. If it is not, and he is considered potentially dangerous, he is normally kept in hospital indefinitely for obligatory treatment. This procedure was used with Esenin-Volpin in 1968 and with Jaures Medvedev in 1970.

Alternatively, the KGB or the Procuracy can at this stage start a criminal case and apply the second procedure, as follows. First a man commits an act which the KGB, say, considers a crime and which may for instance be participation in a demonstration, the circulation of a leaflet, or a speech at a debate: the man is arrested and interrogated. Then, if the KGB thinks he may have committed the crime in a state of legal non-accountability, or if it wants to frame him and thus avoid an open trial which might involve his spirited self-defence and also provoke demonstrations, he is sent for psychiatric diagnosis to, usually, the Serbsky Institute. Professor Lunts and his colleagues then consult with the KGB investigators as to what diagnosis would be politically most convenient and duly produce it. This usually asserts that the crime was committed in a state of legal non-accountability. Then a court which the defendant has no right to attend usually endorses without question the Institute's recommendation of indefinite compulsory treatment. The defence can do little but produce massive evidence to contradict the diagnosis and request a second, more objective, psychiatric diagnosis, which is almost always refused.

Once inside, the patient-prisoner's chance of release are very uncertain. He may come across an honest doctor, who with difficulty, secures his discharge. This process has been known to take as long as *six years*. Or he may acknowledge his acts to be crimes, committed in a state of mental illness. Writing of his experiences on the occasion of his first incarceration, Grigorenko says: "I was especially saddened by the tragic case of engineer Pyotr Alekseyevich Lysak. Because he had spoken at a student meeting against the expulsion for political reasons of a number of students, he had landed in a psychiatric hospital, and, at the time of my arrival, had already been there for seven years. Bitter anger at this wild injustice, at his ruined life, had permeated his being, and he would write complaints daily, which, naturally, never reached their destinations, but found their way into his hospital file and were used as an excuse for further "treatment". People who do not admit their illness are not usually discharged from psychiatric hospitals. I tried to drum this truth into his head. During one such conversation, I said in irritation: 'Your reasoning is so unreal that I'm beginning to doubt your normality.' He stopped all of a sudden, looked at me with an expression I shall remember to the day of my death, and asked in a barely audible voice and a tone of bitter reproach: 'Do you really think that a man can spend seven years in here and still remain normal?'" (P. G. Grigorenko: *On the Special Psychiatric Hospitals*, a section of N. Gorbanevskaya's book *Midday* appearing in the *Chronicle* of December 1969. *Midday* was published in Russian in Frankfurt, 1970.)

THE CASE OF MAJOR-GENERAL PYOTR GRIGORENKO

(see Appendix II, 1, 3, 9, 19).

Born into a poor family of humble origins, Grigorenko achieved a distinguished military career, holding for seventeen years the post of head of the Research Department of the Frunze Military Academy and later becoming head of its Cybernetics Department. His intellectual interests ranged far beyond the army; and he was an active and devoted member of the Communist Party. His first brush with authority seems to have occurred at the beginning of the war, when he voiced criticisms about the preparedness of the armed forces at the time of Hitler's invasion. For this he was officially reprimanded by the Party.

After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February, 1956 (notable for Khruschev's speech revealing Stalin's crimes) he gave much thought to the state of the country, and in 1961 spoke at a

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Party conference calling for an end to the excessive privileges of Party members and the growing cult of Khruschev's personality and for the restoration of Leninist principles. He was reprimanded, dismissed from his post and sent to one of lower grade in the [Pacific] Maritime Province. Nevertheless, he continued his struggle against neo-Stalinism, circulating leaflets in this connection. In 1964 he was arrested, and in order to prevent him defending himself at a trial he was declared insane by the Serbsky Institute and spent 15 months in prison, eight or nine of them in the special psychiatric hospital in Leningrad. *"Meanwhile, he had been reduced to the ranks and expelled from the Party, although, if genuinely considered a sick man, he should have been considered no more responsible before Party and administrative organs than before the law."* (*Chronicle*, June, 1969.)

In 1965 he was discharged by the Leningrad hospital authorities—thanks to the intervention of the chief military psychiatrist—as in no further need of treatment and was obliged to work as a loader. But he continued the struggle against arbitrary acts: protested at the political trials which followed that of Sinyavsky and Daniel; at the trial of those who demonstrated on August 25, 1968, in the Red Square against the occupation of Czechoslovakia; and in February 1969, in collaboration with Yakhimovich (see below), circulated a leaflet urging Soviet citizens to press for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

He became particularly active in championing the cause of the Crimean Tatars. During the war, Stalin had deported the entire Tatar population of the Crimea to Central Asia, alleging they had collaborated with the Germans. Great numbers of them perished in the terrible conditions of deportation and exile. In 1967 the Soviet government exonerated the Crimean Tatars from the charge of treason, but refused them permission to return to their homeland as they wished to do. In the summer of 1968 ten of the Tatar leaders were arrested and brought to trial in Tashkent on a charge of anti-Soviet agitation.

During this time Grigorenko's home was watched; he was followed by KGB cars; finally, the KGB faked a telephone call from one of the Tatar leaders, summoning him to Tashkent as a defence witness. He was arrested on arrival (May 4, 1969). Between the time of his arrest and his trial (February 4, 1970) he was severely beaten, forcibly fed when he went on hunger-strike, denied contact with his family or his defence counsel, and told (correctly) that his family had been deprived of his army pension. (*Grigorenko's Prison Diary*: *Chronicle*, February 1970).

On August 18 he was given a psychiatric out-patient examination in Tashkent (in a KGB cell and in the presence of a KGB official, but by independent psychiatrists). The commission, after examining him thoroughly, declared him to be of sound mind: "... Grigorenko is not in need of in-patient observation, since his personal characteristics and mental condition are amply described in the documents of the case, in the data furnished by observation of him in the investigation prison, and also by the data supplied through examination of him as an out-patient.

"No doubts about Grigorenko's mental health have arisen as a result of out-patient examination of him. In-patient examination would not at this time provide additional knowledge of him, but, on the contrary, taking into consideration his age, his sharply negative attitude to being in psychiatric hospitals, and his heightened sensitivity, it would complicate a diagnosis.

(Signed) (Professor) Detengof; Kagan (Chief Psychiatrist of the Turkestan Military District); Slavgorodskaya; Smirnova."

The Uzbek KGB, however, sent him back to Moscow for diagnosis at the Serbsky Institute (Oct. 22 - Nov. 19).

In his prison diary, smuggled out later, Grigorenko quotes two problems set him in the Serbsky Institute at a preliminary meeting with the doctors: one involved nothing more than a knowledge of the four rules of arithmetic, and the other was to explain the meaning of a picture, evidently taken from *Krokodil* [a Soviet humorous magazine].

"Perhaps," writes Grigorenko in the diary, "such conversations are necessary when one is dealing with a cretin or someone in his dotage . . . The Professor . . . behaved throughout as if he felt embarrassed. I was probably no less embarrassed myself."

"The Tashkent commission had at its disposal the following materials: the results of the clinical examination performed in the Serbsky Institute in 1964, including a psychological examination and an encephalograph; papers from the Leningrad special psychiatric hospital; the observations of the psychiatric out-patients' unit of the Leningrad district of Moscow; the observations of the prison administration and the laboratory analyses made in the prison clinic. The Moscow commission, in addition to everything listed above, had another encephalograph and the results of a further [the Tashkent] psychological examination." (*Chronicle*, February 1970.)

The Tashkent commission's examination lasted about three hours, with all four doctors taking active part. The Moscow (Serbsky Institute) commission examined Grigorenko for twenty minutes. "... There were no examinations, but a straightforward question and answer conversation led by one man, ... Lunts was so wrapped up in his own thoughts that when the chairman addressed a question to him, he had to repeat it. My general impression was that everything had been decided." (*Grigorenko's Prison Diary*: *Chronicle, February* 1970).

The conclusion was as follows: "... Grigorenko is suffering from a mental illness in the form of a pathological paranoid development of the personality with the presence of reformist ideas that have appeared in his personality with psychopathic features of the character and the first signs of arterio-sclerosis of the vessels of the brain ...

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"As is evident from the documents of the criminal case and the data of the present clinical examination, the paranoid condition [of 1964] has not been completely overcome; reformist ideas have taken on an obstinate character and determine the conduct of the patient; in addition, the intensity of these ideas is increased in connection with various external circumstances which have no direct relation to him and is accompanied by an uncritical attitude to his own utterances and acts. The above-mentioned condition of mental illness excludes the possibility of him being responsible for his actions and controlling them, consequently the patient must be considered of unsound mind.

"The commission cannot agree with the out-patient forensic psychiatric diagnosis formulated in Tashkent . . . for the reason that in out-patient conditions the pathological changes in his psychology could not be discovered owing to his outwardly well-adjusted behaviour, formally coherent utterances and retainment of former knowledge and manners—all of which is characteristic of a pathological development of the personality.

"Because of his mental condition, Grigorenko requires compulsory treatment in a special psychiatric hospital, as the paranoid reformist ideas described above are of obstinate character and determine the conduct of the patient.

"(Signed) Corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences—G. V. Morozov, Professor V. M. Morozov, Professor P. R. Lunts; Senior Research Officer Z. G. Trubova; Lecturer, Junior Research Officer M. M. Maltseva."

"If it is only a person who bows submissively before any arbitrary acts of the bureaucrats who is considered a normal Soviet person," writes Grigorenko, "then I am 'abnormal'. I am not capable of such submissiveness, no matter how, or how much, I may be beaten up."

On February 20, 1970, the Tashkent court concluded that Grigorenko was guilty of crimes under Part I of Article 70, and Article 190-1 of the Russian Criminal Code*, committed while of unsound mind; Grigorenko to be "exempted from criminal punishment and placed in a special psychiatric hospital till his recovery."

On May 13, four Academicians, including A. D. Sakharov, lodged a complaint with the USSR Procurator-General concerning "serious procedural violations" at Grigorenko's trial, and appealed that the court's decision be suspended and Grigorenko released. But in June 1970, Grigorenko was sent to Chernyakhovsk, where he was kept in a cell of six square metres, with one other person: a man who stabbed his wife to death and was in a constant state of delirium.

*Article 70 concerns "anti-Soviet agitation"; Article 190-1 concerns the "spreading of false information defaming the Soviet system", and was promulgated by decree in 1966 in spite of protests from Russian intellectuals, including Academician Sakharov.

"Grigorenko has been deprived of paper and pencil. His enforced immobility, the acute pains in his wounded leg, the ceaseless effect on his mind of a gravely ill patient, all this gives cause for concern. Grigorenko is 62.

"His address: Kaliningradskaya oblast, g. Chernyakhovsk, uchrezhdeniye 216/st.2." (*Chronicle*, June 1970.)
Later in the summer he was transferred to a solitary cell.
(see Appendix II, 1, 4, 5, 13, 21).

NATALIA GORBANEVSKAYA is a 34-year-old writer, translator, and poet. She had, in her early twenties, a nervous illness, expressing itself in fear of heights, an unpleasant sensation in the finger-tips, and restlessness. She had no recurrence of it after 1960. At the beginning of 1968, when pregnant, and in a maternity hospital for a threatened miscarriage, she was transferred to Kashchenko psychiatric hopital, which dicharged her after a week.

On August 25, 1968, she was arrested in connection with the demonstration in Red Square against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The seven demonstrators were able to sit for only one or two minutes holding placards before they were arrested and beaten up. All except Natalia were punished by imprisonment or exile; one, Victor Fainberg (see Appendix II, 1, 7, 13, 22), was confined to a mental hospital. Natalia, too, was examined at Serbsky Institute and pronounced "non-accountable" for her actions, but, probably as she had now a three-month-old baby, was allowed to return to the guardianship of her mother.

However, as she "did not cease her activities", she was again called to account. She had written a description of the trial of the Red Square demonstrators in her book *Midday*, circulated in "samizdat" and published abroad. She had also written a letter, describing the Red Square demonstration, which she sent to foreign newspapers (*Rude Pravo, Unita, Humanite, Morning Star, Times, Le Monde*). It concluded thus:

"My comrades and I are happy that we were able to take part in this demonstration, that we were able, if only for a moment, to interrupt the flood of unbridled falsehood and cowardly silence, and to show that not all the citizens of our country approve of the violence which is being perpetrated in the name of the Soviet people. We hope that the people of Czechoslovakia may learn what has happened. And the belief that the Czechs and Slovaks, when thinking of Soviet people, will think not only of the occupiers, but also of us, gives us strength and courage."

On November 19, 1969, a psychiatrist commission, under the chairmanship of the chief psychiatrist of Moscow City, I. K. Yanushevsky, concluded, nevertheless, that she was sane: "On the basis of a study of the history of her illness, of a follow-up analysis of more than 10 years, and of an examination, there are no grounds for a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Psychopathic personality with symptoms of hysteria and a tendency to decompensation. At the present time, she has no need of treatment in a psychiatric hospital."

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On April 6, 1970, she was again sent for diagnosis, this time at the Serbsky Institute. The report of the Commission (on which Lunts served) includes the following statements:

"The patient is outwardly correctly orientated in relation to conditions surrounding her, and understands the purpose of her being sent for diagnosis . . . Considers herself a mentally fit person, is sure that she was sent for diagnosis 'so that there would be no noise', 'because it suited the public prosecutor'. At the same time, does not deny the psychotic episode in the past, considering that she was 'at that time, suffering from a nervous illness'. Does not renounce her actions, but thinks that she has done nothing wrong. Unshakeably convinced of the rightness of her actions, she moralizes a great deal, in particular saying that she acted thus 'so as not to be ashamed in the future before her children . . .' Gorbanevskaya is suffering from a chronic mental illness in the form of schizophrenia . . . Our psychiatric observation reveals in Gorbanevskaya the presence of changes in the thinking process and in the emotional and critical faculties, which are characteristic of schizophrenia. Therefore, as a mentally sick person in relation to the actions incriminating her, performed in a state of illness, she must be considered of unsound mind. Because of her mental condition in relation to the obstinacy of the pathological experiences determining her conduct, Gorbanevskaya should be sent for compulsory treatment to a psychiatric hospital of special type."

Her trial (from which she was excluded) took place on July 7, 1970, and is recorded in the *Chronicle* of August 1970. Lunts was present. Defence counsel (S. B. Kallistratova) was given only one day in which to study the four volumes of the case. Witnesses for the defence, apart from Natalia's mother, her legal representative, were not allowed to attend.

Defence counsel petitioned for a further forensic-psychiatric examination, as the diagnosis of the Serbsky Institute conflicted with that of the chief Moscow psychiatrist, had not mentioned the form of schizophenia, nor adduced a single symptom of mental derangement. Her request was refused.

Defence counsel asked for a clarification of how the "changes in the thinking processes, and in the emotional and critical faculties" were concretely expressed in Gorbanevskaya; and in regard to what actions held against her by the investigating bodies the diagnostic team had discerned signs that she was of unsound mind.

Professor Lunts replied that it had been established that Gorbanevskaya was suffering from a mild chronic form of schizophrenia which "has no clear symptoms", that she was showing slowly increasing mental changes, which from "the theoretical point of view cannot be described as an improvement, although externally they resemble this".

To the defence's question as to why a special hospital was necessary, Lunts replied that in such hospitals, apart from the actual treatment, a regimen existed which met the requirements of patients' subsequent adaptation to the conditions they would encounter on their discharge from hospital.

The Prosecutor described Gorbanevskaya's "crimes": the demonstration, followed by her letter to foreign newspapers; her book *Midday;* alleged participation in the preparation of the *Chronicle of Current Events* and the possession of manuscripts and books [found in the police search of her home] of a nature slanderous to the Soviet state.

Defence counsel contested every one of these charges as not of a criminal nature, or, as regards the *Chronicle,* unproven. She requested that the case against Gorbanevskaya be closed and that she be released from custody and allowed to return to her small [fatherless] children and aged mother in order to look after them.

The court delivered a verdict that N. E. Gorbanevskaya had, while of unsound mind, committed acts falling under Articles 190—1 and 191 of the Russian Criminal Code and would be placed in a psychiatric hospital of special type for compulsory treatment. The period of treatment was not stated.

Natalia Gorbanevskaya was at first held in the mental wing of Butyrka prison, Moscow; she is now in Kazan prison hospital undergoing drug treatment.

THE CASE OF OLGA IOFE, recorded in the Chronicle of August 1970. She was tried in her absence on August 20, at Moscow City Court, under Article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code (concerning "anti-Soviet agitation") for having prepared 245 copies of a leaflet of anti-Soviet content, and for possessing and circulating anti-Soviet documents. She had been diagnosed by Professors Lunts and Morozov and Doctors Felinskaya and Martynenko at the Serbsky Institute to be suffering from "creeping schizophrenia of a straightforward type".

Defence counsel asked Dr. Martynenko (present at the trial) "Exactly what physiological tests were carried out to establish she was suffering from an illness?"

Answer: Such physiological tests are carried out on everybody without exception. The absence of symptoms of an illness cannot prove the absence of the illness itself.

Question: On the basis of exactly what remarks did the commission establish that her thought processes were functioning on different levels? Describe even one of the tests administered to Olga, by means of which major disturbances of her thought processes were established, or give even one remark by her which suggested such disturbances.

Answer: I am unable to give a concrete answer, and if the court requires one it will be necessary to send to the Serbsky Institute for the history of her illness.

Question: How do you explain the fact that the presence of an illness, which, according to the diagnosis, has been developing in O. Iofe since she was 14 [she had circulated leaflets at school]

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did not prevent her from successfully graduating from mathematical school and entering the University?

Answer: The presence of this form of schizophrenia does not presuppose changes in the personality noticeable to others.

Defence counsel read out the usual symptoms of the illness from which, according to the diagnosis, Olga was suffering (hostility, isolation from the world, apathy), and asked Martynenko to say exactly which symptoms had been observed in her, as they had all been refuted by the glowing character references from her places of work and study and by the testimony of the witnesses.

Answer: All these symptoms cannot be considered in isolation, but only in their entirety.

The defence counsel's request for a further psychiatric examination was refused.

Defence counsel said that Olga maintained her activity was not anti-Soviet; he asked that Article 70 should be replaced by Article 190—1 (less serious) and that, as her schizophrenia was "straight-forward", she should be sent to a normal psychiatric hospital, not one of special type, which presupposed serious illness.

The court decided to send Olga to a special psychiatric hospital and to hold her in custody until she was taken to the hospital.

Olga Iofe is twenty years old.

IVAN YAKHIMOVICH (see Appendix II, 1), a Latvian citizen of Polish origin, studied at the Faculty of History and Philology of the Latvian State University, became a teacher, and then Inspector of Schools. He was an active Communist Party member. In 1960, seeing the need for improvement in agriculture, he took up the post of Chairman of the "Young Guard" collective farm, accepting only a very low salary. At the same time he enrolled as external student of the Agricultural Academy. The paper *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, organ of the Young Communist League, wrote about him and his work in ecstatic terms (October 30, 1964).

In January 1968, he wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU, protesting at the trial of Galanskov and Ginsburg and others (who were tried for their protests at the treatment of Sinyavsky and Daniel): "One should not undermine the confidence of the masses in the Party; one should not gamble with the honour of the State, even if some leader or other wants to settle accounts with 'samizdat'. 'Samizdat' can be abolished in only one way: by developing democratic rights, not strangling them; by respecting the Constitution and not violating it; by putting into practice the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which Vishynsky agreed on behalf of our State and not by putting it under an extinguisher." (He goes on to quote Article 19 of the Declaration.) On March 13, 1968, he was expelled from the Party; in May dismissed from his post as Chairman of the collective farm without a meeting being held (a violation of the statute on agricultural co-operatives.) (*Chronicle*, April 1969.)

He was obliged to work as a stoker at a sanatorium, and live, together with his wife (a teacher, since deprived of her post) and three small daughters in the home of his parents-in-law (six people in a room eight square metres).

In March 1969 he was arrested after this room had been searched and his various manuscripts removed.

On April 1, 1969, he underwent an out-patient psychiatric examination. Extracts from the doctors' statement describing his condition:

"According to objective information he often took part in meetings with critical remarks about various questions, sometimes of an original, irrelevant and trifling nature. In January 1968 the patient became involved in the spreading of slanderous fabrications, smearing the Soviet government and the social system. In March 1968, on account of this, he was excluded from the Party and dismissed from his post as chairman of the collective farm. However, the patient continued to spread scandalous fabrications and wrote essays and letters in similar vein, which were subsequently handed over to capitalist countries abroad and published there and also broadcast in Latvian and Russian. [Yakhimovich was much exercised over events in Czechoslovakia.]

". . . The patient does not deny his guilt and considers himself to be in good mental health.

". . . His mental condition: the patient is correctly orientated. His bearing is haughty. Rather mannered. His appearance is original—beard, clothes. Speaks of what he has done with great feeling. Memory functioning normally. Thinking—detailed; inclined to be moralizing. There are many flagrant contradictions in his political thought. He underestimates his actions, not understanding their treacherous, criminal character . . .

"On the basis of the above, and of documents in the case, the commission concludes that the patient should be sent for in-patient psychiatric diagnosis at the Riga City psychiatric hospital for a more precise diagnosis and decision on the question of his sanity. Preliminary diagnosis of the commission: Schizophrenia, paranoid syndrome?

" (Signed) Brishke, A. A.; Ligure, L. A.; Vitenberg, Z. R."

The in-patient report contains the following remarks:

"Very well orientated . . . Completely convinced of his rightness, however declares that if he had been treated in a human way, with understanding and warmth, as the deputy Minister of the Interior, Comrade Seya, had treated him, he would not have started to propagate his ideas so widely, for, as he considers, his activity was the result not only of his political convictions but also to a significant extent a reaction against the absurd behaviour of certain State officials, who, completely wrongly, in his opinion, judged him to be anti-Soviet."

The commission declared him to be suffering from "paranoid

development in a psychopathic personality" and prescribed compulsory treatment in a special psychiatric hospital.

At his trial in August 1969, the Latvian Supreme Court granted the requests submitted by defence counsel, S. B. Kallistratova; additional witnesses were summoned, Yakhimovich was called to appear, and a further psychiatric commission was agreed upon. According to eye-witnesses at the trial, Yakhimovich aroused the sympathy of all present, not excluding the Prosecutor and escort soldiers. (*Chronicle*, August 1969.)

He was sent to the Serbsky Institute for a third diagnosis. The result is interesting. In his case, the Serbsky proved less severe than the Riga in-patient commission.

Extracts from the Serbsky Institute statement:

"As the documents in the criminal case show, Yakhimovich began in 1963 openly to express his independent ideas about the state of agriculture, for which reason he was expelled on August 21 from the Party, subsequently reinstated and given a severe reprimand.

"In January 1968 he wrote down a broadcast he heard on the BBC and distributed it, partly by post, to students known and unknown to him. At the same time, he wrote a letter containing reformist ideas covering a wide range of state and social questions and sent it to the Central Committee of the CPSU . . .

"In his depositions when interrogated the patient pointed out that in his actions he pursued only one aim, the triumph of truth, for truth 'must be worked out with our own brains, must be felt by our own hearts, by every cell of the body'. The patient ended his testimony with a poem by Yevtushenko . . .

"He insisted to the doctor that his actions should not be considered those of a sick man, and at the same time declared frankly that he was afraid that he would be pronounced mentally ill . . .

"Because of his mental condition, Yakhimovich should be sent to a normal psychiatric hospital for obligatory treatment.

"(Signed) Pechernikova, Lunts, Taltse, Tabanova."

Yakhimovich is now in Riga City Psychiatric Hospital.

VLADIMIR GERSHUNI (see Appendix II, 23), a bricklayer (b. 1930), was incriminated by 20 copies of a leaflet in defence of Grigorenko, published in Paris by the International Committee for the Defence of Human Rights. He himself signed, amongst other documents exposing injustice, the appeal to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

"For Gershuni the struggle against lies and violence is not a part of life, but the whole of it." (*Chronicle*, December 1969.) He was arrested in 1949 for his part in an anti-Stalinist youth group, tortured during interrogation (the interrogator, Nikolsky, now receives a pension), and sent for ten years to the same camp where Solzhenitsyn was held and which is described in *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*.

In spite of evidence by witnesses who testified that he was a good worker and a morally stable person, the court decided that Gershuni was "non-accountable" and sent him to the mental hospital wing of Butyrka prison, where he at first shared a cell with criminals seriously ill. The Serbsky Institute diagnosed him to be suffering from "chronic schizophrenia" (form not mentioned) and an Ideological Diagnostic team including V. A. Mezentsev [editor of the journal *Science and Religion*, dedicated to the eradication of religion in the USSR] concluded he was an active member of a group fighting against the Soviet social and political system. (*Chronicle*, April 1970.) He is now in a prison mental hospital in Oryol, which occupies the buildings of the old provincial jail.

VALERIA NOVODVORSKAYA, aged 19, a student of outstanding ability, was forcibly committed to Kazan special psychiatric hospital after distributing leaflets in the Palace of Congresses, Moscow, on December 5, 1969 (Soviet Constitution Day). (*Chronicle*, April 1970.)

VLADIMIR BORISOV (see Appendix II, 1, 16, 22), signed the appeal to the United Nations in May 1969, and a letter in defence of Grigorenko. In November 1969 he was tried after being subjected to psychiatric examination, at which it was stated that the "samizdat" in his possession, and his signatures to protest letters could only be regarded as evidence of mental disorder or hooliganism. (*Chronicle*, December 1969.) He was sent to a special (prison) psychiatric hospital.

VICTOR KUZNETSOV (see Appendix II,1), (whose father was also imprisoned and perished) completed a course in graphic arts, until 1966 worked in the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. In March 1965 he spoke at Moscow University in a debate on "Cynicism in Modern Life". The debate was tape-recorded. After it, KGB collaborators grabbed him in the street and illegally searched him. In October 1966 at a student conference in "The House of Friendship", Moscow, on "The problem of freedom in the modern world", Kuznetsov had just managed to recount the consequences of his last speech when the organisers closed the conference—Kuznetsov was arrested, forcibly put into a mental hospital for investigation and spent two months there.

Kuznetsov's wife protested energetically. In a letter sent to the paper *Izvestia* (not published there, but later printed in *Il Populo*, Rome, April 17, 1967; and in Russian in *Possev*, Frankfurt, May 12, 1967) she wrote: "On November 1, at 6 a.m., he was seized and delivered in a police van, escorted by a policeman and a nurse, to the Moscow Region psychiatric hospital on 8th of March Street . . .

"Since when have people been picked up for diagnosis so early in the morning?

"Since when have people been delivered in police vans for diagnosis? . . ."

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He was arrested again on March 20, 1969, examined at the Serbsky Institute (the commission included Lunts, Landau, and Pechernaya), which recommended compulsory treatment in a special psychiatric hospital. The court rejected defence counsel's plea for a second expert examination, and Kuznetsov was sent to Kazan even before his appeal was heard. The appeal court upheld the decision. (*Chronicle,* August 1969.)

G. SHIMANOV (see Appendix II, 6), has described his experiences in Kashchenko Psychiatric Hospital (Moscow), where he was committed for his religious beliefs, in a collection of writings *Before my death,* circulated in "samizdat". Attached to the writings are two appeals by him, to Soviet and to world public opinion, to speak out against the practice of committing mentally healthy people to psychiatric hospitals because of their opposition views. (*Chronicle,* April 1970.)

IVANKOV, radio operator of the tanker "Tuapse", asked for political asylum in the United States and was later deceived into returning to the Soviet Union. (The US State Department has a letter from the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington guaranteeing that on his return to his homeland Ivankov would not be subjected to repressive measures or persecution.) From the moment of his return he has been imprisoned in mental hospitals, and the doctors tell him openly that he is in for the rest of his life. While in Chernyakhovsk prison hospital, Ivankov used to tell the other patients and politicals about his tragedy, and was punished with aminazine and sulfazine injections in gigantic doses. In July 1968 he was transferred to the similar hospital at Dnepropetrovsk. (*Chronicle,* June 1969.)

VALERY LUKANIN, aged 23, of the town of Roshal, Moscow Region, in the Spring of 1969 placed a poster in his window protesting against the continuing presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. He was despatched to a psychiatric hospital, and without being informed of the fact, was declared insane with a diagnosis "serious form of schizophrenia". His action was classified under Article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code ("anti-Soviet agitation"). The investigation of his case and trial were also concealed from him. His mother was threatened that if she told her son about the trial she would not in future be allowed visits.

He is now in Kazan special psychiatric hospital. (*Chronicle,* August 1969.)

GIRSH FEIGIN. The *Guardian* of December 30, 1970, reported that according to Jewish sources, Feigin, a 45-year-old Jew who declared the previous June that he renounced his Soviet citizenship, had been placed in a psychiatric hospital in Riga. Feigin, a major in the armed forces reserve, had returned his wartime honours after his applications to emigrate to Israel had been turned down. He was released after three weeks and allowed to emigrate.

HOW MANY MORE?

The above are only a few of the known cases. How many other people, whose names are unknown, have suffered a similar fate? We do not know, but some idea of scale is provided by the fact that the Leningrad and Kazan hospital prisons are reported to have a total of about one thousand inmates each.

The *Chronicle* reveals an official attitude which affects to see not only social and political deviation but also private protests and petitions as signs of insanity: "A number of facts indicate that the reception rooms of the highest official bodies in Moscow either have an ambulance on permanent duty from the psychiatric first-aid service, or are in direct and speedy contact with this service . . . People . . . who have come to the reception rooms of the Party Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet, the All-Union Council of Trade Unions, the KGB and other organizations with complaints have not been able to put their case, but have been forcibly driven off to Moscow mental hospitals and then, after a psychiatric diagnosis, to their local hospitals."

The confinement of the internationally known biologist Jaures Medvedev in a psychiatric hospital from May 29 to June 17, 1970, raised an outcry both in the Soviet Union and abroad. The writer and Nobel prize-winner Solzhenitsyn wrote, at the time of Medvedev's arrest, the following letter (*Chronicle,* June 1970):

"This is how we live: without any arrest warrant or any medical justification four policemen and two doctors come to a healthy man's house. The doctors declare that he is crazy, the police Major shouts: 'We are an ORGAN OF COERCION! Get up!' They twist his arms and drive him off to the madhouse.

"This can happen tomorrow to any one of us. It has just happened to Jaures Medvedev, a geneticist and publicist, a man of subtle, precise and brilliant intellect and of warm heart (I know personally of his disinterested help to unknown, ill and dying people). It is precisely for the DIVERSITY of his fertile gifts that he is charged with abnormality: 'a split personality'! It is precisely his sensitivity to injustice, to stupidity, which is presented as a sick deviation: 'poor adaptation to the social environment'! Once you think in other ways than that which is PRESCRIBED—that means you're abnormal! As for well adapted people, they must all think alike. And there is no means of redress: even the appeals of our best scientists and writers bounce back like peas off a wall.

"If only this were the first case! But this devious suppression of people without searching for any guilt, when the real reason is too shameful to state, is becoming a fashion. Some of the victims are widely known, many more are unknown. Servile psychiatrists, breakers of their [Hippocratic] oath, define as 'mental illness': concern about social problems, and superfluous enthusiasm, and superfluous coldness, and excessively brilliant gifts, and the lack of them.

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"Yet even simple common sense ought to have acted as a restraint. After all, Chaadeyev [the thinker declared officially mad by Emperor Nicholas I in 1836] did not even have a finger laid on him, but we have now been cursing his persecutors for over a century. It is time to think clearly: the incarceration of free-thinking healthy people in madhouses is SPIRITUAL MURDER, it is a variation on the GAS CHAMBER, but is even more cruel: the torture of the people being killed is more malicious and more prolonged. Like the gas chambers these crimes will NEVER be forgotten, and all those involved in them will be condemned for all time, during their life and after their death.

"In lawlessness, in the committing of crimes, the point must be remembered at which a man becomes a cannibal!"

* * * * *

There is a reverse side to the picture:

On May 4, 1970, in Camp 3 of the Mordovian camps, a certain Baranov, while attempting to escape, was first wounded and then finished off by several shots, in full view of the prisoners. Baranov was mentally ill; but in spite of prisoners' demands he was not treated. [Anatoli Marchenko, in his book *My Testimony* (English version published by Pall Mall Press), an account of his prison and camp experiences, describes what appears to be part of KGB policy—the placing of some mentally sick people in the labour camps to make life even worse for the political prisoners in them.]

As a sign of protest at the murder of Baranov, 21 witnesses announced a hunger-strike. Three were punished by being sent to Vladimir Prison to complete their sentences (two years), the other 18 were sent to the punishment block of the camp for an unknown period. (*Chronicle*, June 1970.)

VENITE KODENE, born 1919, a Lithuanian collective farm worker, was sentenced in 1968 to ten years in a labour camp for events of 20 years ago [the post-war nationalist resistance]. She was arrested in the psychiatric hospital where she was being treated, on the denunciation of a doctor who had listened to her talking in a delirium. She is still mentally ill. (*Chronicle*, August 1970.)

CORNELIA MEE

* * * * *

APPENDIX I

Appeal to Western Psychiatrists by Vladimir Bukovsky

In recent years in our country a number of court orders have been made involving the placing in psychiatric hospitals ("of special type" and otherwise) of people who in the opinion of their relatives and close friends are mentally healthy. These people are: Grigorenko, Rips, Gorbanevskaya, Novodvorskaya, Yakhimovich, Gershuni, Fainberg, Victor Kuznetsov, Iofe, V. Borisov and others—people well known for their initiatives in defence of civil rights in the USSR.

This phenomenon arouses justified anxiety, especially in view of the widely publicized placing of the biologist Jaures Medvedev in a psychiatric hospital by extra-judicial means.

The diagnoses of the psychiatrists who have served as expert witnesses in court, and on whose diagnoses the court orders are based, provoke many doubts as regards their content. However, only specialists in psychiatry can express authoritative opinions about the degree of legitimacy of these diagnoses.

Taking advantage of the fact that I have managed to obtain exact copies of the diagnoses of the forensic-psychiatric teams which examined Grigorenko, Fainberg, Gorbanevskaya, Borisov and Yakhimovich and extracts from the diagnosis on V. Kuznetsov, I am sending you these documents, and also various letters and materials which reveal the characters of these people.

I will be very grateful to you if you can study this matter and express your opinion on it.

I realize that at a distance and without the essential clinical information it is very difficult to determine the mental condition of a person and either to diagnose an illness or assert the absence of any illness.

Therefore I ask you to express your opinion on only this point: do the above-mentioned diagnoses contain enough scientifically-based evidence not only to indicate the mental illness described in the diagnoses but also to indicate the necessity of isolating these people completely from society?

I will be very happy if you can interest your colleagues in this matter and if you consider it possible to place it on the agenda for discussion by the next International Congress of Psychiatrists.

For a healthy person there is no fate more terrible than indefinite internment in a psychiatric hospital.

I believe that you will not remain indifferent to this problem and will devote a portion of your time to it—just as physicists find time to combat the use of the achievements of their science in ways harmful to mankind.

Thanking you in advance,

28 January 1971. V. Bukovsky

Note: V. Bukovsky was arrested on March 29, 1971 for anti-Soviet agitation and faces a possible prison sentence of 7 years—or internment in a psychiatric hospital.

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APPENDIX II

Documents available (September 1971)

1. Official diagnoses on (i) Grigorenko (ii) Gorbanevskaya (iii) Yakhimovich (iv) Fainberg (v) Borisov (vi) Kuznetsov.
2. Formulae of drugs used and notes on some of them
3. Kallistratova's speech in defence of Grigorenko at Tashkent.
4. Gorbanevskaya's letters from prison-hospital to her family.
5. Open letter to Soviet psychiatrists by two of Gorbanevskaya's friends.
6. Shimanov's account of his confinement in Kashchenko hospital because of his religious beliefs.
7. Fainberg's appeal from the Leningrad prison-hospital to human rights organizations.
8. The experiences of Bukovsky (Report of an interview with a Western journalist).
9. Esenin-Volpin: Open letter to Solzhenitsyn (on Grigorenko).
10. Esenin-Volpin: Appeal to friends.
11. Roy Medvedyev: Day-by-day account of the confinement in Kaluga Mental Hospital of his brother Zhores Medvedyev, the biologist.
12. V. N. Chalidze: On compulsory internment in mental hospitals.
13. Gorbanevskaya on Fainberg.
*14. M. Naritsa's account of his internment in the Leningrad prison hospital.
15. Chernyshov's appeal from Leningrad prison hospital.
16. Borisov's letters from Leningrad prison hospital.
*17. Razumny's denunciation of practices in Leningrad prison hospital.
18. The Ministry of Health's directives of 1961 on "The immediate hospitalization of mentally ill people representing a social danger".
19. Mrs. Grigorenko's appeal to the World Mental Health Society (World Federation of Mental Health?).
*20. About twenty other important items, from the *Chronicle of Current Events*.
21. Gorbanevskaya on her experiences.
22. Academician A. D. Sakharov's appeal on behalf of Fainberg, Borisov and others to the Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs.
23. Gershuni's diary—letter from Oryol prison mental hospital, March 1971.

* Ready soon.

APPENDIX III

Moved January 19, 1971:

The Board of Directors of the Canadian Psychiatric Association accepts the report† of the Section of Psychiatry, British Columbia Medical Association of December, 1970, regarding the alleged wrongful detention in mental hospitals in the U.S.S.R. of seemingly healthy individuals whose views and attitudes are in conflict with those of the regime.

The Board of Directors recognizes that the information concerning instances of such practice included in the report is as "hard" as can be expected short of first-hand investigation (which is most unlikely to be allowed).

The Board of Directors therefore accepts and endorses the resolutions of the Executive Committee of the Section of Psychiatry, B.C.M.A., December 21, 1970 (page 1, paragraphs A, B, C, D.).

The Board of Directors urges the Canadian Medical Association to study the report, to support the resolutions and to press strongly through the following channels for further study and actions regarding such alleged practice in the U.S.S.R. or in any other country or countries where similar practices are alleged to take place:

a. Medical Associations of other countries.
b. International psychiatric associations.
c. World Health Organization.
d. World Psychiatric Association.

†see over

†A 45-page document edited by Norman B. Hirt, M.D., Chairman, Section of Psychiatry, British Columbia Medical Association, 301-720 West Broadway, Vancouver, B.C. Canada.

Notes to page 4:

Chlorpromazine/Largactil.
1% sterile solution of purified sulphur in peach kernel oil.

PUBLISHED SOURCES:

Survey No. 77, Autumn 1970 (the televised interviews with Bukovsky, Amalrik and Yakir; Pisarev's letter to the Praesidium of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences; Grigorenko's Prison Diary).

Rights and Wrongs (Essays on Human Rights), edited for Amnesty International by Christopher Hill, published by Penguin.

FORTHCOMING PUBLICATION:

P. Reddaway: *Uncensored Russia; the Human Rights Movement,* published by Jonathan Cape.

Produced by Cornelia Mee for a Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals.

This booklet is obtainable from Housmans, 5 Caledonian Road, London, N.1., England. Price 15 p, plus postage

John Arliss Limited, Cambridge. England.
(*Any correspondence will be forwarded.*)

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3. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
7 November 1971

A Question of Madness

Zhores Medvedev is a prominent Soviet biochemist who, after being dismissed from his post as director of a biochemical laboratory in 1969, was seized at his home in Obninsk, an atomic research center in the Kaluga Region, southwest of Moscow, and taken to a mental hospital in Kaluga, the regional capital, for "psychiatric examination" on May 29, 1970. A bold opponent of state interference in Soviet science, Zhores Medvedev had used his enforced leisure to write a number of samizdat, or privately circulated, articles pursuing his attack on the stifling effect of Soviet bureaucracy. The following account of how the stage was set for his seizure, of his 19 days in a clinic and of how he came to be "provisionally released" is a distillation of "A Question of Madness"—a book he wrote in collaboration with his twin brother, Roy. The book, which has been published in England and is scheduled for publication in the United States by Knopf in December, has drawn from the Soviet Government newspaper Izvestia a vehement denial that healthy persons are detained in psychiatric hospitals because of their dissident activities.

IN early May, 1970, I was asked by the director of the Obninsk Psychiatric Clinic, Y. V. Kiryushin, to come for a talk about my elder son, Aleksandr. (Having reached the so-called awkward age, Aleksandr's conduct both at school and at home had, for the last couple of years, decidedly changed for the worse. His general behavior was what would be called "hippy" abroad.) Since I had previously consulted with Kiryushin about Aleksandr and since the director had every reason to check on the boy's development, I was not particularly worried by this summons.

The Obninsk Psychiatric Clinic consists of an outpatient department and a small hospital with some 25 to 30 beds. My son and I went to Kiryushin's waiting room in the outpatient department, but the nurse on duty told us he was expecting us in his office in the hospital. There the three of us talked for a time; then Kiryushin said he wanted to speak to my son alone. Leaving them, I sat down on a chair in the corridor. About two minutes later, a nurse told me that I could not sit in the corridor and that Kiryushin wanted me to go to the hospital waiting room. Opening a door with a special key, she led me through a bathroom, then opened a second door and left me in a small room whose double-framed window was covered by a solid grill and was locked. So, too, I discovered, was the door. Clearly, I had walked into a trap. This was no waiting room; it was a changing room where, after admission, patients were undressed before being given a bath and issued their hospital clothing.

I began to bang on the door as hard as I could, but soon stopped. Such behavior, I realized, might be used against me if my confinement in this small room turned out not to be simply a mistake on the nurse's part. I had to think of some other way out. It was becoming very warm in the room, so I threw my coat on the chair, then remembered that in the inside pocket was a large pocketknife I used for pruning in my garden. Using the blade, I finally managed to slip the lock and open the door. Opening the door that led out to the corridor in the same way, I arrived in the waiting room, where another nurse, seeing a stranger in an overcoat, showed me out to the street.

ON Friday, May 29, Kiryushin called to say that he must see me—again, ostensibly, about Aleksandr—at the clinic immediately. I asked whether he could not perhaps discuss the matter with my wife this time. "No," said Kiryushin, "it's something too awkward to discuss with your wife." Aware that this was another trap, I told him that I was planning to leave that afternoon for a weekend in Moscow (which was true) and asked if we could postpone our meeting until Monday. He agreed to the change. Later that afternoon, however, I heard the sound of brakes [illegible] building and, looking out the window, saw three policemen, Kiryushin and some other person getting out of a hospital minibus. Within a few seconds there was a knock at the door.

I decided not to respond; after all, the inviolability of the home is protected by the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. After knocking harder, Kiryushin started to shout: "Zhores Aleksandrovich. Please open the door. It's Kiryushin."

But still I made no reply. Someone began shaking the door, cautiously at first, then for all he was worth. Plaster was coming off the jamb and the door was beginning to give when I heard the voice of my younger son, Dima, outside and the sound of a key turning. The door opened.

"Papa, there are . . ." Dima began to say as three policemen burst into the apartment behind him.

"Stop!" I shouted. "This is a private apartment."

"It belongs to the state," a hulking sergeant promptly replied, "and the police have the right to enter any apartment."

"Do you have a warrant? Show it to me."

"We're not planning to arrest you. We are just accompanying the doctors."

The sergeant pointed to Kiryushin and the other man, who in the meantime had marched uninvited into my study and sat down. Kiryushin sat on the sofa, trying by his whole demeanor to make clear that he was not the principal figure in this scene. I sat in my chair behind the desk opposite the stranger. For a moment we looked at each other in silence. Then, suddenly, in the affable tone of an old friend, he said: "Zhores Aleksandrovich, is something troubling you?"

"And who do you think you are, bursting into my apartment without permission?"

"I am the head doctor of the Kaluga Psychiatric Hospital, Aleksandr Yefimovich Lifshits."

"Do you have any identification or a document authorizing you to do this?"

"No, but we invited you to come [illegible] you refused, so we had to come to see you at home."

"But surely you at least have your identity papers?"

When it turned out that neither Lifshits nor Kiryushin had brought along any identification, I reminded them that in that case I was not obliged to discuss anything with either of them.

"If you refuse to talk to us," Lifshits replied, "then we will be obliged to draw the appropriate conclusions." And he nodded significantly toward the policemen standing by the door. I realized that even my silence could be used as a pretext for some decision on their part. In this situation I had to restrain my natural indignation and play for time until my wife returned. She had, ironically, gone off to see Kiryushin directly after his phone call to ask him why he so urgently needed to see me.

"How is your son feeling?" asked Lifshits.

"Quite well at the moment. But surely you didn't come to me with the police because of him?"

"Why not? We might also be interested in your son's health," answered Lifshits, and he began to ask professional questions about my son's behavior.

"And how do you feel yourself, Zhores Aleksandrovich?"

I answered that I felt marvelous.

"But if you feel so marvelous, then why do you think we have turned up here today?"

"Obviously you must answer that question yourself," I replied.

JUST then my wife ran into the room. She understood everything at a glance and began to fire indignant questions at Lifshits and Kiryushin. While Lifshits fidgeted in his chair, talking to my wife, I realized that it had not been finally decided beforehand how this unsolicited visit would end. The head doctor of the Kaluga Hospital had come to have a look at a man whom he had never seen before. With Kiryushin I had previously talked only about my son. They would undoubtedly have studied my medical "history" in the local clinic, but from these papers they could have seen only that their intended victim had never consulted psychiatrists or neuropathologists and had always been diagnosed as normal in the yearly neuropathological checkups obligatory for people who work in medical institutes where they can be exposed to X-rays. They could have had no complaints about me from people who knew me. The doctors could come into a man's apartment without an invitation, but they could not just take a man they didn't know off to the mental hospital simply on K.G.B. orders. Through personal observation and conversation they had to find "evidence," and in this way "convince themselves" that the man somebody had marked down for treatment really did display signs of mental illness. For this reason it was important to talk to them only in the presence of witnesses.

I took my wife aside, calmed her and asked her to go to several colleagues who lived nearby and tell them to come immediately.

It was while Lifshits was asking about certain aspects of my scientific work in Obninsk and, before that, in Moscow that my colleagues from the Institute of Medical Radiology began to arrive. Inviting them into my study, I briefly explained the situation. To the obvious consternation of the doctors and the police, the six men who had come were all very solid citizens. Lifshits quickly recovered his composure, however, and soon came to the main point.

"Zhores Aleksandrovich," he said, "in 1962 you wrote 'Biology and the Cult of Personality,' an attack on Lysenko [Trofim Lysenko, the Stalinist geneticist]. I read it recently. It's a polemical work. But by now people have forgotten about Lysenko. The struggle in genetics is over. And instead of forgetting about it like everybody else and getting on with your work, you recently published this book abroad. Why?"

It took some time for me to explain the complicated history of how this book had come to be written, completely revised and unanimously recommended for publication in the Soviet Union by a 15-man commission set up by the Academy of Sciences; of how this recommendation had never been acted upon; of how a Russian émigré journal in West Germany had planned to publish the outdated first draft, which had—without my permission or connivance—been circulating in *samizdat;* of how, to protect my own interests, I had given permission to my friend Prof. I. Michael Lerner, a noted American geneticist who knows Russian, to translate the book, and of how, in 1969, it had been brought out by a serious academic publisher, the Columbia University Press. I remarked [illegible] that the publication of academic work abroad by Soviet scholars is not forbidden and added that nobody had discovered anything "psychopathological" about my book—except perhaps in the mentality of some of the persons involved in the genetics controversy. And I concluded my explanation by saying that if I had broken some law I was prepared to discuss the problem with any relevant official—right up to the Procurator General [the Procurator is charged in the Soviet Union with prosecution and with such other duties as investigating citizens' complaints]—but not with psychiatrists from Kaluga.

Whether I convinced my visitor, I don't know. He changed the subject and started talking about another book which existed only in manuscript. Titled "Fruitful Meetings Between Scientists of the World," it deals with the problem of co-ordinating scientific research on a worldwide scale. Yet at first I wasn't even sure which book Lifshits had in mind because he had got the title wrong and was unable to tell me what it was about. Evidently he had been shown only one or two episodes from the first section of the manuscript and told very little about the rest. Nevertheless he asked me why I had published this book abroad as well.

I answered that this was absolute nonsense, that someone had crudely misinformed him. After briefly describing the central theme, I said that no copies had gone abroad and that it was not even circulating in *samizdat.* If anyone thought otherwise, then let him show me facts and not indulge in fantasy.

Nothing deterred, and having reached the end of the series of questions obviously prepared in advance, Lifshits now came to the purpose of his visit. Very politely, he suggested that I "voluntarily" go with him to the Kaluga Psychiatric Hospital for a brief examination. He assured me that I could return home afterward, adding that refusal to submit to a voluntary examination would be very detrimental to my interests.

AT this point, my wife and colleagues joined the discussion. They asked from whom Lifshits had got the authority to come with the police to a man he had never even seen before. Also, aware that someone must request a psychiatrist to visit a person suspected of mental illness and that, even then, the psychiatrist could act only if the person were dangerous to those around him or to himself, they asked who had sent him. Hard-pressed under very professional interrogation, Lifshits finally admitted that his visit had been made at the request of the chairman of the Obninsk City Soviet, Nina Petrovna Antonenko. (She had been the first of the officials to ask to talk to me about Aleksandr's behavior.) Mrs. Antonenko had allegedly asked that I be examined, and now Lifshits could see for himself that it would really be best for me to agree to this.

By now, nearly an hour had passed since the arrival of the psychiatrists, and "the patient" still just sat there in his chair. Something, obviously, had to be done. Yet it was equally obvious that Lifshits very much wanted to secure my "free" consent to being taken off to the hospital. Having so far failed to obtain this, he asked Kiryushin and my friends to join him in the next room for a "confidential" talk which resulted in a number of unacceptable "peace proposals."

Lifshits's main concession was a guarantee that the examination would not take more than three days. But I remained adamant on several points: that I did not need a psychiatric examination at all; that, should the need ever arise, I would make my own arrangements and consult more experienced men than Lifshits, and that I would not submit to the verbal orders of policemen who had entered my apartment illegally. They would have to use force.

Thus, the better part of a second hour had gone by in fruitless discussion when, suddenly, a police major entered the room. Where he had come from I don't know. Nobody had used my phone to call for reinforcements. None of the three policemen had left the apartment. The major's sudden arrival was very odd.

"What's this?" he demanded in a blustering tone. "Why are you refusing to submit to the requests of the doctor?"

"And who on earth might you be? I didn't invite you here," I replied none too politely myself.

"I'm Police Major Nikolai Filipovich Nemov. I must ask you to come with me to the ambulance."

"If you are a police major, then you must know the law regarding the inviolability of citizens' homes, especially since the police are responsible for law and order."

"We are responsible for enforcement!" Nemov retorted. "Get to your feet! I order you to get to your feet!"

Not observing any reaction to his command, the major ordered everybody to leave the room. Only my wife refused. Then, at some sign from the major, the policemen rushed toward me. But my wife blocked their way and said she would not permit them to use force. Grabbing her arms, the policemen dragged her into the next room. Nemov kicked the door shut. The two sergeants returned, grabbed my arms, twisted them behind my back and yanked me out of my chair. Then they marched me down the stairs and out into the courtyard. A curious crowd had already gathered around the ambulance. They shoved me inside, climbed in after me and off we went to Kaluga.

* * *

ON my first night in the Kaluga Psychiatric Hospital, where I was put in a general ward for six people, I slept badly. In the morning I got to know my neighbors, then met the doctor in charge of my wing, Galina Petrovna Bondareva. She informed me that in about an hour I would be called before a "commission."

I had been placed in a relatively quiet ward. One patient, a scientist, had been suffering a depressive psychosis periodically during the last few years. A youth with suspected psychopathy had been [illegible] by his draft board. My third neighbor was in the hospital by order of the Procurator: the hospital's task was to determine whether he was "legally responsible" and could be brought to trial on charges growing out of a fight with policemen. The fourth man was undergoing compulsory treatment for alcoholism. The fifth—considered the most seriously ill—was a pleasant young man named Sasha who had been in the hospital for eight years.

ADJUSTING to my new situation and preparing to face the commission, I began to think about the workings of the system which had brought me here. It was important for me to understand who was responsible for staging this production. The doctor in charge of a regional psychiatric hospital was a fairly important man, and as such Lifshits would never normally have traveled to another city to see a citizen suspected of mental illness. Antonenko, the Obninsk City Soviet chairman, had neither the authority nor the power to order Lifshits to do what he had done the day before. On the contrary, whoever had written the scenario had given Antonenko only a minor part to play. Pressure had also been put on Kiryushin. It must have come from the regional level in Kaluga—hence the involvement of the Department of Education, Lifshits and the Kaluga mental hospital. Furthermore, without special instructions the Obninsk police would never have sent a detail headed by a major to help Lifshits, who had arrived without any official documents. It was apparent that Major Nemov had been expecting a speedy conclusion to the operation, so he could report to someone higher up. But when enough time had passed for a trip to Kaluga and back and the sergeants still hadn't returned or reported, he could no longer contain himself and had gone to see what was wrong. Yet to whom would Major Nemov have reported?

The fact that Lifshits had read a first draft of the work on the controversy in genetics, as well as some excerpts from my manuscript on internation-

al scientific cooperation point-

ed above all to the Kaluga office of the K.G.B., the Committee for State Security, or secret police. It would be their function to collect this sort of material relating to people living in the region, and links with foreigners and correspondence with people abroad were also matters of special interest to the K.G.B. Moreover, while the judiciary has a legal right to require that lawbreakers submit to a psychiatric examination, the K.G.B. apparently has this right but no obligation to observe the legal formalities. The main reason for mounting this operation must have been not my work on genetics but my more recent manuscript, which had found its way into my Kaluga dossier in summary, perhaps, together with photocopies of extracts.

Yet was only the regional office of the K.G.B. involved? Lifshits was not directly subordinate to the regional K.G.B. since his hospital came under the jurisdiction of the Kaluga Health Department and eventually under a special branch of the Ministries of Health of, first, the republic, then of the U.S.S.R. During the two months of preparations, then, Lifshits must have coordinated the two sides of the operation (K.G.B. and Ministry of Health), most probably through the offices of the Ministry of Health of the U.S.S.R. since the completely centralized K.G.B. has no autonomous system in the various republics.

The whole performance, then, was obviously a Moscow-directed attempt to represent my manuscript on international cooperation as the result of mental illness, the pathological delusions of someone shown to be suffering from mania, etc. At the same time they would be able to discredit my other works in similar terms, and perhaps those of my brother for good measure, since the mental make-up of twins is generally the same.

These were my preliminary hypotheses. I was not very optimistic; a man is not seized by the police in front of his family in order to be released three days later and told that the examination has not revealed anything wrong. My wife would, of course, have immediately informed my brother and Moscow friends about my plight. But what could they do on a weekend, when all medical and judicial institutions are closed? By Monday the commission would already have given its verdict. It was no accident that Kiryushin had knocked on my door at 5 o'clock on a Friday afternoon.

AT about 1 P.M. on Saturday I was asked to appear before the commission in Bondareva's office. The first person I saw in the room was a man whom I had met in the office of the chairman of the Obninsk City Soviet and whom Mrs. Antonenko had described only as belonging to the regional Department of Education. He had not further identified himself then. Now he was sitting behind a desk and smiling insolently.

"Stop this masquerade," I said, "and tell me who you are!"

Lifshits introduced him: "This is the head of the Kaluga Psychiatric Clinic, Vladimir Nikolaevich Leznenko."

The third member of this commission was Bondareva.

"May I make a note of your questions while we talk?" I asked.

"No, you may not."

After this, the interview began—some of it reproduced here from brief notes I made that evening when my wife brought me pencil and paper. (Fortunately it is not forbidden to possess writing materials in a mental hospital.)

Judging by his questions, Lifshits now knew more about my manuscript, "Fruitful Meetings Between Scientists of the World," than on the previous evening. Yet his questions also showed that he still had read only the first section. The more important second and third sections—which contained practical recommendations for a more democratic system of international cooperation between scientists and intellectuals and demonstrated the harm suffered by Soviet science because of its relative isolation and poor organization of international scientific contacts—had not been shown him. Therefore, in reply to such questions as "What were your aims in writing this work?" I could only recommend that the doctors read the whole manuscript. I must add that neither Leznenko nor Bondareva had ever seen it or my book about Lysenko.

Later they got around to asking questions about my activities as a scientist and as a "publicist":

"Why have you turned from experimental work to theory in the last few years?"

"What's your view of yourself as a scientist—do you think of yourself as a great scientist, or not?"

"Why do you want to send your book on international scientific cooperation abroad for publication? Who has read it?"

"What is your family life like? How do you sleep at night? What do you do before going to sleep? Do you frequently have headaches?"

I answered that I sleep normally, do not suffer from headaches, had not yet completed my work on international scientific cooperation and therefore didn't intend to publish it anywhere just yet. I further told them that I consider myself an average scientist—many of my colleagues and friends who are the same age have achieved significantly more success in science than I—don't engage in publicist work in the literal meaning of that term but am concerned with questions related to the history of science, scientific popularization and the sociology of science—all of which is completely compatible with my basic profession. I had not switched from experimental to theoretical work, theoretical problems had always interested me, and without going into theoretical problems it is impossible to carry on experimental work. These, approximately, were my answers to the various questions.

I then made the general observation that I had not expected many of the questions they asked. It seemed to me that they bore only a very remote relationship to psychiatry.

"Psychiatrists are interested in all aspects of human activity," answered Lifshits.

"Psychiatry has always been a social science," added Leznenko.

BY Tuesday, June 2—the day after my "examination" was supposed to have been completed—I still had not been discharged, despite the fact that a second commission, including a forensic psychiatrist sent from Moscow, had failed to find signs of any "acute" deviations from the norm or of psychological disturbance. Lifshits would say no more than that he felt it advisable to keep me under clinical observation for several more days. On Thursday, June 4, still another commission — this time including a three-man delegation from Moscow—interrogated me. Now the outcome seemed more hopeful. When the group had finished its deliberations, Lifshits stepped into the visitors' room, where my wife was waiting to hear the verdict, and informed her that the commission had found it possible to recommend my discharge.

"It's too late today to make all the formal arrangements," said Lifshits. "Come tomorrow afternoon."

The following day, however, the mood inexplicably changed. Although I could see the package containing my clothes lying ready on the matron's desk, I was not given the clothes. Then at 4:30, when inmates of the nonviolent Third Wing were allowed a supervised stroll in the small square next to the hospital, my brother came up to me and said that I might not be discharged that day. His theory was that the Minister of Health might personally have authorized my committal at the request of the Kaluga authorities and might now be reluctant to admit his mistake so quickly. Our conversation was broken off by a nurse who told me to return to the ward. Seeing Bondareva in the corridor, I asked her why I had been called in from my walk.

"Today is not a visiting day, and you were talking to your brother," she replied. "I must ask you to strictly observe hospital regulations."

"But I'm supposed to be discharged today. Has this been changed?"

"Tomorrow Dr. Lifshits will explain everything himself."

Until now, relatives coming from other cities had always been allowed a meeting, no matter what day of the week it was. Now, standing in the corridor, which was separated from the visitors' room by a door, the upper half of which was glass, I could see several patients talking to relatives and I could see my wife. The door that separated us was locked. A nurse, instructed not to let me through, guarded it. While my wife and I communicated by signs through the glass, patients clustered behind me, amazed at a situation so unusual in this wing.

One of the astonished bystanders was my neighbor from the ward, Sasha, the youth who had already spent eight years in the hospital. His illness was cyclical; some conflict or irritation would spark a relapse, but afterward there was usually a period of remission when he could work and study. He was a completely reasonable young man and well-read. Right now he was in a period of temporary recovery and served as the "elder" of our wing and also as its librarian. As the "elder," he openly expressed his indignation to the nurse guarding the door. At that moment Bondareva came by. Seeing Sasha arguing with the nurse, she said to him sternly, "Sasha, go back to the ward immediately!"

"And why can't I stay here? After all, it's a public corridor," the boy replied.

"Sasha, go to the ward!" Her tone was sharper.

"Then I resign as elder of the wing!" Sasha burst out furiously. This was insubordination, yet the staff in a psychiatric hospital does not usually pay much attention to such displays. On this occasion, however, Bondareva's face grew red with rage. Although Sasha returned to the ward as ordered, 20 minutes later he was summoned to Bondareva's office. Then a strapping orderly we had never seen before arrived. A few moments later I saw through the window that this orderly was taking the boy to another building, to the terrible Seventh Wing. Because of the iron bars on the windows, the Seventh Wing resembled a prison. Very severe chronic cases were kept there, patients with advanced disintegration of the personality, dangerous madmen and persons under compulsory treatment by order of the courts. Soon after this a nurse and the orderly came into the ward and began to remove the night table and all of Sasha's belongings, which consisted mainly of books. Earning a little money by making boxes in the wing's workshop, Sasha spent the major portion of his savings on books, and he was especially fascinated by political literature. In the course of his hospital stay, the boy had managed to collect almost all of the works of Marx and Engels.

* * *

ON the morning of June 6 it became clear that the "liberal" period was over and that the day before Lifshits had received new instructions from both Kaluga and Moscow.

After Sasha had been transferred to another wing, the same thing happened to two other patients whom I had gotten to know well—like me, they were in the hospital for political reasons. One of them, a young man of about 24, soon after demobilization from the army had begun to write memoranda to different official bodies sharply criticizing the Komsomol, the youth organization of the Communist party, for having degenerated into a bureaucratic organization. He had proposed the creation of a new, more democratic youth association. I never read any of these memoranda, but practically everyone is familiar with the bureaucratic ways of the Komsomol. All the same, a proposal to reorganize it had obviously been taken for the "reformist delusion" of a madman. The second person, a middle-aged man, had been picked up on the street early one morning for posting a declaration he had composed. In the handwritten declaration, he criticized the Kaluga Party Committee, on whose orders he had been fired three months previously from the

local school where he taught. After several hopeless attempts to be reinstated or find a new job, he had exercised his constitutional right of freedom of speech to complain about this arbitrary treatment. And here he was in the hospital with a condition diagnosed chiefly as "poor adaptation to the conditions of the social environment." Both "patients" had been undergoing intensive treatment for three months. The man who had proposed the reorganization of the Komsomol received periodic insulin shock. The author of the declaration had been prescribed something milder—two powerful depressant drugs which, according to the doctors, would change the "basic structure" of the psyche.

Curtains had been pinned over the glass door between the corridor and the visitors' room. The right to walk in the grounds adjacent to the nonviolent Third Wing was withdrawn. Now we were all taken for exercise to the small "pen" fenced off from the rest of the hospital grounds by a high enclosure with doors that could be locked. I was warned that visits would be allowed only on the appointed days (and for not more than 15 or 20 minutes), and that it was desirable if only relatives came.

The relatives came, and—in spite of their being considered "undesirable" — friends and colleagues came as well. Meanwhile, Lifshits and the other authorities were receiving a steady stream of telegrams and protest letters. Flooded with these messages (my brother estimated that on some days Lifshits alone must have received a telegram every half hour), the incredulous Lifshits questioned their authenticity. "These people can hardly all know you personally," he said to me one day, "yet they all categorically contradict the opinion of the doctors. The person who makes up these telegrams is obviously going a bit too far. I suppose your brother is behind it all."

ON Tuesday, June 9, two visitors arrived who, after [illegible] conversation with Lifshits which appeared to have considerable effect on the already rather shaken doctor. My visitors that day were Aleksandr Trifonovich Tvardovsky and Vladimir Fyodorovich Tendryakov.* These two writers contended that if a certain Comrade X has been known for many years to dozens of scientists and other intellectuals who had read his works, heard his lectures and talked with him informally without ever noticing the slightest signs of mental illness or any other "deviations from the norm," then the obvious conclusion is that there are none. Though Lifshits had been subjected to similar arguments many times before, this time the logic seemed to sink in. At any rate, while at first he tried to rebut them by claiming that mental illness can be detected only by a trained psychiatrist, he concluded by assuring the two men that I would be released that week—that is, before June 13—and he was evidently quite sincere. The improved behavior of the hospital staff toward me in the following days was one indication of a change of heart. Also, restrictions on visits were relaxed and walks were again allowed in the grounds next to the wing. However, it was not until June 17 that I was finally released.

To judge by conversations with the doctors between June 6 and 11, the original intention had been to keep me in the hospital for "treatment" for several months. After this, I was to be registered as an outpatient in Obninsk or sent to Kaluga once a month for a check-up. (Without this follow-up my forcible committal would have been shown up for the criminal abuse that it was.) The preliminary diagnosis of "severe mental illness dangerous to the public" had clearly been supplied before May 29 on the basis of the "evidence" presented by the party committee and the opinion of Leznenko. But in agreeing to take on the chief parts in the scenario, Lifshits, Leznenko and Bondareva never imagined that they would be called upon to give so many explanations and clarifications and have to talk to so many people. (My visitors made a point of talking to one or another of the staff doctors, even though this often entailed waiting for hours.) They were also well aware that all these conversations were immediately put down on paper and then discussed with others, but there was no avoiding the talks. Their most difficult problem was having to explain in what way I constituted a danger to the public.

When all was said and done, the commissions sent from Moscow and all the other outside bodies were only peripheral factors. Thus, while the party committee might wish me put away for treatment, the actual treatment, including my discharge, devolved entirely upon the Kaluga doctors, and it was they who bore the brunt of the pressure from both sides. This pressure was all rather too much for them, and the final outcome of the struggle was not clear-cut.

On June 16 Lifshits set a time for a last meeting with my wife to give her some final advice. It amounted to his urging her that in the interests of the family she must use her influence to get me to stop spending my time on "sociology" and "publicist activity." He confirmed that on the next day she could come for me.

On June 17 my wife came to Kaluga on the first train. And now, before being allowed to change into my own clothes, it was my turn to listen to some final advice. Both Lifshits and Bondareva assured me that they were solely concerned about my health, that the interests of the patient were supreme. All along Lifshits had been trying to convince me that I must stop my "publicist activities"; now he made a special point of asking me not to write any account of my stay in the Kaluga hospital. He told my wife that the party committee had given instructions for my immediate reinstatement at the Institute of Medical Radiology and even named the laboratory in which I would be given the post of senior research fellow.

[illegible] act along previous lines and don't

put an end to your publicist activities, we doctors will be unable to help you." Lifshits shrugged, hinting that in those circumstances the affair would be taken up by other authorities. With these parting words, I was released from the hospital.

* * *

WE got home from Kaluga at about 2 o'clock on June 17. Only when I was at last in my own apartment did I feel that the whole fantastic episode was over. But was it?

Arriving in Moscow on June 18, I was astonished to hear that the day before, when I was already free, two of my friends, the film director Mikhail Romm and the writer Venyamin Kaverin, had been seriously criticized at a rather high level for sending protest telegrams.

These rather belated attempts to discipline them could only be explained by some lack of coordination between those responsible for putting the psychiatric scenario into effect and its creators. Neither the Kaluga doctors nor even the Minister of Health had the authority to oblige the Committee on Cinematography or the Secretariat of the Union of Writers to set up a disciplinary meeting for eminent members of the Moscow intelligentsia. (Afterward I learned that several other friends had also been called in on June 16 and 17—by their district party committee or the primary party organization at their place of work or by the authorities of their institutes—and asked to explain their protests.) Instructions to call these meetings, together with copies of the relevant letters and telegrams, could only have come from some central body, which would have been anything but a medical one.

On June 18 my brother was called to the central headquarters of the K.G.B. and assured that it had had no direct involvement in what had happened at Kaluga and Obninsk, and that the whole episode was the work of local authorities. They asked him not to write anything about what had happened and to consider the case closed. My brother agreed on behalf of us both but only if certain conditions were observed. What he insisted on was quite simply that there must be *mutual* action to wind up the whole business. In particular, he demanded that the Kaluga hospital destroy the false medical record, that I not be registered as an outpatient and that no file be kept requiring me to appear at regular intervals for a check-up by psychiatrists. I had made a similar agreement with Lifshits, assuring him that I would not write about the episode so long as he did not remind me of his existence by summoning me for any further psychiatric sessions.

At the end of June, I received a call from the Obninsk Psychiatric Clinic. In a calm, matter-of-fact voice, a nurse informed me that I was expected at the outpatient department for a routine check-up. At first I thought that they were again interested in my son and had got the names wrong, so I asked her to tell me who exactly she wanted and what for. But there was no mistake.

"You have just been treated in the Kaluga hospital," said the nurse, "and now they have sent us your papers, and you are registered with us in the outpatient department. Under the rules we must keep a regular check on the patients' condition for our records."

* * *

THE promise that Zhores Medvedev would be reinstated at the Institute of Medical Radiology, where he had previously worked, was not kept, but he did eventually find a position in his field.

In the fall of 1970, the Moscow Bureau of The New York Times received a postcard from him that said in part:

"My present situation has substantially improved. On Oct. 19 I started work as a senior scientist at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Physiology and Biochemistry of Agricultural Animals. I will be working in the laboratory of proteins, in the field of molecular mechanisms and the development of aging organisms."

According to American scientists who correspond with Medvedev, he continues to hold his post at the institute, which is in the Kaluga Region, and is apparently no longer required to appear for check-ups at any Soviet psychiatric clinic. □

Open Letter

On June 15, 1970, when Zhores Medvedev was confined in a mental hospital, Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, the Soviet novelist and Nobel Prize winner, wrote the following letter, which was soon widely circulated among the Moscow intelligentsia:

THIS IS HOW WE LIVE

Without any arrest warrant or any medical justification, four policemen and two doctors arrive at the home of a healthy man. The doctors declare that he is mad, the police major shouts: "We are the agency of enforcement! Get to your feet." They twist his arms behind his back and take him off to the madhouse.

This could happen tomorrow to any one of us, and it has just happened to Zhores Medvedev, a geneticist and publicist, a man with a brilliant, subtle and precise mind and a warm heart (I have personal knowledge of his disinterested help to sick people dying in obscurity). Because of the very *diversity* of his talents, he is charged with being abnormal, a "split personality." His very sensitivity to injustice, to stupidity, is presented as a "morbid deviation," "poor adaptation to the social environment." Apparently, to harbor thoughts other than those which are *prescribed* means that you are abnormal. Well-adjusted people all think alike. And there is no means of redress. Even the appeals of our best scientists and writers are to no avail—it is like talking to a blank wall.

If only this were the first case! But it has become fashionable, this way of settling accounts with no pretense at seeking out guilt when it is too shameful to state the real reason. Some of the victims are well known, others remain obscure. Servile psychiatrists who break their Hippocratic Oath and are able to describe concern for social problems as "mental illness" can declare a man insane for being too passionate or for being too calm, for the brightness of his talents or for his lack of them.

Yet simple prudence should teach restraint. After all, no one so much as laid a finger on Chaadayev [Petra Yakovlevich Chaadayev, the philosopher officially declared mad on the order of Nicholas I in 1836], but we have been cursing his persecutors for over a century. It is time to understand that the imprisonment of sane persons in madhouses because they have minds of their own is *spiritual murder*, a variation on the *gas chambers*, and even more cruel; the condemned suffer torments more frightful and prolonged. Like the gas chambers, these crimes will *never* be forgotten, and those involved will be condemned for all time, during their life and after their death, without benefit of moratorium.

In lawlessness and evil-doing one must always remember the boundary line beyond which man becomes a cannibal.

It is a very limited calculation to think it is possible to live relying only on force, continually disregarding the protest of conscience.

4. THE LISTENER
25 November 1971

Why are you so backward?

We are already in Zhores Medvedev's debt for his account of the problems under which Soviet scientists have had to labour. Here we have the story of how someone —even now it is not clear who—conceived the idea that the way to discredit his work and to keep him out of circulation was to have him certified insane and committed to a closed ward. The story of how the Obninsk City Soviet, the directors of the Kaluga psychiatric hospital and their unseen prompters in the local KGB and Party were finally defeated reads like an old-fashioned adventure story crossed with *Brave New World*. It is both immensely heartening and in a more subtle way somewhat embarrassing.

The plot, briefly, was this. Zhores Medvedev had been dismissed from his research post in 1969; he had kept up a campaign to have himself reinstated on the grounds that his dismissal had been illegal in the most straightforward sense and contrary to the express terms of his contract. In April 1970 he was invited to discuss his son's psychological problems with the chairman of the Obninsk City Soviet, but it became clear that the object of the invitation was in fact to examine *him*. A slightly comic series of bungled stratagems on the part of the local bureaucracy failed to get him to give even an apparent consent to his own incarceration; eventually, *force majeure* was employed and he was dragged off by a squad of local police, though these, too, were obviously put out at having to behave in so blatantly illegal a manner.

As soon as he was in Kaluga hospital, his friends and colleagues began to fight back. And this side of the story is both hilarious and admirable. For his twin brother, Roy, set out to make the lives of Zhores's captors as morally miserable as he knew how. The head of the clinic received a telling-off which proceeded from the warning that 'he was not only risking his own reputation but also discrediting the whole of Soviet psychiatry' to advising him to 'think of his own future, including the possibility that in a few years nobody would want to shake hands with him.' His assistant Galina Bondareva came off equally badly when she tried to stall on the question of just what Zhores's mental illness was supposed to consist of: her questioner was an old Bolshevik who turned on her a moral indignation which years of bureaucratic cynicism and public apathy had strikingly failed to quench. 'One thing is certain,' he says, 'you will have to live with your conscience for ever—it will be impossible to hide from your conscience and nobody else's authority can save you.' It shows a splendid faith in human nature and morality alike that he should have thought her still open to such pressures.

Meanwhile, the Moscow intelligentsia were trying their strength on the Party and administrative hierarchies—telegrams and telephone calls rained in on all possible targets. Foreign assistance was invoked, for one thing which emerges quite plainly here is that foreign protest of the right kind is very embarrassing for the Soviet Government: the right kind seems to involve expressing pained regret that the Soviets are again so dreadfully backward in the appropriate field—in this case, psychiatry.

Just as the Soviet Government has spent its energies on making sure that its sportsmen will not be disgraced in international competition, so it appears to be extremely anxious that its academic achievements should measure up to foreign standards. Zhores's many foreign friends, who had ensured that his work on Lysenko was eventually published, were well placed to play on just these fears. But it is the courage of his Russian friends and colleagues which is beyond praise. They had everything to lose, and no guarantee that the Government would not at any moment lash out and cut short their careers. Yet they behaved with an utterly undramatic devotion to what they regarded as the basic demands of justice.

After three weeks of these pressures Zhores was released. The psychiatrists' last face-saving device was to insist that he attend an out-patient clinic: when asked what 'diagnosis' justified this, they said he was suffering from 'reformist delusions'. About all that, both the Medvedevs have some sharply worth-while things to say. For they see in Soviet society the same tendencies that have disturbed recent critics of our own society, in particular the tendency to define mental illness in social terms, so that political criticism is written off as 'failure to adapt to social reality'. If some kind of convergence theory has recently seemed attractive to social scientists, it is certainly not this one. Yet the facts do suggest that writers like Alvin Gouldner have been right

to see Soviet Marxism and American functionalism as similar [illegible] for the defence of the status quo.

The optimistic convergence theorists of the 1960s relied on the Soviet managers for a looked-for pluralism and liberalism. But it is apparently only among scientists and writers that protest is audible. The explanation may lie in the thoroughly old-fashioned ideas about the duties of the intellectual to which all the Medvedev circle evidently subscribe. Zhores, for instance, is perfectly prepared to consider the question of whether he might be mentally ill; but, as a scientist, he cannot conceive that a man can be declared mad by fiat any more than he can be declared to have diphtheria by fiat. [illegible] is something objective and unamenable to political manipulation, and the image of science as by nature anti-authoritarian gets a decided boost from this story. But for English academics who enjoy the quiet life, and who are, if anything, excessively adapted to social reality, it raises the embarrassing question of how good we are at defending our own Medvedevs. How careful are we in drawing the right line between 'neurotic troublemakers' and the victims of genuine injustice—and how brave in acting on the answer?

5. WASHINGTON POST
28 November 1971

THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD AT WORK IN A GOOD CAUSE

The Medvedev Papers
The Plight of Soviet Science.
By Zhores A. Medvedev.

A Question of Madness
By Zhores and Roy Medvedev.

In every generation, a few people—a very few—have the wisdom to see the truth and the courage to act on it. Zhores Aleksandrovich Medvedev, a Soviet biochemist and gerontologist, is one of them. For more than a decade, he has been observing and reporting on the effect of the Soviet security apparatus on Russian science, bluntly and honestly. The bureaucracy has made him suffer for it. He has been denied permission to attend foreign scientific meetings, had his personal correspondence seized, been thrown out of his job and, finally, was accused of insanity and held briefly in a mental hospital. They still have not broken him.

We now can read Medvedev's own account of the actions that got him into trouble and the unsuccessful attempt to shut him up, in these two volumes which form an organic unit. They should be read by anyone who is interested in human liberty and who wants to make the acquaintance of a remarkable man.

The Medvedev Papers contains two books: *Fruitful Meetings Between Scientists of the World*, a detailed description and analysis of Soviet barriers to international travel, and *Secrecy of Correspondence Is Guaranteed by Law*, about Soviet censorship of the mail. Since Medvedev became involved in both issues through personal experience, it is possible, by backtracking through the two books, to put together a fairly comprehensive biography of Medvedev for the past decade.

Starting roughly in 1960, Medvedev began having more than the usual difficulty in getting permission to travel abroad, even when he was invited to prestigious meetings. At about the same time, he began noticing peculiarities in his postal service—missing copies of foreign journals, unduly delayed mail from overseas, letters that failed to arrive on time or at all. Although he does not say so, this was understandable. Not only had Medvedev written an honest account of the Stalinist oppression of Soviet geneticists (published in the United States as *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko*) but he also was one of the small circle of Soviet intellectuals who dared to speak out for civil liberties.

Another man might have accepted this harassment in silence. Medvedev, instead, started an amazingly incisive study of both the postal service and travel regulations. In reading the results of this study, one understands why Medvedev is an outstanding scientist. Working with no official help, in his spare time, and with only open material, he has assembled a picture of the inner workings of two separate Soviet administrations that is astonishingly complete.

In particular, Medvedev's work on postal censorship is a remarkable example of the scientific method in action. Starting with a few scattered unusual events—a customary starting point for scientific research—he managed to get a fairly complete outline of the postal censorship service, including the size of the staff, the time and place of censorship, and even individual characteristics of many censors. All this was done using only magazines and books on open shelves and collections of envelopes from personal correspondence.

Then, using this information, Medvedev began to bring action against the bureaucracy, demanding recompense for letters seized by the censorship and more sensible policies for overseas travel. Naturally, he was unsuccessful. But he

did succeed in giving them a good deal of administrative difficulties and awkward moments. In 1970, the security apparatus had its revenge, and Medvedev was removed as head of the laboratory he had founded and, in effect, forbidden any work.

The Medvedev Papers ends its narrative at this point, in April, 1970. *A Question of Madness* begins in the same month, as the security police begin to close in. There are strange calls from psychiatrists, odd requests for meetings. At the end of May, in spite of all his precautions, Medvedev is seized and thrown into a mental hospital. *A Question of Madness*, written in alternate chapters by Zhores Medvedev and his brother, Roy, tells how a flood of protests within the Soviet Union and abroad, won Zhores's release.

This is the barest outline of the story. To experience the fullness of Medvedev's intelligence and humanity, one must read both books from start to finish.

Medvedev's courage is astounding. One anecdote of many will do: A functionary from the Ministry of Health tells Medvedev that he cannot make a trip abroad despite an invitation, and that he must send a refusal immediately. Medvedev continues:

> If I did not do this, then their Section would hardly be able to do any serious business with me in the future. This was an obvious, though polite, threat, and it was only left for me to tell [the functionary] my candid opinion of him and his department.

"Candid opinions" are rare anywhere, but they must be unheard of in such situations. Nevertheless, Medvedev has only candid opinions, and he voices them:

> At present . . . the structure of the organs of power in our country is such that it protects them from criticism and influence from below. But in a rationally constructed society the structure of the organs of power must in the first place protect the people and the individual representatives of the people from abuse by the organs of power, from acts of lawlessness, from excessive exploitation and from arbitrary rule.
>
> With such an abundance of unpleasant features and selfish attitudes which have become apparent over several decades, both in the capitalist and the socialist world, one can only assume that in the immediate future neither of these systems has any real opportunity of dominating the world.

No wonder the Soviet bureaucrats thought him mad, to voice such thoughts. The real wonder is that they let him go free. His luck apparently was due to three factors. First, Medvedev is always careful to make it clear that everything he does is done for the benefit of the Soviet Union. He is a confirmed Socialist who believes that such monstrosities as postal censorship and travel restrictions are hurting the cause of socialism. His appeals are to the original words of Marx and Lenin, who in their time were devoted foes of censorship and travel restrictions.

Second, all his charges are firmly founded on facts. Everything is here, with dates, reference numbers of letters, detailed descriptions of facts and events. Nothing he says can be impeached, which is always embarrassing to the bureaucrats.

And finally, even more embarrassing is the fact that he has the Soviet law on his side. In demanding freer travel and uncensored mail, Medvedev can simply quote the Soviet constitution and international regulations. Squirm as they will, the security men cannot get around that. They must lie and bluster, never quite looking their man in the eye. It is clear to all that Medvedev has the moral superiority, and it wins in the end.

For, at this moment, Medvedev does appear to be free, and even back at work, although in a less convenient position than he had before. The drive for civil liberties is stifled but not crushed. A foreign observer can at least hope that Medvedev's cogent, logical arguments will some day convince the men who are running the Soviet Union that more freedom will help, not hurt their country. Certainly, the small band of which Medvedev is a member will never stop insisting on that. And that persistence, in the face of all the browbeating tactics of the security apparatus, shows signs of paying off.

For one is struck, in reading these remarkable books, by how shabby and small the security functionaries are. Stalin, bloody though he was, had a certain malignant stature. But these are narrow, scared people, blustering to cover up the weakness of their stand. They can still make life very difficult for many people, but a reader does get the impression that the bureaucracy is on the losing side.

But the personal narrative is only part of the contribution these books have to make. *The Medvedev Papers* has a mass of data that is invaluable to anyone who is interested in the sociology of science. *A Question of Madness* has a closely reasoned discussion of the Soviet practice of using mental institutions as prisons for dissenters (a practice borrowed from czarist officialdom). Both are written simply, directly, with few wasted words and—most surprising of all—with a real sense of humor.

Some books deserve praise. These are above praise. □

6. WASHINGTON POST
30 November 1971

CPYRGHT

Psychiatric Treatment Of Soviet Dissidents Hit

MEXICO CITY, Nov. 29 — The use of psychiatric hospitals as prisons for political dissidents came under strong attack today at the opening session of the Fifth World Congress of Psychiatry in Mexico City.

The attack was directed at the Soviet Union, according to a press officer at the congress, but no country was mentioned by name "for diplomatic reasons."

Dr. Ramon de la Fuente, president of the congress and president-elect of the Mexican Academy of Medicine, told some 5,000 psychiatrists that the congress had received numerous documents about "some places in the world" where political opponents of the state were treated as mentally disturbed.

He said such "ignominy" should not be ignored and he hoped this situation would be "duly clarified."

Officials at the meeting saw this criticism as a sign that a number of Western delegations plan to raise the question of such alleged abuses in psychiatric hospitals in the Soviet Union.

Delegates at the congress seemed to be divided over whether the matter should be raised. Several U.S. and British psychiatrists expressed opposition to "making politics out of a scientific meeting."

The Soviet delegation to the world congress comprises 12 psychiatrists, among them Prof. Andrei Snezhnevsky. According to an open letter to the congress which nine Soviet citizens sent from Moscow, the professor was "well-informed" about the "forced admission" to a mental clinic of the scientist Dzhores Medvedev, who was later released.

Prof. Snezhnevsky, who is scheduled to speak Thursday on "the role of the psychiatrist today," has not been seen at the congress yet, an official said, "although many people are looking for him."

Also speaking on Thursday will be Dr. Isador Ziferstein from New York who will present "some transcultural observations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.," a paper which one U.S. delegation member said will probably touch on the controversy about Soviet mental hospitals.

7. WASHINGTON POST
1 December 1971

Moscow's Misuse of Psychiatry

CPYRGHT

Putting political dissenters in insane asylums is about the dirtiest thing the Russians do. They've been doing it and denying it for years, as at least some few of the victims have later been able to report. The most recent victim of note was Zhores Medvedev, a biologist and author of books on the corrupt Soviet geneticist Lysenko and on international scientific cooperation. Last year, on the evidence that he was both scientist and writer, he was diagnosed as an "incipient schizophrenic" with "paranoid delusions of reforming society" and he was forcibly stuffed into a provincial mental hospital. By his twin brother's extraordinary success in rallying the Soviet scientific and intellectual community, his release was obtained in three weeks. The experience is detailed in his and his twin Roy's new book, "A Question of Madness" (Knopf)—like their other books, unpublished at home. The number of other victims, not so fortunately endowed with powerful and resourceful friends, can only be guessed at.

Dr. A. V. Snezhevsky, chief psychiatrist of the Soviet Ministry of Health, figures prominently in the new book. An apologist for the use of psychiatry as a weapon against political dissent, he is quoted on page 63 as warning: "In a year's time there is going to be an international psychiatric congress in Mexico. How do you think this is going to make our delegation look!" The Fifth World Congress of Psychiatry is currently in session in Mexico City. Dr. Snezhevsky is scheduled to speak tomorrow. No misguided sense of international or professional delicacy should keep other delegations from condemning the perversion of medicine which he represents. Such public criticism by professional colleagues is a powerful aid to those within the Soviet system who wish to reform it. Incipient political detente neither requires nor excuses indifference to civil liberty and human dignity.

8. WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1971

PSYCHIATRISTS SHUN CENSURE OF SOVIETS

By Marlise Simons
Special to The Washington Post

MEXICO CITY, Dec. 2 — After several days of back-room squabbling, delegates attending the fifth World Congress of Psychiatry have decided not to take an official stand on charges that political dissidents are confined to mental hospitals in the Soviet Union.

At last night's meeting of the general assembly, delegates could not agree on any of the motions before them, including a proposal to form an international ethics committee that would examine allegations of psychiatric abuse anywhere in the world.

The efforts of individual American psychiatrists and several European psychiatric associations, who wanted to see condemnation of the Soviet Union, have not only resulted in a widespread reaction "to keep politics out of science," but also in breast-beating among Western psychiatrists themselves.

An official of the Netherlands' department of health pointed out that delegates have neither the evidence nor the right to point an accusing finger at the Soviet Union. "We all know of instances in our own countries in which the psychiatrist has responded to family pressure and put someone away because he is a nuisance or because of an inheritance question," he said.

A U.S. military psychiatrist, who declined to be named, pointed to the common American practice in which the psychiatrist is persuaded to write a letter that exempts a young man from military service. "However humanitarian and pacifist this may seem," he said, "this is still a political act."

Several other American delegates at the symposium described psychiatry in the United States as a "social control mechanism, more subtle than Soviet practices," but frequently used to transform dissidents who are in serious disagreement with their parents or with the culture that surrounds them.

Dr. Paul Lowinger, from Detroit, cited the example of "a patient of mine in Michigan, a girl of 21, whose parents disapproved of her boyfriend and of her smoking marijuana." These parents, who were well-to-do, with the right contacts, managed to have the girl confined to a mental hospital in the hope that isolation would brainwash her back to "normality," Dr. Lowinger said.

It seems clear that the reaction of the majority of delegates against a condemnation of Soviet practices stemmed largely from their feeling that they were victims of political manipulation.

Many of the 5,000 psychiatrists here for the congress complained that they had been inundated with pamphlets and books, outlining the case against the Soviet psychiatrists, which had been sent to them anonymously.

9. THE TIMES
16 September 1971

Dissenters in Soviet mental hospitals

From Professor F. A. Jenner and others

Sir, Since March 29 Mr Vladimir Bukovsky, a Soviet citizen, has been under arrest on a charge of "anti-Soviet agitation". On March 12, *The Times* had published an appeal by him to Western psychiatrists. He asked them to study the official psychiatric reports and other documents (which he enclosed) relating to the detention, mostly in prison mental hospitals, of persons who had protetsed against certain actions of the Soviet Government.

In his letter Mr Bukovsky said: "I realise that at a distance and without some of the essential clinical information it is very difficult to determine the mental condition of a person and either to diagnose an illness or assert the absence of any illness. Therefore I ask you to express an opinion only on this point: do the above mentioned psychiatric reports contain enough scientifically based evidence not only to indicate the mental illness described in the reports, but also *to indicate the necessity of isolating these people* [illegible] (our italics).

The reports on Grigorenko, Yakhimovich, Gorbanevskaya, Fainberg, Borisov and Kuznetsov, and other materials relating to these people have now been translated by the recently constituted Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals (which includes psychiatrists, lawyers and people concerned with human rights), and are available.

On the basis of the evidence contained in these reports, the undersigned psychiatrists feel impelled to express grave doubts about the legitimacy of compulsory treatment for the six people concerned, and indefinite detention in prison mental hospital conditions. Four of them do not appear to have any symptoms at all which indicate a need for treatment, let alone treatment of such a punitive kind.

As for Gorbanevskaya and Fainberg, according to the official diagnostic reports they had symptoms of mental illness at an earlier period in their lives. With Gorbanevskaya these were minor, involving only a two-week voluntary [illegible] apparently no recurrence of them for seven years preceding the demonstration (against the occupation of Czechoslovakia) in Red Square on August 25, 1968—for participation in which she and Fainberg were arrested. Fainberg's earlier illness appears to have been more serious, but there was apparently no recurrence of it for at least eighteen years preceding the demonstration.

So if there were, conceivably, any grounds for some kind of psychiatric treatment for these two people in 1968, prolonged detention in prison conditions would certainly have been quite inappropriate. It seems to us that the diagnoses on the six above-mentioned people were made purely in consequence of actions in which they were exercising fundamental freedoms—as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution.

The current widespread anxiety could perhaps be mitigated if the Soviet authorities made available further evidence on these matters. The misuse of psychiatry for political and other ends is, of course, an insidious danger, not [illegible] nowhere.

We also hope especially that the

Soviet Government will [illegible] case of Vladimir Bukovsky, who acted with courage in making his appeal and who appears to have suffered in consequence. The information we have about him suggests that he is the sort of person who might be embarrassing to authorities in any country because he seems unwilling to compromise for convenience and personal comfort, and believes in saying what he thinks in situations which he clearly knows could endanger him. But such people often have much to contribute, and deserve considerable respect. As he has appealed to us to make some sort of statement on persons — outspoken like himself — whom he believes to be the victims of corrupt psychiatric practice, we feel that to answer with a stony silence would be not only wrong but also inhuman.

[illegible] on other cases in addition to those of the six people named, lend considerable extra weight to the grave doubts we have expressed above. As noted in your excellent leader of July 12, a deeply disquieting pattern, sometimes involving the punitive and potentially dangerous use of powerful drugs, seems to be emerging in the treatment of dissenters in Soviet mental institutions. We therefore call on our colleagues throughout the world to study the voluminous material now available, to discuss the matter with their Soviet colleagues, some of whom we know to have doubts as grave as our own, and to raise the issue, as Vladimir Bukovsky requested, at international conferences such as that of the World Psychiatric Association in Mexico City from November 28 to December 4.

F. A. JENNER,
W. VON BAEYER,
E. F. CARR,
D. H. CLARKE,
H. CLAPHAM,
A. H. CRISP,
D. L. DAVIES,
H. V. DICKS,
GRIFFITH EDWARDS,
L. EITINGER,
T. FERGUSON RODGER,
C. FINN,
J. A. FRASER ROBERTS,
L. R. GJESSING,
M. HAMILTON,
I. M. INGRAM,
EINAR KRINGLEN,
D. M. LEIBERMAN,
S. MACKEITH,
P. MULLIN,
A. MUNRO,
IAN OSWALD,
THOMAS L. PERRY,
J. PIPPARD,
D. A. POND,
F. POST,
K. RAWNSLEY,
DEREK RICHTER,
H. R. ROLLIN,
D. ROSENTHAL,
P. SAINSBURY,
J. SCHORSTEIN,
MOGERS SCHOU,
S. SHAFAR,
D. M. SHAW,
A. M. SHENKIN,
E. SLATER,
J. R. SMYTHIES,
K. SODDY,
D. STAFFORD-CLARK,
E. STENGEL,
A. STORR,
W. L. TONGE,
W. H. TRETHOWAN,

University Department of Psychiatry, Whiteley Wood Clinic, Woofindin Road, Sheffield.

10. WASHINGTON POST
17 May 1970

SOVIET DISSENTER SPEAKS OUT

'No Matter What, I'm Free Inside,' He Told Judge Sentencing Him

By Holger Jensen

MOSCOW, May 16 (AP)—Meet Vladimir Bukovsky, dissident. He has spent six of his 27 years in Soviet prisons, asylums and labor camps.

He is currently free, but expects to be arrested again. Agents of KGB, the committee of state security, keep him under surveillance.

The son of privileged Communist party members, he was a bright and promising scholar at Moscow High School No. 59. Then he found repression and inequitites in the "classless society." The teen-ager could not remain silent and in 1960, his final school year, he published an underground satirical humor magazine called Martyr.

The school principal and several teachers were dismissed. Bukovsky's parents received a reprimand from their local party committee for "failure to raise the boy in the proper spirit." Bukovsky was expelled and told he could never study in a Soviet university.

He registered anyway at Moscow University and studied biophysics for a year before they learned who he was. From then on he spent his days working as a museum handyman, and his nights on Mayakovsky Square meeting other young people opposed to the system.

This was "the Movement," a loosely knit group of young people who liked to discuss things they could not read about in the government-controlled press.

In 1962, Bukovsky organized an illegal exhibition of paintings by abstract artists not approved by state censors. The exhibition was shut down by the authorities and an order was issued for Bukovsky's arrest. But he fled the Soviet capital and joined a six-month geological expedition to Siberia.

He returned when things cooled off and worked as a programmer in a computer center. In May 1963 the KGB caught up with him.

Bukovsky was sent to the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute and declared insane. That December he was transferred to a prison asylum in Leningrad, where he spent, in his own words, "15 months of Hell."

"There were about 1,000 men in the asylum, political prisoners and insane murderers," says Bukovsky. "The sick raved, the healthy suffered.

"I had two wardmates—an old Ukrainian nationalist who'd been there 16 years, and a maniac who murdered his children, then cut off his own ears. The Ukrainian spent every waking minute yelling about Ukrainian independence. The murderer just sat and smiled all day."

Bukovsky kept out of their way and taught himself English.

Foreign Communists

Later, he was moved to a larger ward and made new friends. They included a French Communist and an Australian of Latvian origin. Both had believed Communist writings about the good life in the Soviet Union and emigrated to see it first-hand.

Shocked at the pay in a

Moldavian shoe factory, the [illegible] ers to strike. "Communism will never condemn the working class fighting for its rights," he argued. He was condemned to three years in the asylum.

The Australian, disillusioned by life in Moscow, had simply tried to leave. He was told that since he was of Latvian origin, he was a Soviet citizen and could not go. He persisted and was put in the Leningrad asylum for contacting foreign embassies.

Doctors were technically in charge of the inmates, but the real masters were brutal turnkeys and prisoner trusties, criminals from the regular part of the Leningrad prison.

"Only the crafty survived," Bukovsky says. "You had to be nice to the guards, you had to make friends with them, you had to bribe them. Otherwise they can beat you until you're nearly dead and tell the doctors you misbehaved. Or they could recommend medical punishment.

"They beat the Ukrainian every day, just tied him up and kicked him in the stomach. Sometimes they would put inmates in padded isolation cells and beat them almost continuously. I knew of several men who died after this, and the clinic on the floor above us was always full."

Three Punishments

The worst was medical punishment. Bukovsky describes three methods:

- On the recommendation of a trusty or turnkey, doctors would inject a drug that produced severe stomach cramps, fever, intense pain and a temperature of 104. The sickness lasted two or three days and left the inmate very weak.
- Another drug reserved for serious misbehavior induced sleep and dulled the brain. Imates were punished with ten days of daily injections. They woke up as human vegetables. Some regained their senses after two months, others did not.
- The third punishment was the canvas bandage. An inmate would be tightly swathed in wet canvas from neck to toes while others in his ward were forced to watch.

"The canvas shrinks as it [illegible] sight. They usually only do it for two or three hours. A nurse is always in attendance, and the bandages are loosened when the pulse grows weak."

Asylum food consisted of thin oatmeal, cabbage soup that was "mostly water and no cabbage," bread and fish once a week. There was never any meat.

Sick But Sane

Bukovsky was released in February, 1965, shortly before his 22nd birthday. He had lost weight, he had a heart murmur and rheumatism, "but otherwise I was all right. I was still sane."

In Moscow, he plunged back into the dissident movement, circulating underground manuscripts, reading prohibited Western books, organizing demonstrations, informing foreign newsmen of new arrests, attending trials and keeping track of friends who had been imprisoned.

"You must have friends in this type of work," he explains. "The KGB follows you all the time and sometimes they pull you in for questioning. If no one knows about it, you just disappear.

"But if your friends know you've been arrested, you're reasonably safe. They tell others. They attend your trial. They know the length of your sentence, and they know when you are supposed to be released Stalinist methods don't work anymore. The authorities don't want a big scandal. They have to maintain a semblance of legality."

Dissidents never go anywhere alone. They never live alone and they always tell others what they are doing. All arrests and trials are recorded by "Samizdat," the chain-letter underground news letters.

On Dec. 2, 1965, after nine months of freedom, Bukovsky was arrested for organizing a demonstration protesting the imprisonment of Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, two writers, whose work was considered anti-Soviet. Again Bukovsky was sent to the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute.

Amnesty International [illegible] don on account of his plight. [illegible] a representative to Moscow to plead for his release. Bukovsky theorizes the Amnesty people "probably threatened to make a big scandal about it." He was released without explanation in August, 1966.

But his freedom was short. On Jan. 26, 1967, he was arrested for organizing another demonstration protesting that Soviet intellectuals were repressed. He was convicted by a criminal court of "hooliganism" and sentenced to three years at the Borr labor camp in the Voronezhskaya district, 300 miles south of Moscow.

But Bukovsky spirit wasn't broken. At the trial he told the judge: "No matter what you do to me I'm a free man inside. And I'll do exactly the same things when I get out again."

There are 10 labor camps and two prisons in the Voronezhskaya district. The Russian Federation, which covers 90 per cent of the Soviet Union, is divided into more than 65 districts.

The Borr camp with 1,500 men, was surrounded by watchtowers with armed guards, coils of barbed wire and a free-fire zone. The guards could shoot any inmate seen in the zone.

'Son, Please Work'

The prisoners lived in barracks and had to work for their keep. Posters admonished: "Those who don't work don't eat" and "Remember that hard work is the only way home." Bukovsky's barracks had a picture of a tearful mother beseeching: "Son, please work to regain your freedom."

Most of the inmates were country people, locked up for petty thievery. Bukovsky's bunkmates included a peasant sent up for three years for stealing a chicken and a man imprisoned for a year for fighting with his wife.

Bukovsky managed to talk his way into one of the few "skilled" jobs at the camp, polishing the edges of tables in the carpentry shop. He received 60 rubles a month —$66 at the official exchange rate.

Half of this was deducted as a contribution to the state. Another 12 rubles [illegible]

in the camp dining room. The rest went for clothing, bribes [illegible] purchasing extra food at the camp store.

Prisoners were allowed one package from home every four months and an annual visit by relatives. When not being punished, they could make one monthly purchase not exceeding seven rubles, at the camp store.

Few could afford such luxury. Most worked as unskilled laborers earning only enough for the 12-ruble food bill.

"Not even a dog could live on 12 rubles a month. And when we were punished with strict regime, which was often, the monthly ration was reduced to seven rubles and no store privileges. We lived on smelly porridge and water with a cabbage leaf. Any man who relied just on the camp food would have been dead in six months. The only way to eat was to bribe the guards or get packages from home."

Smuggled Money

On their annual visits relatives would also smuggle [illegible] The best method was to shake the tobacco out of cigarettes and substitute a rolled-up 1 ruble bill. The guards who searched us were stumped and never caught on. I won't tell the other ways because I don't want my friends to starve."

Prisoners who bought extra food shared it with other inmates. The code of the labor camps, Bukovsky says is: "Those who have give to those who don't."

There were not many beatings at the labor camp. "Whenever the prisoners heard of a man beaten up by guards we would riot. We just screamed, banged things, broke chairs and doors and made a racket. After a few riots like that they stopped beating us."

However, more refined punishments were used. Loitering "unproductively," failure to doff one's hat to a guard, talking back, all merited being placed on "strict regime." "They got you where it really hurts most, in the belly," Bukovsky observes.

More serious misbehaviour [illegible] finement in solitary-small unlit cages without toilet facilities and with virtually no food. Bukovsky was in solitary five times and he insists, "I was not a particularly troublesome prisoner."

He lives in a small apartment with his mother, sister, her husband and their baby. He earns 50 rubles as secretary to a sympathetic writer.

The apartment and telephone are bugged. Bukovsky feels he is trailed everywhere he goes. Every time he passes on an underground newspaper or talks to a foreigner he risks arrest. But he insists: "The people have to know what is happening here. The world has to know."

Bukovsky makes one thing clear: He does not want to live in the West. He does want to try to improve life in the Soviet Union. He admits he belongs to a very small minority with little chance of success. He estimates that there are about 2,000 other persons like himself in major Soviet cities.

11. DAILY TELEGRAPH
10 November 1971

SCIENTISTS SEEK RELEASE OF YOUNG RUSSIAN

by John Mossman

A DEMAND for the release of a young Russian from isolation in a psychiatric hospital has been made by two leading Soviet scientists.

Dr Andrei Sakharov, co-founder of the unofficial Soviet human rights committee, and Igor Shafarevich, a mathematician, say in a letter to Western human rights organisations that Vladimir Bukovsky, 29, has been held in the Serbsky psychiatric institute, Moscow, since his arrest in March.

"His relatives have not been given one meeting with him. They (the authorities) have allowed not one letter nor even the shortest note to or from him," they allege.

Bukovsky has claimed that apparently some people are being held in hospitals because of their political views.

The letter says that Bukovsky was originally placed in the Moscow hospital for a one-month period of investigation, which was later extended.

Call for lawyer

It urges that the investigations should be stopped and the results given to Bukovsky's mother. She should be allowed to see him to assure herself there was no "illegal actions" and Bukovsky should be permitted a lawyer, the letter adds.

The 50 signatories of the letter also include Pyotr Grigorenko, a former Army general, who is himself in a psychiatric hospital after campaigning for Soviet Tartars' return to the Crimea and Pyotr Yakir, son of General Yakir, who was shot in the Stalin purge of 1937.

Bukovsky was arrested in 1963 for possessing forbidden literature and declared insane. He spent one and a half years in a Leningrad prison hospital.

He was later given a three-year labour term for taking part in a demonstration in 1967.

12. THE GUARDIAN
11 November 1971

BUKOVSKY IS SANE AND WILL STAND TRIAL

A 28-year-old Russian dissident, Vladimir Bukovsky, is legally sane and will be tried for alleged anti-Soviet activities, sources close to his family said today. Bukovsky was found to be "normal" by psychiatrists who studied him for two months at Moscow's Serbsky psychiatric institute, the sources said.

Dissidents here feared he would be declared insane and committed to an asylum. Before his arrest in March, he protested that apparently sane persons are confined to Soviet mental hospitals because of their political views.

According to the sources Bukovsky's mother received a telephone call today from the chief investigator in her son's case. He told her a panel of psychiatrists had found that her son was "normal." He also said that his investigation would be completed about the end of the month and that her son would then go on trial.

The call came a day after Western newsmen had reported that an open letter had been addressed to human rights organisations by two prominent scientists and more than fifty other people in protest against Bukovsky's isolation.

The letter asked for the investigation to stop and for its results to be given to Bukovsky's mother. "His relatives have not been given one meeting with him," the letter said. "They (the authorities) have not allowed one letter nor even the shortest note either from or to him."

Bukovsky, a leader of Moscow's tiny but active underground movement, has been the object of several recent petitions. The nuclear physicist, Andrei Sakharov endorsed one to the director of the Serbsky Institute which said; "If Vladimir Bukovsky were declared mentally ill, this would be a crime against which we would struggle with all legal means."

If found guilty of anti-Soviet agitation, Bukovsky faces six months to seven years in a labour camp, followed by banishment to remote areas for up to five years.

13. IZVESTIYA, Moscow
24 October 1971

"THE PSEUDOPROTECTORS IN A QUAGMIRE OF SLANDER"
by K. Bryantsev

Valeriya reread again and again the address on the parcel which had arrived here, in the Kazan psychiatric hospital, in her name. It was as if all this was meant for her. But who was this Mrs. (Isyulet Spigel) from Amsterdam who had sent the parcel, and what was the meaning of these strange "gifts"--a notepad with the Israeli flags, envelopes, and sugar? At her first meeting with her mother after this incident, Valeriya told of the unsolicited gift which she has refused. "I was extremely indignant at this outrageous, provocative act of foreign 'benefactors.' My daughter and I do not have and never have had relatives or acquaintances living beyond the borders of our motherland," Nina Fedorovna Novodvorskaya writes. She urgently asks that her sick daughter be guarded from pittances "pursuing provocative, anti-Soviet aims."

It is easy to understand the mother's feelings. It is far more difficult to gage the full measure of the moral degradation of those who have blasphemously chosen the mentally ill, suffering from serious psychiatric illnesses, as the object of their dishonorable game. It sounds monstrous, but it is so. From the pages of the Western press, from the anonymous emigre "Posev" to the U.S. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE which has claims to reliability, and on various radio stations (as usual the Munich Radio Liberty tries to "outdo" them all), the wildest tall stories are disseminated concerning the fact that in the Soviet Union "completely healthy people" are allegedly kept in psychiatric hospitals.

To lend this ill-intentioned fiction at least some verisimilitude, "ammunition is brought to light made up of [illegible] of people who at various times have been under investigation and brought to court for committing criminal deeds. Not every "movie star" in the West is favored with such "publicity" as some of these people. What do the slanderers care that doctors have established that these people are psychiatrically sick. The scandalmongers are concerned with only one thing: depicting a mentally sick person as some "fighter for an idea."

The notorious "Amnesty International" whose unscrupulous methods have already been described in the pages of IZVESTIYA (No 64) is particularly zealous. One of the reports of the British division of this organization asserts that in the Soviet Union representatives of the intelligentsia are allegedly sent to psychiatric hospitals "without trial." The old wives' tales on the subject of "psychiatric isolation wards for healthy people" are invariably accompanied by a hypocritical reference to the "martyrs" allegedly doomed to remain behind impenetrable walls to the end of their days.

In reality it is a question of people who have committed socially dangerous actions while in a state of irresponsibility or who have, during the investigation and trial or after sentence has been passed, contracted a mental sickness which deprives them of the opportunity to be aware of their actions or to control them. In accordance with the existing laws such people, on the basis of the conclusion of a competent legal-psychiatric appraisal from experts, and at the insistance of the court, are sent to be cured at a general or special psychiatric hospital. They can be discharged from here if on reexamination by psychiatrists, (this takes place no later than every 6 months) it is established that the use of the above-mentioned measures of protection--measures of a medical nature--are no longer engendered by necessity.

It is in precisely this way that it happens in practice. For instance, Olga I., who was brought to court and recognized to be not responsible was undergoing compulsory cure in a special psychiatric hospital. At present she has been discharged from the hospital because of an improvement in the state of her health. By the way, in regard to one of the people around whom a great deal of noise has been made in the West, compulsory treatment was ended a few years ago on the conclusions of the legal-psychiatric appraisal by experts.

The Western ideological diversionists who build every type of fiction around the psychologically sick do not even notice the absurd position into which they put themselves: surely they are rushing to teach and refute medical specialists, representatives of the Soviet psychiatric school which has won respect and recognition throughout the world. This is what the famous Soviet scientist, A.V. Snezhnevskiy, USSR Academy of Medical Sciences academician, and director of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences Psychiatric Institute says:

"Yes, I, too, have read these absurd reports that in the USSR healthy people are put into psychiatric hospitals. Like all my colleagues, I cannot express my feelings of profound indignation at this wild fantasy. Soviet psychiatrists--a detachment of Soviet medical workers consisting of many thousands--do not of course need to be defended from insulting attacks of this sort. In our country and abroad fame and deserved authority are enjoyed by such psychiatrists as A.D. Zurabashvili, USSR Academy of Medical Sciences academician, and USSR Academy of Medical Sciences corresponding members V.M. Morozov, G.V. Morozov, and A.A. Megrabyan, professors N.N. Timofeyev, R.A. Nadzharov, B.A. Lebedev, N.N. Zharikov, S.F. Semenov, G.K. Ushakov, and many others. A number of Soviet psychiatrists have been elected as members of international psychiatric societies and associations.

"Russian and Soviet psychiatry has always been distinguished by its lofty humanism and the aspiration to help the sick person to feel that he is not outside society. It is enough to recall that even in 1919, during the famine and the Civil War, Prof P.B. Gannushkin created a system of rayon psychiatrists which grew later into the neuropsychiatric dispensaries--the foundation of the contemporaty organization of

psychiatric aid throughout the world. It was precisely in Soviet psychiatry that the foundation of rehabilitation--the restoration of the work capability of sick people suffering from mental illnesses--was laid. This experience is also widely borrowed in many countries of the world.

The placing of sick people in psychiatric hospitals in our country has always been carried out only on the basis of a doctor's findings. The best traditions of the Russian psychiatric school were further developed under Soviet power. In the Soviet Union the findings of expert doctors are the grounds for the court's ruling that sick people who have committed socially dangerous actions be sent for compulsory treatment. These findings are compiled and signed by not one but several psychiatrists. The system, widely operative in the USSR, for improving doctors and raising the standard of their knowledge insures the high qualifications even of our country's rank and file psychiatrists. Thus, cases of placing healthy people in psychiatric hospitals in our country are completely excluded. I should like to stress, A.A. Snezhnevskiy says, that our foreign colleagues who become acquainted with the organization of Soviet psychiatric aid to the population assess it extremely highly.

The professor holds out a well-printed book in a dark blue binding with gold stamping. On the cover is written: "Special Report: The First U.S. Mission on Questions of Psychiatric Aid in the USSR."

The authors of the report are eminent leaders of U.S. Psychiatry: Stanley Yolles, director of the National Institute of Psychiatry; Walter Barton, director of the U.S. Psychiatric Association; David Bazelon, attorney general of the District of Columbia Federal Court of Appeals; journalist Mike Gorman, executive director of the National Committee Against Mental Illness; Alan Miller, head of the Department of Psychology of New York State; Philip (Sirotkin), director for coordinating the programs of the National Institute of Psychiarty; and Harold (Visotskiy), director of the Department of Psychiatry of the State of Illinois.

What conclusions did these 7 eminent U.S. specialists draw after becoming acquainted with the Soviet organization of psychiatric aid? Comparing the solution of this problem in the United States and the USSR, the authors unanimously conclude: "It appears that the Soviets are leading." The U.S. guests stress the high degree of effectiveness of the Soviet psychiatric first aid centers, and the better quality of their staffs compared with the U.S. centers. Acquaintance with Soviet psychiatric hospitals convinced them that "every effort is made to release the patient as soon as this is possible." "Again and again the delegation was surprised at the emotional concern and individual attention shown to psychiatric patients, including disturbed patients suffering from schizophrenia or from senile confusion."

The U.S. specialists paid careful attention to questions of criminal psychiatry as well. Having visited the Serbskiy Institute, they noted that the findings of expert Soviet psychiatrists are "far more detailed and contain more useful information on the personality and environment of the accused than the findings submitted at trials in the United States." As for compulsory treatment, in the opinion of the authors of the report, the Russian standard is essentially the same as the U.S. standard. The approach of the Soviet doctors "in many respects is not too different from the viewpoints of some U.S. doctors.... It is possible that these doctors, Russian and U.S., are right. It is possible that people who need treatment should be compulsorily hospitalized from their own good."

To conclude our conversation, A.V. Snezhnevskiy shows a long article on Soviet psychiarty printed in the French journal PSYCHIATRY INFORMATION Vol 46, No 9 for 1970. In this article French scientists highly priase the activity of the psychiatric institutions of Moscow and Leningrad. A.V. Snezhnevskiy adds that these views are not unique. The eminent U.S. specialists (Zh. Uortis), (N. Kleyn), (I. Tsifershteyn), and a number of others have given a high assessment to Soviet psychiarty.

The organizers of the anti-Soviet ballyhoo perhaps include among "communist agitators" the above-mentioned figures of U.S. and French psychiatry. Of course, they are no agitators. They have simply told the truth. And, as it happens, the truth is quite contraindicative of the bawlers who suffer from pathological hatred of the Soviet system. We vouch for the exactitude of this diagnosis, but we do not undertake to cure it. These are hopeless people.

14. ZA RUBEZHOM, Moscow
26 November - 2 December 1971

"THE SLANDERERS' IMPOTENCE"
by Ye. Makarov

Propaganda "essays," whose authors, having finally exhausted their blatant anti-Sovietism, are undertaking clumsy and openly crude provocation and forgery, have been appearing in some bourgeois newspapers and periodicals recently. It is a question, in particular, of "works"--occasionally extremely verbose ones--in the Hamburg periodical DER SPIEGEL, for example, which allege that some "fighters for an ideal" in the USSR have been sent to psychiatric hospitals and kept there.

The provocative savor of this malicious fabrication is so strong that DER SPIEGEL itself adds the reservation that some commentaries have described it as a "wild fairy-tale." Nevertheless the magazine and some other bourgeois publications devote whole columns or even pages to these "wild fairytales."

Seizures of pathological anti-Sovietism, which engender such base fabrications, are normal symptoms for bourgeois propaganda. During our half-century history, apologists of capitalism whose hatred of socialism has affected their mental faculties have frequently resorted to wild fabrications about our country and have made futile attempts to besmirch Soviet society.

The recent anti-Soviet scenario concerning psychiatric hospitals in the USSR is the continuation of all these slanderous attacks which have failed time and time again.

The "psychiatric cycle" of anti-Sovietism, which is expounded in a vulgar sensationalist manner and aimed at extremely undiscerning tastes, testifies to the profound moral decline of those who "shape" public opinion in the capitalist countries. At the same time, this latest slanderous campaign, initiated after the bankrupt London anti-Soviet spectacle involving spy-mania, is noteworthy in its own way. The anti-Soviet fabrications published by the editorial boards of certain bourgeois newspapers and periodicals and reiterated by the CIA-financed Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe are by no means hostile to our country alone. Anticommunism and anti-Sovietism are attributes of the policy of attempting to impede the relaxation of international tension, particularly in Europe. The lies, slander, and dirty attempts to besmirch the Soviet people are aimed at casting a shadow over Soviet foreign policy, which constitutes a powerful factor for improving the situation in Europe and throughout the world.

Bourgeois propaganda's anti-Sovietism serves the basest aims. For example, the publication in the British press (the most prostituted, in the words of the late prominent trade union figure Aneurin Bevan) of fairytales about inmates of a Soviet psychiatric hospital dissatisfied with socialism is accompanied by a vast amount of material in the SUNDAY TELEGRAPH proclaiming American Lieutenant Calley, the butcher of the Vietnamese village of Son My, to be almost an apostle of "Western democracy" and a fighter against socialist ideas.

The present anti-Soviet campaign, through which the manufacturers of lies and misinformation are pumping poison into people's souls, also has other objectives. While the editorial boards of some bourgeois newspapers are churning out semiliterate and heartrending melodramas about some mythical "martyrs" languishing in a psychiatric hospital in the USSR, completely real and living people in the "free world" are becoming the objects of brutal torture and ill-treatment at, for example, the Long Kesh concentration camp which the British punitive forces have set up in Northern Ireland. The newspaper the IRISH DEMOCRAT recently described the occupationists' monstrous treatment of the Irish patriots. Speaking about the Conservative government's policy in Northern Ireland, the LONDON DAILY MIRROR states that, "in contrast to the United States in Vietnam, we British have not yet employed artillery and napalm in Ulster." Reports from Ulster show that London is making up for the oversight and that the British prison guards in Northern Ireland are no less "skilled" than their fellow butchers in utilizing the South Vietnamese torture chambers of terrible renown--the so-called tiger cages.

The 4,770 prisons in the "citadel of the free world"--the United States--are places of humiliation and torture as calculatingly planned and cold-bloodedly implemented as political murders. "We are treated as if we were not human," stated one of the prisoners at Attica prison, where detainees demanded an end to humiliation and the release of all American political prisoners. In response to this the authorities turned Attica into the arena for mass bloody carnage. Well-known American journalist Tom Wicker wrote that the Attica prisoners were identified solely by numbers, being deprived of names, and even when the corpses of those who had been shot were brought into the prison morgue they were recorded by number only.

"Attica is undoubtedly not the worst prison in the United States," TIME magazine summarized, adding with bitter irony "it has rivals." George Jackson, Fred Billingsly, Cleveland Edwards, Erwin Miller--these are the names of people no longer with us who were among the prisoners at San Quentin prison in California. Some, like George Jackson, the outstanding fighter for civil rights and social transformations in the United States, were killed in broad daylight in the prison yard. The others named above were shot or gassed. But they all belonged to the enormous number of U.S. political prisoners, and their murders constitute just one manifestation of that sinister process of a reactionary offensive about which warnings were given by Angela Davis, whose life is also in real danger.

Distracting public attention from the cruelties of prison and policy tyranny and from the constant, obvious and veiled, humiliations against the individual under the conditions of the capitalist system is one of the purposes of the present falsification, which clearly exposes the bestial malice of the anti-Sovietists and their impotence to impede our progress.

Goebbels once said that the cruder and more vulgar the falsehood, the more quickly it is swallowed. Present-day bourgeois propaganda's anti-Soviet fabrications confirm that some capitalist newspapers and periodicals which proclaim themselves "fighters for the rights of the individual" employ such misanthropic formulas. They pursue these by spreading lies about inmates in Soviet psychiatric hospitals who claim that they are of sound mind--but what lunatic will admit to DER SPIEGEL informants and others that he is mad? Anti-Sovietists used to rummage in our trash cans; now they seek "information" in lunatic asylums. Well, as they say, as you sow so shall you reap!

15.

The Chronicle of Current Events (USSR)

The Chronicle has now been appearing in Moscow for nearly three years. It contains accurate news on political trials, extra-judicial persecution, political prisoners, the Soviet forced labour camps, samizdat (i.e. typewritten) publications etc. The Soviet civil rights movement is neither centrally organised nor in any general sense anti-Soviet; yet the Chronicle has to be circulated unofficially, in a more or less clandestine way, in the USSR. The Chronicle is a unique and valuable record of the movement in the USSR for the protection of civil rights.

The text of the Chronicle, translated into English and printed as six separate issues every year - will run to some 250 - 350 pages in all. Every issue will contain an index of names and brief annotation.

The annual subscription will be £3.50 - (US $10) including packing and air mail postage. Please send your cheques to Amnesty International Publications, Room 6, Turnagain Lane, Farringdon Street, London EC4, making them payable to Amnesty Publications.

I enclose a cheque/money order for £ / $ as annual subscription(s) to the Chronicle of Current Events.

To: Amnesty International Publications,
Room 6, Turnagain Lane,
Farringdon Street,
London, E.C.4.

Date.....

Name.....
(BLOCK LETTERS)

Address.....

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 January 1972

DATES WORTH NOTING

Jan 2	Chile	50th anniversary of the Chilean Communist Party, founded 1922.
Feb 8	France	2nd anniversary of Roger Garaudy's ouster from his seat on the Central Committee of the French Communist Party (FCP) and from its Politburo in 1970. The FCP acted against Garaudy because of his public criticisms of the Soviet brand of communism. In January 1971 Garaudy became one of the founders of a new national organization of dissident French Communists called the Centers of Communist Initiatives (CIC), which now claims 1,300 members of whom 31% still belong to the French CP and 58% are former FCP members. The CIC is highly critical of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and of Brezhnev, whom it says, "has given the USSR the image of 'Panzer-Communism.'" (Action, journal of the CIC, November 1971)
Feb 14	USSR/CPR	Anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact, signed in 1950.
Feb 21-28	US/CPR	President Nixon to visit China.

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January 1972

TWO SOVIET VIEWS OF STALIN

Let History Judge	Roy A. Medvedev, announced for publication in January 1972 by Alfred A. Knopf, New York City, $12.50.
Tupolevskaya Sharaga	Georgiy A. Ozerov, published 1971 in Russian by Marija Cudina & Slobodan Masic, Belgrade. Printed by Possev-Verlag, V. Gorachek KG., Frankfurt/M.

Two new, outstanding, and historically compatible samizdat documents have recently reached the West. Their major importance lies in their sober documentation of organized inhumanity as practiced by Stalin. Let History Judge, by far the more significant of the two, presents a political overview of Stalin's bureaucracy of terror; Tupolev's Sharaga, an intimate close-up view of the impact of that terror on one segment of Soviet society. Although neither document has been published inside the USSR, neither can be considered "anti-Soviet." They are merely unacceptable to an establishment which claims to have "de-Stalinized" and wishes nothing more said on the Stalinist phenomenon.

Let History Judge

Roy Medvedev is the twin brother of Soviet biologist Zhores Medvedev, author of three works recently published in the West.* Roy Medvedev, as described by former Moscow correspondent, Anthony Astrachan, "is a rarity among Soviet intellectuals -- a convinced Marxist who believes that the Soviet system can be truly socialist and still tolerate dissent." Medvedev's book, Let History Judge, gives ample evidence of his loyalty to the Soviet system in his assumption that there is a "correct line" in politics and his rejection of the "bourgeois historian's" thesis that without Stalin's crimes "socialism could not have been built in the USSR . . . without a barbarous totalitarian state." Medvedev's assessment is that it was not Stalin, but the "October Revolution" which "opened the door to education and culture." He contends that "the transformation would have been effected much more quickly if Stalin had not destroyed hundreds of thousands of the intelligentsia, both old and new," and that Soviet industry would have developed much faster if "millions of innocent people" -- prisoners in Stalin's concentration camps -- had been able to work as free men to build the USSR's economic infrastructure.

*"Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko," Columbia University Press, 1969; "The Medvedev Papers," Macmillan, 1971; and "A Question of Madness," with Roy A. Medvedev, Knopf, 1971.

Roy Medvedev joined the Communist Party after the 1956 Party Congress at which Khrushchev first exposed Stalin's crimes. He began work on his monograph on Stalin after the 22nd Party Congress had issued a new call for de-Stalinization in 1961. An early version of the monograph failed to get Central Committee approval in 1965 as did the final version in 1968, the same year that the Party theoretical journal Kommunist published an article defending Stalin. Medvedev wrote a protest letter which Kommunist never published but which found its way, unauthorized by Medvedev, to the pages of the emigre journal Posev. It has now been accepted that the KGB furnished Posev with a copy of the letter to establish a pretext for later harassment of Medvedev, who was ousted from the Party following the appearance of his letter in the Western press.

It was also in 1968 that the West first heard of Roy Medvedev's new monograph with the publication in July of Soviet physicist and human rights champion, Andrey Sakharov's essay entitled "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom," in which Sakharov wrote:

> "A profound analysis of the origin and development of Stalinism is contained in a 1,000-page monograph of R. Medvedev. This was written from a Socialist, Marxist point of view and is a successful work, but unfortunately it has not yet been published. The present author is not likely to receive such a compliment from Comrade Medvedev, who finds elements of 'Westernism' in his views. Well, there is nothing like controversy!"

On this one point there is certainly agreement among the outspoken dissidents of the Soviet Union: their conviction that discussion, not repression, is the proper response to political controversy. And therein lies the main difference between them and the men who run the Soviet Union today. As Medvedev continually emphasizes, therein also lay the difference between Stalin and the intelligentsia he so ruthlessly destroyed.

Attached are reprints of excerpts from Roy Medvedev's Let History Judge which appeared in the 5 December 1971 issue of The Washington Post, a copy of the book jacket description, and excerpts from both the author's foreword and the editors' introduction.

Tupolev's Sharaga

A "sharaga" is a technical design bureau wherein all the scientific-technical personnel are prisoners. Andrey Nikolayevich Tupolev is the "grand old man" of Soviet avaition, was its pioneer, and is the USSR's foremost aircraft designer. The concepts for all major Soviet transport aircraft have come from Tupolev drawing boards. In the mid-1930's, at the height of Stalin's bureaucratic terror and

purges, he was arrested and sentenced to five years' enforced labor on trumped-up charges of sabotage, of selling aviation secrets to the Germans. Tupolev's Sharaga, then, is the story of this period of "intellectual enslavement" -- an unvarnished, true story.

The author contends that the sharaga system evolved because of the stultified inertia of the post-revolutionary bureaucracy -- its upper echelons manned by uneducated commissars whose directives had to seep through an uncritical descending hierarchy if "democratic socialism" was to succeed. Even defense-related bureaus bogged down in the sluggish apparatus; only the stamp of the feared NKVD brought results. And the list of those incarcerated in the system of intellectual slave labor reads like the Who's Who of Soviet Science.* The author's immediate sharaga included six full members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Even though many of the leading scientists were released soon after World War II, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's The First Circle, concerning the 1950's, attests to the fact that the sharaga system did not die with the removal of Beria as chief of the NKVD.

A former senior employee in Stalin's aviation industry commissariat and himself an outstanding aircraft designer, the author spent four years in the NKVD secret sharaga which he describes. Along with hundreds of other members of the Soviet aircraft technology elite -- all political prisoners -- he worked, under constant NKVD guard and harassment and under the mounting pressures of approaching war, to create a Soviet dive bomber with performance characteristics superior to the then existing Nazi prototypes. His story is a detailed and documented history of the establishment, personnel, material and psychological milieu, daily routine, problems, frustrations, sufferings, and achievements of his sharaga.

The work of this sharaga was directed by fellow-prisoner Andrey Nikolayevich Tupolev who had had a distinguished career from 1918 to 1935 as second in command of the USSR's foremost experimental design organization, where he had shown himself to be the most original and prolific of Soviet aircraft designers. Tupolev -- clearly the idol of the author -- emerges as the central personality and hero-protagonist of the sharaga. It is his personality, genius, leadership, and character that give the story unity.

A major theme of Tupolev's Sharaga is the blundering meddling of Beria and Stalin in the operation of the design bureau. The "vozhd" and his NKVD minion repeatedly obstructed, delayed, and threatened to defeat the vision, skills, and self-sacrifice of Tupolev and his assistants. What then compelled the sharaga personnel to self-sacrificing and dedicated work in the service of

*Among them, Sergey Korolev -- father of the Soviet missile program; nuclear physicists Lev Landau and Gleb Frank; well-known communications specialist and cyberneticist, Aksel Berg; Anatoliy Blagonravov, designer of space rockets and Soviet artillery systems; etc. etc.

a leadership which had arrested, tortured, and imprisoned them? The prisoners were confronted by a complicated web of motivations: fear for the fate of their families, love of country, sheer professional passion to create, realization that non-cooperation would send them to the NKVD death camps, and perhaps a lack of comprehension of the Stalinism phenomenon. The major lever applied by Stalin, however, was the promise of freedom. Tupolev and his staff were haunted by the prospect of release from the sharaga if their bomber were a success. The bait of freedom was the ultimate incentive that drove Tupolev and his sharaga staff to unremitting labor in the service of the man who had condemned them as "enemies of the people."

THE WASHINGTON POST
5 December 1971

LET HISTORY JUDGE

A Russians Chronicle Of The Stalin Years

By Roy A. Medvedev

The author is the first Russian to write a massively documented history of Stalinism. Refused Soviet publication, the manuscript was smuggled to the West. Medvedev, his papers seized by the secret police, is now in hiding with friends (a Medvedev biography is on Page D5). The following excerpts are the first to appear in America. Brief transitional sections, in italics, have been added by The Washington Post.

ON DEC. 1, 1934, a shot in the back killed Sergei M. Kirov, a member of the Politburo, secretary of the Central Committee, and first secretary of the Leningrad committee. The murder aroused profound grief and anger among the Soviet people. Everyone demanded that the culprits be caught and severely punished. The report of the assassination said that the shot was fired by a young party member, Leonid Nikolaev, who had been caught while trying to escape.

Kirov's assassination was obviously not the work of Nikolaev alone. Peter Chagin, a prominent party official and close comrade of Kirov, has told the author that several attempts were made on Kirov's life in 1934. It was a real manhunt, directed by a strong hand. For example, there was an attempt during Kirov's trip to Kazakhstan in the summer of 1934.

Nikolaev at first acted on his own initiative. Psychologically unbalanced, he planned the murder of Kirov as an important political act. Kirov liked to walk around Leningrad, and Nikolaev carefully studied the route of these walks. Of course Kirov was carefully guarded; his guards, headed by the NKVD official Borisov, walked before and after him in civilian clothes.

Once the guards' suspicions were aroused by a passer-by who tried to get too close. He was detained. This was Nikolaev. His briefcase had a slit in the back, through which a revolver could be taken without opening the briefcase. And a revolver was there, loaded, along with a map of Kirov's route. Nikolaev was at once sent to Leningrad NKVD headquarters, where he was questioned by the deputy director, I. Zaporozhets. After questioning Nikolaev, Zaporozhets phoned Moscow and reported everything to Yagoda, then commissar of internal affairs and one of the people Stalin most trusted. A few hours later, Yagoda instructed Zaporozhets to let Nikolaev go. With whom had Yagoda consulted in the meantime?

When Nikolaev was released, he acted in a very clumsy way, and a few days later, on a bridge, he was again arrested by Kirov's guard. For a second time the same loaded revolver was taken from him. The strange liberality of the Leningrad NKVD officials, who again let Nikolaev go, aroused serious suspicions among Kirov's guards. Some tried to protest, but they were told at the NKVD that it wasn't their business. Individual guards had their party cards temporarily taken away and were threatened with expulsion. All this was so suspicious that Borisov decided to tell Kirov that someone was after him and that the armed terrorist Nikolaev, who had been arrested twice by the bodyguards, had once more been released. We do not know what steps Kirov took after the conversation with Borisov. In any case, the conspirators quickly learned of Kirov's conversation with Borisov, and that soon decided Borisov's fate.

In spite of all this, it was Nikolaev who killed Kirov at his party headquarters on Dec. 1. On the same day, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Yezhov, Yagoda and Zhdanov came to Leningrad from Moscow. When F. D. Medved, the head of the Leningrad NKVD, went to welcome Stalin at the Moscow Station in Leningrad, Stalin, without removing his gloves, struck Medved in the face. Right after his arrival, Stalin took complete charge of the investigation, and Nikolaev was brought to him for questioning.

Behind a table in a large room sat Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Kosarev, and several others. In back of them stood a group of Leningrad party officials and, separately, a group of Chekists (secret police). Nikolaev was brought in, held under the arms on both sides. Stalin asked him why he shot Kirov. Falling on

his knees and pointing at the group of Chekists standing behind Stalin, Nikolaev shouted: "Stalin, they forced me to do it!" Then some Chekists ran to Nikolaev and began to beat him with their pistol butts. Covered with blood and unconscious, he was carried out of the room. Some of those present believed that Nikolaev was killed at the interrogation; they thought that another person was substituted for Nikolaev in the trial at the end of December. But Nikolaev was not killed at the interrogation. He was taken to the prison hospital and revived with difficulty, by alternating hot and cold baths.

Borisov was to be interrogated after Nikolaev. Although the arrested men came to the interrogation in automobiles, Borisov was brought in a closed truck with several Chekists carrying crowbars. One sat beside the driver. On Voinov Street, as the truck was passing the blind wall of a warehouse, the Chekist suddenly jerked the wheel. The driver nevertheless avoided hitting the wall head-on; the truck struck it a glancing blow and then managed to reach the place of the interrogation. But Borisov was dead, killed by the crowbars. The autopsy report drew the false conclusion that he had died in the truck accident. Some of the doctors who signed this report were alive after the 20th Party Congress in 1956, and they said that the autopsy report was of course forced, and that Borisov had died from the blows of heavy metal objects on his head.

On the evening of Kirov's assassination, Stalin ordered the issuance of a decree "that would serve as the basis for a great deal of repression," Medvedev writes. The decree ordered faster investigations into the cases of accused terrorists and declared that those sentenced to death should be executed immediately, without appeals for clemency.

ON THE BASIS of this decree, dozens of cases of counterrevolutionary crimes, which were in no way connected with Kirov's murder but happened to be at various stages of investigation on Dec. 1, were quickly transferred to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court and just as quickly decided there. On Dec. 5, in closed session, the Military Collegium sentenced almost all the accused to be shot. They were shot at once. This was reported the following day, which was the day of Kirov's funeral. In Leningrad 39 people were shot this way; in Moscow 29. During the next few days 12 people were reported arrested in Minsk, nine of whom were shot, and 37 in Kiev, 28 of whom were shot.

The investigation of Kirov's assassination was also carried out with unusual haste. On Dec. 22 a report said that Nikolaev belonged to an underground terrorist organization set up by members of the former Zinovievite opposition, who killed Kirov on the order of the "Leningrad Opposition Center" in revenge for Kirov's struggle against the opposition. On Dec. 27, the indictment of the "Leningrad Center" was published, signed by the procurator of the U.S.S.R., A. I. Vishinsky, and by the investigator for especially important cases, L. Sheinin. The indictment asserted that Kirov's murder was part of a long-range plan for the murder of Stalin and other party leaders.

This indictment, riddled with contradictions, was the only document published in the case. Neither the text of the verdict, nor the depositions of the accused, nor their final speeches were ever published. There were no speeches for the prosecution or for the defense, because the case was tried without prosecuting and defense attorneys and also without the right to appeal or the right to petition for clemency. According to the military jurist A. B. ———, who attended the trial, Nikolaev behaved quite differently than during his interrogation by Stalin. He confessed to premeditated murder of Kirov on instructions from the "Leningrad Center," and named the members of the "Center." But most of the other defendants did not confess, and many claimed they had never seen Nikolaev before. All received the death sentence and were shot immediately. The papers reported the execution on Dec. 30.

There is also important testimony of Katsafa, a former NKVD agent, who was one of the constant guards in Nikolaev's cell (it was feared that he might commit suicide). Nikolaev told Katsafa how the assassination had been arranged, and how he had been promised his life if he implicated the Leningrad Zinovievites. He asked Katsafa whether he would be deceived. When his sentence was read out, he began to shout and struggled with the guards.

The portrait of Kirov should not be gilded. He had many characteristics of Stalin's entourage, and many reprehensible events of the late 1920s could not have occurred without his participation. Still, as an individual, Kirov was in many ways different from Stalin. His simplicity and accessibility, his closeness to the masses, his tremendous energy, his oratorical talent, and excellent theoretical training—all this made Kirov a party favorite. His influence was steadily growing, and in 1934 his authority in the party was without doubt second only to Stalin's. When the question arose that year, in connection with Stalin's illness, of his possible successor as general secretary, the Politburo expressed its support of Kirov.

Nasty, suspicious, cruel, and power-hungry, Stalin could not abide brilliant and independent people around him. Kirov's growing popularity and influence could not fail to arouse Stalin's envy and suspicion. Kirov's great authority among Communists and his reluctance to go along with Stalin unquestioningly served to impede the realization of Stalin's ambitious plans. It can therefore be said with assurance that Stalin had no regrets at Kirov's death. Moreover, it gave him a desired pretext for reprisals against everyone obstructing his road to power. Kirov's assassination was an important

link in the chain of events leading to Stalin's usurpation of all power in the country. That is why Stalin's guilt in the assassination, which would have seemed improbable in 1934-35, nowadays appears plausible and, logically and politically, almost proved.

Medvedev's history details the political purges which followed Kirov's assassination and culminated in the great show trials of 1937-38. Each page lists dozens of prominent persons who were arrested and shot.

The Scale of the Terror

ABOUT 700 VICTIMS have been named here, chiefly the best-known officials, military commanders, writers, artists, and scholars. But repression was not limited to the higher strata. It struck a vast number of officials at the middle and lower levels; it touched all strata of the population.

Numerically, the chief victims were hundreds of thousands of rank-and-file party members. The result was a marked depletion of the party. At the time of the 17th Congress in 1934 there were 2,809,000 members and candidate members. More than 900,000 of them were candidate members, almost all of whom would normally have become full members before the 18th Congress in 1939. We would expect by 1939 no fewer than 3.5 million members and candidate members, including at least 2.6 million full members. But the 18th Congress counted 2,478,000 members, of whom only 1,590,000 were full members. This huge deficit can be explained only by the mass repression.

In short, the NKVD arrested and killed, within two years, more Communists than had been lost in all the years of the underground struggle, the three revolutions, and the Civil War.

A still greater number of victims was claimed among nonparty people—ordinary workers, peasants, and office personnel. For example, at the Electric Factory in Moscow, according to L. M. Portnov, more than a thousand people were victims of repression, including not only the executives but also many rank-and-file office workers and shock-brigade workers. There was the same senseless destruction of people in thousands of other enterprises. In the process the NKVD arrested above all those workers, engineers, and white-collar personnel who had gone to American and German factories for practical training.

The farms also suffered great losses. A Byelorussian party official, I. I. Drobinskii, tells in his unpublished memoirs about an old man from a collective farm who sat in the corner of his cell:

> He had grown terribly thin. At every meal he put aside a piece for his son, who was a witness for the prosecution. A healthy young peasant who could not bear the beating and abuse or for some other reason, he had testified that his father had talked him into killing the chairman of [illegible] conscience would not let him lie. No beatings or tortures could shake him. He went to the confrontation with his son with the firm intention to stick to the truth. But when he saw his tortured son, with marks of beatings on him, something snapped in the old man's spirit, and turning to the interrogator and his son, he said: "It's true; I confirm it. Don't worry, Iliushka, I confirm everything you said." And right then he signed the record of the confrontation.
>
> Preparing to meet his son in court, the old man put aside a part of his food every day, and when he was taken out, he broke away from his guard for a second and handed it to Iliushka. Then Iliushka could not stand it: he fell on his kness in front of the old man and tearing his shirt, howling and groaning, he shouted: "Forgive me, Pa, forgive me, I lied about you, forgive me!" The old man babbled something, caressed him on the head, on the back. . . . The guard was embarrassed, upset. Even the judges of the tribunal were shaken when they saw the sight. They refused to try the old man and his son. But the case was not closed. The old man remained in prison. Specialists in our cell thought that the case had gone to the Special Assembly. The old man was almost always silent, and continued to put aside part of his starvation rations for his "meeting with Illushka."

Such tragedies occurred by tens and hundreds of thousands.

The great number of prisons built under the tsars proved to be too small for the millions of people arrested, even though several prisoners were put into cells built for one while up to 100 were packed into cells built for 20. Dozens of new prisons were hastily built, and former monasteries, churches, hotels, and even bathhouses and stables were converted into prisons. New concentration camps were put up all over the country, especially in the Far East, the Northern Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan and Karelia.

Between 1936 and 1938 Stalin broke all records for political terror. The proscriptions of Cornelius Sulla killed several thousand Romans. Tens of thousands perished in the reigns of tyrannical emperors like Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero. The cruelest of all the inquisitors, Tomas de Torquemada, is said to have burned 10,220 living people and 6,860 pictures of absent or dead heretics, and sentenced 97,321 people to such punishment as life imprisonment, confiscation of property, and wearing the garment of shame. The great terror of Ivan the Terrible killed some tens of thousands; at its height 10 to 20 people were killed daily in Moscow. In the Jacobin terror, according to the calculations of an American historian, 17,000 people were sent to the guillotine by revolutionary tribunals. Approximately the same number were condemned without a trial or died in prison. Exactly how many "suspects" [illegible] the best estimate is 70,000.

The scale of the Stalinist error was immeasurably greater. Even according to cautious estimates, 4 to 5 million people were subjected to repression for political reasons. At least 400,000 to 500,000 of them—above all the high officials—were summarily shot; the rest were given long terms of confinement. In 1937-38 there were days when up to a thousand people were shot in Moscow alone. These were not streams, these were rivers of blood, the blood of honest Soviet people. The simple truth must be stated: not one of the tyrants and despots of the past persecuted and destroyed so many of his compatriots.

Techniques of Torture

SOME SURVIVORS' STORIES make the blood run cold. When sadistic investigators in Butyrskaia Prison did not obtain the testimony they needed from one Communist, they tortured him in front of his wife and then tortured her in front of him. A. V. Snegov tells about torture chambers of the Leningrad NKVD where prisoners would be put on a concrete floor and covered by a box with nails driven in from four sides. On top was a grating through which a doctor looked at the victim once every 24 hours. In 1938, both Snegov, a small man, and P. I. Dybenko, who is big, were put into such a box—one cubic meter in size. (This method was borrowed from the Finnish secret police.) One NKVD colonel, on getting a prisoner for interrogation, would urinate in a glass and force the prisoner to drink the urine. If he refused, he was liable to be killed without being interrogated.

Suren Gazarian tells what was done to Soso Buachidze, commander of a Georgian division and son of a hero of the Revolution. When he would not give the required testimony, his stomach was ripped open, and he was thrown, dying, into a cell. In the same cell was David Bagration, one of Buachidze's friends, who had just been arrested. Gazarian, who had been an executive in the Transcaucasian NKVD until June, 1937, was also subjected to inhuman torture. This is how he describes it in his still unpublished book:

> Aivazov, the investigator, took some papers off the table and locked them in a drawer. Only my "record" remained on the table.
>
> "Well, I'm going. The brigade knows its job," and, turning to me, he added, "I will leave the record of the interrogation on the table. As soon as you want to sign it, say so."
>
> He left.
>
> The "brigade" came. There were five men. First Iakov Kopetskii came in. He was an old NKVD official; we knew each other well.
>
> I remained seated. They surrounded me. Kopetskii took me from behind by my collar, lifted and shoved me with a powerful motion to the middle of the room. Somebody knocked me down with a powerful kick. I fell. A third pulled off my pants. [illegible] began.
>
> The five men beat viciously. They beat [illegible] braided towels; they beat with anything anywhere: on the head, the face, the back, the stomach. Someone noticed that I have sick legs and then they began to beat on my legs.
>
> "We'll fix your legs for you!"
>
> And they beat, they beat. The more they beat, the more brutal they became. What annoyed them most was that I did not scream.
>
> "Will you scream? Will you holler? Will you beg for mercy?" Kopetskii cursed, and beat, beat.
>
> How long they beat me I don't know.
>
> "Well, boys, take a break," Kopetskii commanded.
>
> My fresh shirt had turned to bloody shreds. I lay wet on the floor in a pool of blood. My eyes were swollen. With difficulty I raised my eyelids and as if in a fog saw my torturers. They were smoking, taking a rest.
>
> Someone came up to me and just then something very painful burned my body. I was convulsed with pain, and to keep from screaming, I clenched my teeth. And they laughed. Then it burned again, again, again. I understood. They were putting out their cigarettes on my body.
>
> The break came to an end and the beating continued with new force.
>
> A strange sensation. The blows became more vicious, but the pain decreased. When I came to, I smelled medicine, saw something white far away.
>
> So. Seems I had passed out and they had brought me to.
>
> "I'm going, everything O.K.," said a nurse.
>
> "Everything O.K.!" That meant they could start all over again. But the "brigade" was smoking. With horror I thought: they're going to put out their cigarettes on my body again. A cigarette burn is very painful. My whole body was aflame from the first burns. Would there be still more? Yes. One finished his cigarette, came up to me, gave the required insult, put out his cigarette, cursed, spat, and went away, to give the next one his turn.
>
> Everything proceeded in a determined sequence. Beating, break, putting out cigarettes, again beating, fainting, coming to, again beating, putting out cigarettes.
>
> It was already growing light but the brigade was still toiling away.
>
> Aivazov appeared. "It'll be the same every day until you sign. Do you understand?"
>
> Just like Bagration the day before, I was dragged back to the cell by two guards.

Assessing Stalin

THE EVALUATION of Stalin's activity has attracted many bourgeois as well as Soviet historians. Bourgeois historians typically see Stalin as the greatest leader of the world Com-

changed not only the face of Russia but of the whole world. While acknowledging and to some degree condemning Stalin's crimes, the typical bourgeois historian tries to prove that socialism could not have been built in the U.S.S.R. without such crimes, without a barbarous totalitarian state. Stalin's activity is seen as the logical continuation of Lenin's, of the program and methods of socialism in general.

Marxist historiography should reject such reasoning. It was not Stalin who inspired the people with the ideas of socialism or taught them to read and write. The door to education and culture was opened by the October Revolution. The great transformation would have been effected much more quickly if Stalin had not destroyed hundreds of thousands of the intelligentsia, both old and new. Prisoners in Stalin's concentration camps accomplished a great deal, building almost all the canals and hydroelectric stations, many railways, industrial plants, oil pipelines, even tall buildings in Moscow, but industry would have developed faster if these millions of innocent people had worked as free men. Likewise, the use of force against the peasantry slowed down the growth rate of agriculture, with painful effects on the whole Soviet economy to the present day. It is an incontrovertible, arithmetically demonstrable fact that Stalin did not choose the shortest path; he did not speed up, he slowed down the movement toward socialism and communism.

Stalin was a leader in hard times. He did enjoy the confidence of a majority of the party and the people. That confidence, that faith of the common people in Stalin, to some degree helped them endure the hardships of economic construction and the war with fascism. But [illegible] and the government have been stronger had there been no mass repression? Would not the people have shown the Central Committee more confidence if the best people in the party, government, economic, and military *apparat* had not been destroyed in the mid-'30s? Would not economic and cultural progress have been much greater if Stalin had not destroyed thousands upon thousands of scientists, engineers, teachers, doctors, writers? Would not the war have ended much faster and with fewer losses if our finest officers had not perished before the war and if Stalin had conducted a more sensible foreign and military policy? Would not agriculture have achieved greater progress if Stalin had not grossly and constantly violated Lenin's plan for agricultural cooperatives? And the bureaucracy and rule by fiat, the multitude of mistakes in nationality policy, the inhumanity and wilfullness of Stalinist administration—could all this in any measure strengthen the solidarity of the Soviet people, the friendship among the peoples of the Soviet Union?

What then do we have to thank Stalin for? For the fact that his 30-year rule did not completely ruin the party, the army, Soviet democracy, agriculture, and industry? For the fact that he did not completely pervert Leninism and the proletarian character of the October Revolution, that he did not destroy all honorable Soviet people, did not bring the country to catastrophe?

Stalin was for 30 years the helmsman of the ship of state, clutching its steering wheel with a grip of death. Dozens of times he steered it onto reefs and shoals and far off course. Shall we be grateful to him because he did not manage to sink it altogether?

WASHINGTON POST
5 December 1971

REPRESSION RUNS IN THE FAMILY

By Anthony Astrachan
Washington Post Staff Writer

ROY MEDVEDEV is a rarity among Soviet intellectuals—a convinced Marxist who believes that the Soviet system can be truly socialist and still tolerate dissent. "Let History Judge" gives ample evidence of his loyalty to the Soviet system in his assumption that there is a "correct line" in politics and his rejection of "bourgeois" analyses of the crimes of Stalin.

His unusual view of the world is part of the pattern of his [illegible]

born in 1925 in Tbilisi, the capital of Soviet Georgia and the place where Stalin was educated. Roy means "dig" in Russian. His twin brother was originally named Reis, "a route." The names were meant to fit the boys for the revolutionary era in which they were to live. Reis changed his name to Zhores because he liked the sound better—leading friends to think it was an equally revolutionary nomenclature, after the French Socialist Jean Jaures and the Indian Communist M.N. Roy.

The boys' mother was a [illegible] from a professional family in Tbilisi. Their father, Aleksandr Romanovich Medvedev, came from a family of craftsmen and tradesmen in Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea. He had served in the Red Army during the civil war and was a Marxist philosopher. The boys grew up in Leningrad, where their father taught at Leningrad University and the Tolmachev Military-Political Academy. He died in prison in the Stalin terror of the 1930s, which may explain the brothers' continuing concern for Stalinist and other tyrannies in Soviet life.

Roy Medvedev received the equivalent of a bachelor's degree in philosophy at Leningrad University and a graduate degree in education. Hence his modest disclaimer in the introduction to "Let History Judge"—"I am not an historian by profession and have never worked in research institutions that study historical or political problems." He did teach history, however, before becoming principal of a secondary school and a research associate in the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. He resigned from the academy this year before the authorities could move to dismiss him.

Medvedev joined the Communist Party after the 20th Party Congress in 1956, at which Khrushchev first exposed Stalin's crimes. He began to write "Let History Judge" after the 22d Party Congress issued a new call for de-Stalinization in 1961. An early version failed to receive Central Committee approval in 1965.

He finished this version in 1968, the year that Kommunist, the party's theoretical journal, published an article defending Stalin. Medvedev wrote a letter in protest. Kommunist never published it, but the emigre journal Posev did—without his permission. Futher exchanges with Posev suggested that the KGB (secret police) might have transmitted the letter, and Medvedev ultimately decided to authorize publication of "Let History Judge" by a Western publisher of unquestionable good faith. Medvedev was expelled from the party after Posev published the letter intended for Kommunist.

Roy and Zhores—who became a prominent biologist—wrote a book together about Zhores' forcible confinement in a psychiatric clinic and Roy's successful battle to get him out. The confinement was the authorities' way of dealing with Zhores' writings on Soviet obstacles to international scientific cooperation. The book was published in the United States as "A Question of Madness."

In October, the KGB invited Roy Medvedev in for questioning. He declined the invitation, and they searched his apartment and confiscated most of his private papers, including the typescript of "Let History Judge." He is now reported in hiding with friends.

LET HISTORY JUDGE

(Reprint of book jacket)

Vast in scope, scholarly, and crowded with human detail, Roy Medvedev's *Let History Judge* is the first authentic full-scale history and sociological analysis of Stalinism to come out of the Soviet Union.

It is a work that reinstates lost realities of the Stalin years obscured by official apologists and unknown to foreign observers. Its documentation is formidable: unpublished memoirs (many of them written since the death of Stalin); extensive private interviews with men and women who were deeply involved in the events recounted; reminiscences, periodicals, pamphlets, and other published materials unavailable in the West.

Stalin's gradual rise to absolute rule is fully chronicled—from his earliest emergence during Lenin's lifetime—and interpreted, making clear why and how he was able to outmaneuver and annihilate the forces of opposition. The mass terror of the thirties—beginning with the murder of Kirov in 1934 and continuing with the purges, trials, self-denunciations, disappearances, imprisonments, and executions—is seen for the first time in the overwhelming human context of its meaning to Russian lives. The historical narrative is augmented and deepened throughout with intimate recollections of men and women in almost every area of Soviet society.

Even more important, in brilliantly reasoned passages, illustrated with concrete examples of Stalin's behavior, Medvedev comes to grips with the man himself, his mind and his motives. And in the same way he analyzes and makes understood the motives and actions of Stalin's closest aides, whose conniving brought about first the destruction of their colleagues and friends and then of themselves. He tells how the Stalin "personality cult" was propagated and how it changed the fabric of Soviet society, affecting not only the arts and the sciences but also the texture of ordinary life.

Medvedev believes that the Soviet system, which began to be perverted by Stalin while Lenin was still alive, has not yet been thoroughly cleansed of Stalinism. His book, with its exceptional illuminations for the Western reader, was written to reveal to the Soviet people a past that the Stalinists have tried to suppress. The massive research and interviewing, the scholarly detective work, the careful organization, weighing of evidence, and pointed analysis that produced *Let History Judge* would do honor to a group of scholars working openly under optimum conditions. As the work of one man, it is an astonishing achievement—a work of history that is, itself, an important historical event.

A Note About the Editors

DAVID JORAVSKY is professor of history at Northwestern University. Born in Chicago in 1925, he received his B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania and his Ph.D. from Columbia University. He has also taught at the University of Connecticut and at Brown University. Mr. Joravsky is the author of *Soviet Marxism and Natural Science, 1917–32* (1961) and *The Lysenko Affair* (1970). He has contributed articles and reviews to *The New York Review of Books, The Nation, Scientific American, Science, Slavic Review,* and the *American Historical Review.* Mr. Joravsky lives in Evanston, Illinois, with his wife and two children.

GEORGES HAUPT is professor of history at the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris. He was born in Satu Mare, Romania, in 1928 and was awarded graduate degrees in history from the University of Leningrad and the University of Paris. From 1963 to 1970 he was visiting professor at the University of Wisconsin. He is married and resides in Paris.

LET HISTORY JUDGE
Roy Medvedev, Knopf, 1971

Author's Foreward (Excerpts only)

THIS BOOK was conceived after the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956 and written after its XXIInd Congress in 1961. After the XXth Congress there were many who asked what was the point of stirring up the past, exposing Soviet infirmities to the world and causing our enemies to rejoice. Wasn't it better to keep Stalin's image as it had been presented to the Soviet people in the past? Wasn't it better to concentrate on current problems of Communist construction, leaving the analysis of Stalin's crimes to future historians? In other words, wouldn't it be better to forget about the "multitude of base truths" and preserve the "illusion that uplifts us"?

Even today we hear such questions. However, we now know that Stalin's crimes were so great that it would be a crime to remain silent about them. "The pharisees of the bourgeoisie," Lenin wrote, "like the saying: 'Either be silent about the dead or speak well of them.' But the proletariat needs the truth about all those involved in politics, whether alive or dead. For those who are genuine political leaders live on in politics even after their physical death."[1]

Though the crimes and faults of Stalin's era should be criticized and condemned, I have no desire to paint it only in dark colors. It was a time of great accomplishments both at home and abroad. Soviet historians have neglected neither the great dam on the Dnepr nor the metallurgical complex at Magnitogorsk, nor the battles of Stalingrad and Berlin, nor the many other heroic feats of the people. They remain a central theme of Soviet literature and history, and justifiably so. However, we see clearly now that it is impossible to understand our past and our present if we continue to ignore the completely unjustified tragedies that were so abundant in the era of Stalin's cult, if we forget how much Stalin's crimes hampered the development of the Soviet Union and the entire world Communist movement.

The significance of Stalin's cult should not be exaggerated. The history of the Party during those decades cannot be analyzed only in terms of Stalin's crimes and lawlessness. But it would be just as serious an error to ignore or to minimize their grave consequences. We must respect the memory of our fallen fathers and brothers, the hundreds of thousands and millions of people who were the victims of Stalin's lawlessness. For if we are unable to learn all the necessary lessons from this tragedy, then the destruction of an entire generation of revolutionaries and millions of other innocent people will remain nothing more than a senseless catastrophe.

The dangerous effects of Stalin's cult cannot be overcome unless they are discussed openly and honestly. Only by open and honest self-criticism, not by secret instructions through hidden channels, can the Party generate the movement, the feelings, the social indignation capable of destroying all the effects of Stalin's cult and of preventing the revival of new cults and new arbitrary rule.

At its XXth and XXIInd Congresses, the Communist Party resolutely exposed Stalin's crimes and began to restore Leninist norms.

Victims of bloody arbitrary rule were rehabilitated. An extensive critique of the cult of personality began in literature, art, and historical

The political atmosphere of the USSR began to be cleansed of the filth of adventurism and despotism. Soviet people could breathe and work more easily.

Nevertheless, none of us can or should forget our past, and not only because the ashes of our tortured fathers and brothers continue to burn in our hearts. Unfortunately, in some socialist countries Communist parties are reviving the same spirit of sectarianism, dogmatism, and lawlessness that did such harm to the Communist movement in the past. Even within the Soviet Union there is a movement to rehabilitate Stalin. Since the spring of 1965, Stalin's name has appeared increasingly often in Soviet journals and newspapers, not as a criminal, but as a "great general," a "great revolutionary," an "outstanding theorist," a "wise statesman" or even a "prudent manager, who knew how to take care of state funds." His name has been mentioned even from official tribunals, and a considerable part of the audience has applauded. Some Party officials openly and proudly call themselves Stalinists, without risking expulsion from the Party. Stalinism is not yet a mere bogeyman, as one of the orators at the XXIIIrd Party Congress tried to argue.

Stalinism remains a real threat, in open as well as disguised forms. Thus it is especially important to continue the discussion that began at the XXth Congress. We must know the whole truth, and not only to prevent the return of that arbitrary rule which the Party has rejected. If we do not study our past, we will be in no condition to move forward in the necessary direction. . . . . .

Stalin's cult of personality cannot be reduced to political murders and the boundless adulation of a single man. The prolonged period of terror had a great influence on the ideological life of the Party, on the country's literature and art, on the natural and social sciences, on the psychology and ethics of the Soviet people, on the methods of governing the Party and the state, on the union of the workers and the peasants, on the way that tens of millions think and behave. Therefore it is not surprising that throughout the world an intense ideological struggle has been waged concerning the problems that we call for short the "cult of personality," a term that is not very apt. And if we should now recoil from a profound and comprehensive examination of Stalin's era, "lest we delight our enemies," we would only achieve the opposite result. We would in fact be surrendering a huge, important terrain of ideological conflict without a battle, allowing bourgeois propagandists to derive further profit from our mistakes and difficulties. The longer we keep silent or vacillate, the more successfully will bourgeois propagandists use the cult of personality for their own ends. Communists cannot bury their heads in the sand, trying not to notice what was and what still is bad in their political and social life. We must soberly and dispassionately investigate these difficult problems of the Communist movement. We must say openly that Marxism-Leninism will cease to be a scientific study of society if it does not find within itself the strength and the ability not only to describe but also to explain the complex political, economic, and social processes in socialist countries. At a certain stage in the development of these countries, those processes led to the degeneration and the bureaucratization of part of the state and Party apparatus; in some cases, they wrought monstrous perversions. A genuine Marxist-Leninist should be able to analyze the faults as well as the achievements of modern socialist systems, and he should learn how to do this with the same scientific conscientiousness and boldness that Communists have applied to presocialist systems.

revolution and battle, of conscientious labor, of the fight against capitalism and resistance to bourgeois propaganda. But it is no less important to encourage implacable resistance to injustice and arbitrary rule, to lying and bureaucratism. We should encourage initiative, independence, political awareness, and responsibility. Not one of these qualities can be developed if the truth is hushed up. If we dodge the questions asked by the young, we will inevitably alienate them. Of course many of our students will manage to find their own way to the truth even without our help. But hypocrisy, political indifference, and cynicism are spreading among other sections of our young people. Thus we have every reason to declare that the Leninist revolutionary spirit will be fostered in our youth by books that reveal certain ugly pictures of our past truthfully, and from correct Party positions, much more than by books that deliberately conceal our difficulties or errors.

In recent years the Chinese and Albanian press has repeatedly demanded that our Party restore the political "reputation" of Stalin. In 1963 the Peking *People's Daily* wrote that the attitude toward Stalin was the "demarcation line" between true Marxist-Leninists and contemporary revisionists. When it refused to participate in the XXIIIrd Congress of the CPSU, the Chinese Communist Party, in its letter of March 22, 1966, again asserted that our Party, by attacking Stalin, was attacking Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union, China, Communist parties, and Marxist-Leninists of all countries. Admittedly, at the beginning of the cultural revolution the Chinese press changed some of its former pronouncements on this "demarcation line." In an article of July 11, 1966, *People's Daily* declared that "the ideas of Mao Tse-tung are the apogee of Marxism-Leninism of our time"; support of Mao or opposition to him is "the dividing line between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism, between the revolution and the counter-revolution." Even today, however, the Chinese press, while heaping boundless praise on the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, continues to praise the "services" of Stalin also. That is another reason this book was written. Let the facts show who are genuine Marxist-Leninists, those who are openly the defenders and heirs of Stalin's cult or those who wish to eliminate the cult and its aftereffects once and for all.

Some who have been kind enough to review this work have said that it examines Stalin's activity in a partisan spirit, solely from a negative standpoint. We recognize the justice of this opinion. This work is indeed one-sided, and not only because what is negative in Stalin's deeds far outweighs what is positive. This book is not a history of a certain period in the life of our country or Party. It could be called the "history of a disease," to be precise the history of that serious and prolonged disease which has been termed the "cult of personality" after one of its symptoms (by no means the chief one). Naturally we will be concerned only with facts related to the origins and the course of this disease. This does not mean that we wish to depreciate other facts and other phenomena. All the same, one cannot help observing that hundreds and thousands of books have been written about those other facts, about the positive aspects of our history. Many of those books are undoubtedly of value. But historical scholarship cannot examine the past only from the bright side. In this discipline there is also room for works that analyze the darker pages of the past. Unfortunately, as Victor Hugo remarked, history does not have a wastebasket.

It is also natural that the author's attention should be focused on Stalin. But this book is not a biography of Stalin; it was not written

about him alone. Although his rise to power was not inevitable, it did reflect certain tendencies developed in Russian society before the period of terror and then flourished because of Stalin. However great the role of Stalin himself may have been in the tragic events we describe, one cannot help seeing that he relied on certain people and on certain historically determined political and economic conditions.

Socialist revolutions can develop along various paths. It is mistaken to imagine that Stalin knew how to lead his people to socialism by a road that was difficult, even bloody, but nevertheless very short. By his crimes Stalin did not help, he hindered, he did not accelerate, he slowed the people's movement to socialism and communism in the Soviet Union and in the whole world. In some respects Stalin even turned this movement backward.

The world Communist movement still contains a variety of possibilities and tendencies. Many forces are pushing that movement onto a wrong road full of new tragedies, new dangerous gambles, adventures, new cults of personality. The road to disaster can be by-passed only if the dogmatists and sectarians can be confronted with the united will of the Communists of all countries, a will guided by a clear understanding of the enormous damage done to the world Communist movement by the arbitrary rule and the crimes of the cult of personality.

LET HISTORY JUDGE
Roy Medvedev, Knopf, 1971

Editors' Introduction (Excerpts only)
(Edited by David Joravsky and Georges Haupt)

UP TO NOW scholarly analyses of Stalinism have appeared only outside the Soviet Union, nearly all of them written by non-Communists. With this book, a Soviet Marxist is trying to begin the discussion at home. He submitted the work to a Soviet publisher; it was turned down; so he has authorized publication abroad. The author's motives for writing it in the first place are amply explained in his own introduction, written for the intended Soviet audience.

The Soviet audience for which this book was written would take for granted many things that may puzzle or annoy outsiders. Stalinism itself is a term that may cause confusion, for many people in the West have only a vague notion of the difference between Stalinism and the Soviet system or Communism in general. Medvedev draws a sharp distinction. He uses Stalinism to mean personal despotism sustained by mass terror and by worship of the despot ("the cult of the personality"), precisely those features of the Soviet system that Stalin's successors repudiated, sometimes calling them crimes but usually brushing them off as "mistakes." Medvedev agrees with the official view in one sense: he regards despotism and terror and the cult as accidental deformations of a fundamentally sound system, mistakes on the part of the Party and the country as a whole. He vehemently denies that they were mistakes on Stalin's part, for Stalin deliberately engineered them. They must be listed among Stalin's crimes, not among his mistakes.

The reader who detects a scholastic odor in such reasoning, or who is simply annoyed by the author's heavy use of the term "mistakes," should bear in mind that this is not Medvedev's personal idiosyncrasy. It is standard Soviet usage, perplexing to outsiders because it tends to confuse miscalculation and misbehavior—being factually wrong and being morally wrong. Medvedev's desire to overcome that confusion is one of the reasons he labors the distinction between Stalin's mistakes and Stalin's crimes.[8] He is less aware of a more serious difficulty: implicit in the constant talk of mistakes is the dubious assumption that there is always a "correct line" in politics, and an associated confusion between two different methods for establishing it, the say-so of unimpeachable authority and the usual rules of reasoned judgment. Medvedev insists on the sovereignty of reason, but he limits its rule in two important ways. He constantly appeals to Lenin's dicta as unquestionable truth. (There is one important exception: he criticizes Lenin's 1922 recommendation on extra-legal justice.) And he usually fails to consider the perfectly rational, though depressing possibility that human beings in certain situations cannot find the correct line, or, worse yet, that some problems may be insoluble. He is, in short, struggling to clarify the Bolshevik mode of thought, not to abandon it.

The strongest evidence of his difficulty is the book's underlying interpretation, or rather, the bundle of interpretations that keep him in constant tension, struggling to prove them consistent with each other. In this case, his difficulty is a spur to very considerable achievement. His tensely balanced interpretations are as fascinating to the intellect as his vivid extracts from unpublished memoirs are to the imagination. He takes for granted the Marxist rule that the development of state superstructures is determined by the development of socio-economic bases, but he seems to make Stalinism an exception: it was *not* a product of the Soviet social system. He offers brilliant analyses of the conditions, the long-run historical trends, that enabled Stalin to establish despotism, terror, and the cult, but he is anxious to prove that these enabling conditions were not determining causes. He insists that Stalin's criminal plotting was the most important determinant. Stalin created Stalinism. . . .

Aside from Medvedev's urge to find Stalin guilty, he has strong grounds in Marxist political theory for objecting to the fatalistic view that despotism, terror, and the cult were predetermined by unalterable historical forces. Such a view cuts the nerve of political action. A combination of voluntarism and determinism, the will to act on the basis of realistically appraised historical trends, has been a persistent feature of Marxism, and is one of the main reasons for its recurrent vitality despite repeated indications of imminent extinction. Extreme voluntarism can have the same enervating effect on Marxists as extreme determinism. Whether irresistible power is assigned to impersonal historical forces or to the will of great leaders, the political consequence can be the same mass torpor, a passive waiting for fate to have its way. Stalin himself, in his last years, began to perceive this self-defeating aspect of his cult, and Khrushchev campaigned against it vigorously, though with his usual erratic inconsistency. Khrushchev called for a revival of the kind of Marxism that charges everyone with responsibility to take bold action on behalf of history's inevitable goal. Perhaps that is, as critics have remarked, a secular version of Calvinism, but one should make such a remark without a sneer. The scholar who is trying to revive the grand old faith in this book, at great risk to himself, deserves unalloyed respect. Besides, if we take that historical analogy seriously, we should recall the strangely mixed potential of Calvinism for democracy as well as despotism, "for freest action form'd under the laws divine."

Of course, there is a pronounced biographical element in this book, for Medvedev insists that Stalin's criminal character was the main cause of Stalinism. And of course some readers will cavil at the one-sided vehemence of the biography. Olympian detachment comes easily to outsiders. If it is used without Olympian arrogance, it can assist the discussion that Medvedev is trying to start. It is pointless to charge Medvedev with ignoring Stalin's good traits. He argues, with considerable effect, that the traits which have often been praised —the spartan quality of Stalin's private life, the overwhelming will to make "his" country strong, the concern for scholarship and the arts—are further evidence of a fanatical concentration on becoming god.

Useful criticism would focus on the greatest problem that Stalin presents to his biographers: his cagey reticence, which grew the more extreme as he became the man whose every word was law. It is therefore very hard, some would say impossible, to ascertain whether important changes of character accompanied his successive transformations: from Lenin's "wonderful Georgian" in 1913—whose name slipped Lenin's mind in 1915[7]—to the "gray blur" among the revolutionary leaders of 1917, to the chief of the moderates in the mid-twenties, finally, at the age of fifty, to the wild "revolutionary from above" and the bloodthirsty despot of the thirties. Medvedev tries to get around the paucity of psychological evidence, which becomes crippling precisely during the last and most important transformation, by drawing analogies with the personalities of famous despots and scoundrels of the past. Some of the analogies are quite suggestive, but they are heaped up in such diversity that they finally confuse the issue. It is hard to conceive how Stalin's personality could have contained both Nechaev and Azev, Fouché and Napoleon, Sulla and Nero, Ivan the Terrible and Hitler, all rolled into one.

Perhaps the best way out of the tangle is to note the conspicuous omission of Peter the Great, with whom Stalin liked to be compared. Medvedev denies to Stalin the tribute customarily given to Peter, that he "accelerated the Westernization of barbarous Russia by his readiness to use barbarous methods of struggle against barbarism."[8] Medvedev insists that Stalin intensified barbarism, and critics would be well advised to concentrate on that major problem, Stalin's influence, rather than the relatively minor issue of his psychopathology. With respect to psychology, Medvedev's greatest contribution is his analysis of the upper strata of Soviet society: Party members at various levels, managers and specialists, writers and scholars, who alone might have prevented or stopped their country's descent into utter lawlessness. Instead, they submitted or cooperated, though they were the chief victims after the peasants. The most astonishing aspect of the process is their tendency to worship the man in charge of their torment. Medvedev has studied their mental processes from within, as expressed in a multitude of reminiscences, oral as well as written, self-condemnatory as well as self-justifying. He has produced the first reliable study of one of the most disturbing puzzles in social psychology.

The level of analysis in Medvedev's book is especially remarkable when one considers the background from which it emerges: the official school of thought on Soviet history. Within that school, Stalinism is brushed aside as an anti-Soviet fiction, created by bourgeois and revisionist propagandists to obscure the essential continuity of Soviet development from the Leninist beginnings to the Leninist present. The basic formula enjoined on Soviet historians might add a seventh theory to the foregoing list of six, if it were not so completely anti-intellectual. The history of Bolshevism must be viewed as the utterly admirable record of correct policies formulated by wise leaders and carried out by the virtuous people (*narod*). Anything not admirable must be brushed aside as the mistakes of leaders who proved unworthy of their posts, or ascribed to residues (*perezhitki*) of the prerevolutionary past, or to the influence of foreign enemies. The definition of the admirable and the unadmirable changes from time to time to suit the present policies of current leaders, who are always wholly admir-

able. Historians must elaborate and illustrate the received truth of the moment; they must not question it.

Medvedev is by no means the first Soviet scholar to challenge this rigid subordination of the historian to the politician. He repeatedly draws on the work of other critical historians, some that have managed to get into print, others as yet unpublished. But it seems fair to say that the present book is the most ambitious effort to date to start an autonomous academic discussion of the most vital issues in Soviet history. His title expresses his central appeal, and throughout the book the reader will find him continually challenging the official school, sometimes derisively, sometimes sorrowfully, always pleading that genuine patriotism requires study of the homeland's failings as well as its accomplishments. The most important failing, he insists, is the imperfect development of a socialist version of constitutional government.[9] By writing and publishing this book he has offered more than historical arguments in favor of constitutionalism. As a pledge of his faith in the triumph of constitutional principles, he has offered himself.